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USSR Report

MILITARY AFFAIRS

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MILITARY-POLITICAL ISSUES

COL GEN REPIN ON MORAL-POLITICAL TRAINING FOR MODERN COMBAT

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 10, May 85 (signed to press 6 May 85) pp 42-49

Article by Col Gen I. Repin, member of the Military Soviet and Chief of the Political Directorate of the Order of Lenin Moscow Military District: "The Formation of Moral-Political and Combat Qualities in Servicemen"

Text The USSR armed forces, just like all of the Soviet people, are living and working under the wholesome influence of an important celebration--the 40th anniversary of our Great Victory. Servicemen are persistently mastering powerful military equipment and weapons, improving their ground, air, and sea training, increasing their ideological and political hardening, solving military training problems in an exemplary fashion, and strengthening their state of organization and discipline. The decisions of the April (1985) plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, which projected a broad preparation program for the next 27th Congress of the Leninist party, are inspiring them toward new successes in increasing vigilance and combat preparedness.

The Soviet people are carrying out their creative activities under conditions where reactionary imperialist circles, primarily the United States, ignoring the lessons of history, have announced a "crusade" against socialism, are trying to achieve military superiority over the USSR and its allies, and are heightening the threat of nuclear war. This is why the CPSU and the Soviet state are especially concerned about maintaining the fighting efficiency of the army and navy at a level which guarantees the immediate repulse of any aggressor. "We," CPSU Central Committee General Secretary comrade M. S. Gorbachev stressed at the plenum, "will not spare any effort in the future so that the armed forces of the USSR will have everything necessary for the reliable defense of our fatherland and its allies and so that no one will be able to catch us napping."

One of the main trends in solving the domestic multi-planned problem of further strengthening the defense capacity of the country and increasing the military might of the army troops and naval forces is the formation of high moral-political and military qualities and the improvement of military skills among servicemen.

This article is recommended for use in officer Marxist-Leninist training groups when studying the topic "The Formation of High Moral-Political and Combat Qualities, the Improvement in Military Skills in Carrying Out Ground, Air, and Sea Training Tasks."

The communist party is dialectically approaching an analysis of the factors ensuring a reliable defensive capacity for the country. One of these factors is increasing the combat potential of the army and navy which represents a firm fusion of high technical equipment, military skills, and an indestructible moral spirit.

The sources for forming combat potential are varied. They are both material and spiritual in nature. They include Soviet public and state order, a highly developed planned socialist economy, a Marxist-Leninist ideology, the achievements of science and technology, and some others.

One can isolate three main components within the structure of combat potential. The first of these reflects the material and technical side of military matters. This is the quantity and quality of weapons and equipment which determine the fire, strike, and maneuverability resources of the armed forces. The two other components describe personnel--its skill in using weapons and equipment on the battlefield, the political awareness and morality of the servicemen and their psychological stability.

A deep dialectical relationship exists among the combat potential components. Thus, the enormous possibilities of modern combat equipment are well-known. But however perfect it might be, its terrible shattering force can only be set into motion by extremely well-trained specialists. However, even masters of military matters find themselves not in a condition to bring all of their knowledge and skill to bear if their moral spirit is low. Only skilled servicemen possessing high moral-political qualities use combat equipment and weapons safely and effectively. It is especially important to keep this interdependence in mind under today's conditions. For tactical confrontation and combat equipment and weapons are not the only characteristics of modern battle. There is, first of all, a duel of class convictions, political views, will and character, courage, and military skill.

There are also many other interrelationships which significantly influence the development of the combat potential components. For example, the use of new means of armed struggle will face servicemen with difficulties unknown to them earlier. What is more, the lack of experience by the side subjected to a strike of countermeasures to the weapon used and an effective defense against it strongly influences the state of mind of people. M. V. Frunze had already noted such a phenomenon. "The dimensions of these psychological losses," Mikhail Vasilyevich wrote, "are beyond all calculation and, in certain cases, they can many times exceed the material damage which is caused by these weapons of destruction."

The military leader came to this conclusion more than 60 years ago. During the decades which have passed since that time, huge changes have taken place in the means and methods for conducting armed conflict. Actions in cases of an enemy using weapons of mass destruction require of servicemen an ability to bear up under unprecedented tension, an unbending spirit, selflessness, and heroism. The inculcation of these qualities is exactly one of the tasks of moral-political and psychological training which includes a system of measures aimed at producing in servicemen the readiness and ability to successfully execute combat tasks, to endure the most severe trials of modern war,

while not losing the will for victory. Its substance consists of forming among personnel a Marxist-Leninist world outlook, high communist ideals, deep convictions and firm moral principles of behavior, and in arming servicemen with an understanding of the policy of the CPSU and Soviet state, the state interests of the USSR, personal responsibility for the defense of the motherland, and the achievements of socialism.

Based on this knowledge, beliefs and principles, a correct representation of Soviet military duty which answers the highest public interests takes shape within personnel. This means a consciousness of and feeling for the necessity to defend the motherland and give a shattering repulse to any aggressor.

The sacred duty of defender of the socialist fatherland is a powerful motive for the activities of Soviet fighting men. It embodies political and legal force and the moral values of society. A reminder of it, as the Great Patriotic War demonstrated, has always inspired fighting men, given strength to them, and induced them to act selflessly and heroically. The slogan "Forward for the Motherland" was the thing that was most inspiring and mobilizing for the servicemen in their heroic exploits during the last war.

The USSR Constitution reveals the essence and nature of Soviet military duty in its fullness. Thus, article 62 imposes on citizens the responsibility to protect the interests of the Soviet state and to help in strengthening its might and authority. "The defense of the socialist fatherland," this article states, "is the sacred duty of each USSR citizen."

Discipline, courage, steadfastness, boldness, heroism and bravery, initiative, decisiveness, independence, vigilance, and several others are attributed to moral-political and combat qualities. Each of them has great practical importance. Several of these qualities also acquire special urgency today. An example of this is the discipline of servicemen. Its significance is difficult to overestimate. It is not accidental that next to the notion "military discipline" stands the notion "military skill." They are inseparable. In conditions where the volume of military knowledge and the complexity of the skills in using weapons and equipment have grown immeasurably, it is impossible even to imagine that an unorganized and undisciplined serviceman would skillfully master his combat specialty, let alone operate well in battle.

Clear world-outlook aims lie at the basis of high moral-political and combat qualities of Soviet servicemen. Sacred love for one's fatherland and burning hatred of its enemies--this is the rich soil in which valor and unprecedented heroism grow. So it was during the Great Patriotic War. Today's Soviet armed forces are also rich in clear examples confirming this indisputable principle.

The spiritual side of military work is directly connected with increasing the combat training of the troops and naval forces and actively influences it. Military skill is a broad and at the same time specific concept. Its substance and criteria depend directly on developing the means and methods of armed struggle and on the growth in the standard demands on the person who maintains combat equipment and uses it in battle.

Equipping the army and navy with the latest models of equipment and arms requires an uninterrupted increase in knowledge and an improvement in skills of personnel. The growth in the number of kinds of means of armed struggle leads to a corresponding increase in the number of military specialties. However swiftly this process has developed, the training of servicemen must always correspond to the level of technical equipment of the armed forces. This consists of a deep sense of improving military skills--a component of the combat potential of the army and navy.

In determining the basic directions for increasing military skills, the USSR Minister of Defense Marshal of the Soviet Union S. L. Sokolov notes that it is necessary to strive for the quick introduction into service and mastery of weapons and combat equipment, their maintenance in meticulous condition, and constant readiness for action. "The main thing here," he points out, "is to teach personnel to take from their weapons and combat equipment the maximum that has been put into them. All personnel should be made aware of the indisputable truth that a further increase in combat readiness of the subunit (podrazdeleniye), unit (chast), and ship directly depends on the skillful possession by all servicemen of the weapons and combat equipment entrusted to them."

Fulfilling this requirement is connected in many respects with developing high moral-political and combat qualities among personnel. Therefore, in the units, on the ships, and in all collectives, work is being strengthened to form among servicemen a Marxist-Leninist world view, communist integrity and conviction, and awareness. Its importance cannot be overestimated. Thanks precisely to this work, a firm foundation for moral-political and combat qualities is created. A scientific communist world outlook inspires personnel, forms a clear life position and high purposeful activity in them.

Today the problem of the constant reasoned explanation of the world situation and the real military danger emanating from the United States and its NATO allies stands in the forefront on a level with a thorough study by servicemen of Marxist-Leninist theory and Leninist teaching on the defense of the socialist fatherland. Its solution permits personnel to understand the criminal schemes of the imperialists and the aims and nature of a war which an aggressor can unleash. This is extraordinarily important for mobilizing the inner forces of the servicemen, forming in them high moral-political and combat qualities, a striving to study military matters more thoroughly, and a readiness to solve combat problems under any, even the most complicated, situations. Vladimir Ilich Lenin stressed that "the realization by the masses of the aims and causes of war has enormous significance and ensures victory." (Complete Collected Works, volume 41, page 121).

In the district's combined units (soyedineniye), units, and military training institutions a clear work system has taken shape of explaining to servicemen the military and political situation in the world and the criminal plans of imperialism and other reactionary forces. These are the single political days on the topic "The Military and Political Situation in the World and the Tasks of Personnel to Increase Vigilance and Combat Readiness," which are organized at the beginning of each period of instruction, lectures, political information, question-and-answer meetings on international problems, topical meetings, and morning meetings. Leadership personnel take an active part in conducting these programs.

An important task is the formation among personnel of a correct concept of modern war. It is understandable that this cannot be done to the fullest. A battle using nuclear weapons exists only speculatively, as a model in which its characteristics are reflected. But nevertheless, possibilities and more exist for forming in servicemen a notion about modern war. They must be used widely. As practice shows, this positively affects the activities of units and subunits when carrying out various tasks. In the Tamanskiy Guards Motorized Rifle Division imeni M. I. Kalinin, for example, it was observed that those servicemen, as a rule, do better in exercises who during their training negotiated the firing and assault course several times, imitating a modern battle situation. This has prompted commanders and political workers to provide personnel in the future with the maximum contact with training on courses. Now many of the district's units and military training institutions have classes, firing ranges, and sectors imitating, wholly or partially, a modern battle scene.

Of course, one must not be carried away by the technical side of the problem alone. It is no less important, for example, to form in personnel a true and clear idea about the probable enemy and his strong and weak points. The basic conclusion in this matter is that our servicemen in case of a war unleashed by an aggressor will clash with a cruel, crafty, and powerful enemy who has cultivated a spirit of hatred toward socialism and the Soviet people. The probable enemy must be unmasked in a reasoned fashion with specific examples showing the true face of imperialism: the monstrous crimes of its shock detachment--German fascism, on the territory of our country during World War II and the brutalities of modern aggressors in various areas of the world. Such an approach permits developing in servicemen a class position in assessing the enemy, cultivating in them a confidence in successfully fulfilling the established tasks, and in achieving victory under any modern war conditions.

The army and navy collective plays a definite role in forming high moral-political and combat qualities in personnel. It is distinguished not only by high controllability. A great educational force has also been placed in it. Here in the collective the ideological convictions of the servicemen are formed and strengthened, their characters are hardened in the crucible of the military work day, and their combat skills are perfected. Therefore, it is important that the commanders and political workers in their activities lean on the collective, study public opinion more thoroughly, and constantly feel the pulse of life.

However well the training in classes and special lecture halls has been arranged, however effectively the collective has influenced the servicemen, the development of moral-political and combat qualities and the improvement in military skills is accomplished most effectively in ground, air, and sea training. A special kind of formation in personnel of military knowledge, ability, skills and qualities is realized by this. The training of each specialist without exception has acquired especially important significance today under conditions where the main means of armed struggle are collective by nature of their use. In connection with this, the words of F. Engels concerning the importance of training servicemen in coordination, consistency, and the simultaneous clear actions of all trainees are also important today. In the conditions of highly-maneuverable, short-lived modern battle there will not be time for lengthy reflection. Only he who acts quickly, decisively, anticipating the enemy, can achieve victory.

A special place in forming high moral-political and combat qualities and in improving military skills belongs to tactical training. Its very basic principle--to teach troops that which is necessary in war--opens up broad educational possibilities. These are realized most successfully where concern is shown during the organization and conduct of exercises for the creation of a complex instructive tactical background where the very situation motivates the servicemen to act in full force, decisively, with initiative, and displaying creativity.

Exercises are the consummation of tactical training. Their effectiveness is especially high when pampering and simplification are not tolerated. Then everything is available right there to form high moral-political and combat qualities in the trainees and improve their military skills. A complicated tactical situation; sharp, critical situations with controlled elements of risk and danger; obstacles which are not surmounted without great physical effort--all of these things place servicemen in conditions close to those encountered in combat. Without a doubt, they are very important in developing among personnel the ability to withstand fear, confusion, and a feeling of danger. It is necessary for a "serviceman even in peace time," stresses the chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy, General of the Army A. A. Yepishev, "to endure to some degree and to experience many of those difficulties which he may encounter in a future battle and to be in situations, to one degree or another, which are reminiscent of combat situations."

The success of operations in field exercises and training activities largely depends on the skill of the servicemen. The higher it is, the greater the grounds are for expecting quality indicators. Therefore, it is important to direct personnel toward active and systematic work on studying combat equipment and weapons so that each specialist will increase his military skills with full strength. It is impossible not to consider such a major factor here. Only an intelligent attitude of the highest degree of servicemen toward mastering equipment and methods for its use on the battlefield yields high results. It is necessary to actively and purposefully use all educational resources to form such an attitude. It is frequently said, for example, that modern combat equipment and nuclear and other weapons are the basis of the high technical equipping of the army and navy. And this is all very true. However, the point often ends here. Yet it is nevertheless important to stress and explain that powerful combat equipment and terrible weapons are created by the valiant labor of Soviet people and that the communist party mobilizes the best scientific and industrial forces toward this end. Such discussions always influence the feelings of servicemen and increase their responsibility for mastering combat skills. Great possibilities for educating personnel in a conscientious attitude toward weapons and equipment and their study are contained in the wide use of the richest experience of the Great Patriotic War as well as the experience of today's innovators and the post-war year masters of combat specialties.

In training personnel with a desire to tirelessly and daily improve their training, a certain role is allotted to those thrilling rituals which impress servicemen such as the solemn investiture of combat equipment and weapons to those who, having taken the military oath, are just beginning their service. When organizing such programs, it is important to be concerned that the beginners not only accept the weapon from the hands of masters of military matters but that they also pledge to imitate their experience and continue their glory.

The education and training of servicemen, the formation within them of high moral-political and combat qualities, and the improvement in military skills--this is the major direction in the activities of commanders and political workers who have been called to display a maximum of professional competence, creative initiative, adherence to principles, intransigence toward every kind of shortcoming and error, and to provide a personal model in mastering weapons and equipment.

Officers are responsible for educating and training personnel. Very much depends on their ability to organize activities of military collectives and guide them, including the inculcation of the troops with the necessary qualities and skills. Therefore, high demands are made, first of all, on the officers themselves. One of them is professional military competence. This is a very broad concept. The professional training of the officer corps includes a mastery of Marxist-Leninist theory and methodology, operational and tactical training, a knowledge of military regulations, instructions, and other documents regulating the life and combat activities of servicemen, an acquaintance with the latest achievements of military science and technology, an ability to most effectively utilize the potential of modern weapons, and a mastery of advanced methods for training and educating subordinates.

This high professional training allows officers to effectively influence the accomplishment by servicemen of the goals and motives of military work, to fascinate subordinates by personal example and by their ideas and deep interest in the fact that each of them possesses the necessary qualities of defender of the fatherland. The accent here, as we see, is on the educational aspect. And this is right. This is precisely how the Soviet teacher A. S. Makarenko taught people to act. "You may force a person to work as much as you like," he wrote, "but unless, simultaneously with this, you educate him politically and morally... then this work will simply be a neutral process, not yielding positive results." Therefore, officers, in actively influencing the minds and hearts of servicemen, explain the ideological and political meaning of military service, the significance of all types of training, the maintenance of equipment, and increasing military skills. Such work is usually carried out both individually and during political lessons, Lenin readings, topical evenings, and other mass agitational programs.

The effectiveness of field and other exercises and military work on the whole can only be increased by the clear organization of the education and training process and the strict fulfillment, always and in everything, of the requirements of regulations, instructions and manuals. The role of officers is especially great in instructing and educating servicemen in ground, air, and sea training. Also important here are their example, competence, great desire to achieve success, and skill, even under severe time constraints, to effectively influence people. Thus, the leading officers always find the opportunity to inform personnel about the military and political situation in the world and the latest reports about life in the country, to talk about the influence of the Great Patriotic War, about our combat equipment and weapons, and their superiority over similar means of a probable enemy.

Reports about specialists who have distinguished themselves exert a mobilizing influence on servicemen. This was the case, for example, at an exercise where officers talked in the subunits about the courageous acts of Private E. Kozyrev. This individual, a driver-mechanic, in a heavy frost climbed into a half-submerged tank and, getting behind the controls, brought the vehicle to the shore.

Socialist competition greatly influences the formation of moral-political and combat qualities and improves military skills. This obliges officers to be concerned about whether it is well organized and whether these Leninist principles are being constantly observed: publicity, comparability of results, and repetition of advanced know-how. They have been asked to pay special attention to competition on tasks and norms and various contests permitting an increase in military skills and the development of necessary qualities and skills.

Officers lean on the party organizations in directing education and training, in forming high moral-political and combat qualities among servicemen, and in improving skills. Communists set the tone in all good causes and demonstrate splendid models of military work. Komsomol members, especially Komsomol activists, are their true helpers and a reliable resource. They, as a rule, carry out extremely well the tasks in any tactical situation, at training grounds, tank training areas, firing ranges, airfields, and during sea cruises. Their example inspires servicemen to achieve success in improving combat skills and to fittingly fulfill the high duty of the armed defenders of the achievements of socialism.

The training year is in full swing. The servicemen of the Soviet armed forces extraordinarily devoted to their own communist party, day after day are increasing their efforts in competition under the slogan "the 40th Anniversary of the Great Victory and the 27th CPSU Congress--Our Selfless Military Work!" The combat training of the troops and naval forces has been filled with complex studies and exercises during which the ground, air, and sea training of personnel are being improved. To fully utilize these rich possibilities toward forming among servicemen moral-political and combat qualities and increasing their military skills--this is one of the most important problems whose solution requires the constant attention of commanders, political workers, and party and Komsomol organizations.

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MILITARY-POLITICAL ISSUES

WORKING WITH PEOPLE VS. TECHNOLOGY: ORDERING PRIORITIES

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 30 Jul 85 p 2

[Article by Guards Lt Col V. Klinovskiy, commander of the Guards Tank Shepetovskiy Regiment, Order of Lenin Moscow Military District: "Get to Know the Character: Being Close to the Men Is a Feature of the Commander"]

[Text] The regulation duties of every person in charge contain the point that he is to know the working, political and moral qualities of subordinates. And what commander has not seen from his own experience how much depends on this?

The other day I signed a recommendation for Guards Major M. Bogatyrev, commander of one of the battalions in our regiment, to be appointed to a higher position. Mikhail Alekseyevich has proved himself. He has an excellent understanding of the tactics of modern combat, possesses enviable organizational abilities, is industrious, efficient.... The fact that he is capable of thoroughly understanding an individual's character had a no less important role in the decision to advance him, however.

I recall a recent tactical exercise. The regiment was to advance from a position in direct proximity to the "enemy." In order to mislead him with respect to the axis of the main thrust, I decided to carry out a diversionary attack with a company from the battalion commanded by Guards Major Bogatyrev. To my surprise, upon receiving the mission, the battalion commander began regrouping his forces instead of attacking the "enemy" with the company located in the most advantageous position for this. The company commanded by Guards Senior Lieutenant V. Lysak was rapidly moved up to a position convenient for the attack.

Guards Major Bogatyrev later explained his maneuver, saying that Lysak is an officer with initiative and resourcefulness, rapidly assesses a situation and is capable of executing a surprise mission better than the other company commanders. And he proved to be right. the company's performance exceeded all our expectations. The "enemy" took his attack as an offensive by the main forces and threw almost all of his reserves against it.

The following is yet another incident which characterizes Bogatyrev as an officer who gets to know people well. Guards Captain A. Gorokhov, a company

commander, was known in the battalion for his love for the equipment and for his "bristly" nature. The opinion somehow gradually developed in the regiment that an officer with such a character could not be entrusted with serious matters. Bogatyrev was one of the few who came out resolutely in Gorokhov's defense. He vouched for the subordinate with his prestige. And he was not mistaken. Gorokhov soon became deputy commander for technical affairs of an artillery battalion. He is now a major and is one of the most respected specialists in a nearby unit.

This is how Bogatyrev's knowledge of people helps him in difficult situations. And Mikhail Alekseyevich knows people because is accessible to them, loves to work with them and is able to establish a rapport with those who do not open up at once and who do so unwillingly. Those who are said to be difficult to indoctrinate have a special status with him. Guards Captain G. Syromyatnikov, a deputy battalion commander for political affairs, keeps a sort of pedagogical diary which contains information on all of the fightingmen in the subunit. Bogatyrev makes skillful use of his conclusions and advice.

Observing the commander, the other battalion officers also try to work thoughtfully and creatively. Guards Senior Lieutenant Lysak and Guards Senior Lieutenant V. Kuzin, another company commander, achieved good results precisely because they make a thorough study of their subordinates.

There would be no need to write this article, if all of the regimental officers worked with their subordinates as the party demands of us. Unfortunately, I cannot say that all of the officers in the regiment justify the important title of indoctrinator. It still hurts me when I think about Guards Senior Lieutenant A. Britsov. It became necessary to have him removed from his position as a company commander. The factors contributing to this were an inability and sometimes, simply a disinclination on the officer's part to thoroughly consider the needs and feelings of his subordinates. There were cases in which a soldier from the company would violate discipline, and Britsov could not even say with certainty what platoon he was from....

Guards Major Yu. Silayev, a communist and commander of the 3rd Tank Battalion, was brought to strict account at a recent meeting of the party committee for omissions in the indoctrinational work with the personnel. He avoided the men. It was as though he was afraid to come down to their level from his "commander's imminence." His subordinates in turn tried to avoid that "imminence." We have to hope that the demanding party discussion will help Yuriy Mikhaylovich take a different view of his duties and functions as an indoctrinator.

This same purpose is served by service conferences and meetings of the regiment officers which discuss matters pertaining to the indoctrinational work in the spirit of the April 1985 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and of the speech presented by Comrade M.S. Gorbachev to leading personnel of the Armed Forces in Minsk. We place the stress on studying the men. Naturally, we attempt to familiarize every officer with the experience of such commanders as Guards Major Bogatyrev.

Peoples can see that the aggressive course of the imperialists is being countered by the consistent line taken by the CPSU and the Soviet State, which is directed toward lowering the level of the nuclear confrontation between the West and East. The book stresses the fact that the militaristic aspirations of America's ruling circles, aspirations which threaten mankind with catastrophe, are being restrained precisely because the Soviet Union has created its own nuclear capability and because of the strategic military parity between the USA and the USSR.

In this book the reader will find a lot of useful information, theses and conclusions, which will undoubtedly help to broaden and amplify their ideas on the contemporary strategic military situation and on the specific features of the ideological struggle in questions of war and peace.

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MILITARY-POLITICAL ISSUES

IDEOLOGICAL-UPBRINGING WORK MUST TAKE PRIORITY FOR ZAMPOLIT

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 11, Jun 85 (signed to press 20 May 85) pp 45-49

[Article by Capt 2nd Rank Ya. Knyazev under the rubic "Party Life": "In the Thick of Vital Matters"]

[Text] Lines From a Portrait of a Political Worker

"A man with a restless soul. A good organizer. A real political fighter...." Perhaps we could add to this assessment some other opinions expressed about Captain Lieutenant Yu. Nuzhdin in the political organ. When the officer's name was first mentioned to me I asked whether he was related to Captain 1st Rank F. Nuzhdin. Yes, I was told, this is his son.

I knew the senior Nuzhdin well. Several years ago the cruiser "Mikhail Kutuzov, on which Feliks Sergeyevich was deputy commander for political affairs, departed on a long cruise. We traveled the compass points of the Mediterranean, and I had the opportunity to see how devoted the senior Nuzhdin was to the sea, to the ship and to the work entrusted to him.

Here was the Mediterranean Sea, many years later. This time it was on the escort vessel "Deyatelnyy." The deputy commander for political affairs on the vessel was Captain Lieutenant Yu. Nuzhdin.

It was as though both of them, father and son, were standing before me. I frequently compared them, their personalities, conduct and work styles. They differed in many ways, of course. I noticed that both of them made an effort to be among the people, however, and were constantly in the thick of vital matters. One thing, a love for their work, connected them more solidly than their ties of kinship.

In the evening, when the seamen were training at their combat positions, Captain Lieutenant Nuzhdin managed to visit the sonar and radar operators.

The men did not notice his presence. The officer's eyes lock onto things. As he observed the specialists in action, he noticed that the seamen were not competing to better the norms in all of the sections and crews. Some of the specialists performed their work casually, even lethargically, one might say. Yuriy Feliksovich talked with first one and then another. How surprised he was at the indifference with which some of them regarded the job. He even heard reasoning such as the following: I managed "to achieve" a "satisfactory" or "good," so why the complaints?

Nuzhdin already knew for sure that there would be complaints. First and foremost, about the officers and communists. After all, how often had it been said, how many times had the commander underscored the fact that the organization of competition by task and norm and the struggle to achieve good results is a struggle for the ship's combat readiness. And combat readiness is not an abstract concept. One only had to take a look through the porthole: There on the horizon, as though frozen in place, a NATO destroyer had its launchers and radar beams aimed at the Soviet ship.

Even so, not everyone derived the proper conclusions. For example, the zam-polit noticed that certain radar operators were not particularly diligent in the performance of their duties. Judging from everything, this was of little concern to Captain Lieutenant V. Lukoshin, their commander. When the drill was over, he did not critique the performance of the seamen, did not analyze their errors and did not single out those who deserved praise.

Yuriy Feliksovich had to straighten out the officer on the spot. Nor did he put off a discussion with Captain Lieutenant V. Garmanov, secretary of the department's party organization. It essentially had to do with whether it had become necessary to raise at a party meeting the question of increasing the responsibility of the department communists for the organization of socialist competition. The secretary agreed. Yes, he himself had already given this some thought. The intensity of the competition had indeed dropped. At the beginning of the cruise they had concerned themselves with the spirit of rivalry in the drills but had then forgotten about this important element....

"The communists and the competition"--this entry in his notebook would subsequently take Nuzhdin back to that drill, force him to think, to compare what he had seen in other departments and to compare his opinion with those of other people. It would ultimately turn into a substantive analysis of how the party organizations of departments helped the commanders to develop the competition, how they increase their influence in this extremely important area of the struggle to enhance combat readiness, and would develop into an impassioned and concerned address at a meeting of the ship's party organization.

Toward night the wind increased and the waves grew higher. The ship began to rock. The political worker visited the electrical and engineering division, and the usual atmosphere of seriousness and efficiency reigned there. The seamen were adeptly servicing the equipment and keeping a close eye on the instrument readings. In that customary scene, one's attention was immediately drawn to one of the sailors, who stood silently to the side and nervously squeezed a rag in his hands. Nuzhdin recognized him as Vlasenko.

It was clear from his distressed look that something bad had happened. It turned out that the young sailor had committed an error while standing watch and had Warrant Officer V. Pikin, the senior man on the crew, not intervened, one of the instruments could have stopped functioning.

Pikin looked more upset than Vlasenko.

"This sailor is nothing but trouble," he told the political worker with annoyance. "How did we end up with him...?"

Indeed, there had been problems with Vlasenko in the past. Once, he had even committed a blunder which had resulted in a complex situation for the crew.

"One is not patted on the head for mistakes, of course," Yuriy Feliksovich said in his discussion with the warrant officer. "And the sailor should be held strictly accountable for irresponsibility and negligence. Something else is also apparent, however. Vlasenko does not have enough experience. He therefore sometimes becomes confused, and his errors stem from this. Let us think about it: Have we taught the sailor properly to perform the job to which he is assigned"?

Nuzhdin said "we," but the senior man on the crew understood that the political worker's words were primarily a rebuke to him, Vlasenko's direct superior. The young sailor did indeed still need to be taught a great deal. The young man appeared to be diligent, but he did not grasp everything immediately like the others. Extra work needed to be done with him, as much attention as possible given to him. But that requires time....

Oh, those references to time! The political worker had frequently listened to such excuses. Yes, on a long cruise the rhythm of time is felt particularly acutely. Days, hours, minutes all seem to be compressed into a long chain of concerns, large and small--most frequently, urgent ones. It sometimes seems that there is not a free minute for resolving some urgent problem, for doing something. Nuzhdin was certain that this is a deceptive perception, however. He knew from his own experience and from observing his colleagues that the shortage of time is due mainly to an inability to manage it, to organize one's work, to a desire to do everything oneself. The incident with Captain Lieutenant V. Lushnitskiy also convinced Nuzhdin of this.

Yuriy Feliksovich once began talking with Captain Lieutenant A. Bolshikh, secretary of the party organization. The latter complained that it was difficult to involve certain communists in working with the men. Lushnitskiy, for example. As one of the best specialists, he had been given the assignment of conducting a technical quiz. The appointed time passed, but the activity did not take place. Lushnitskiy came up with a justification: He had been bogged down in work, overwhelmed by routine matters. He had completely forgotten about the assignment because of them.

"If this were the first time such a thing has happened," Bolshikh said with annoyance. "But he has previously failed to carry out assignments due to his 'forgetfulness,' and they had to be turned over to other communists...."

"And what did you conclude from this"?

"Conclude?"--Bolshikh thought for a moment. "Lushnitskiy is simply bogged down in 'routine matters.' I say this also on the basis of something else. His petty officers demonstrate almost no independence. Why? He does not trust them to do anything, but tries to do everything himself. How could he have any time? He can't look after everything himself. One therefore finds a weak spot first in one place then another. Their group recently delayed the repair of an instrument...."

That discussion made the political worker take a closer look at the work style not just of Lushnitskiy, but of the other officers as well. And what did he find? Many of them complained about being overloaded with work and not having enough time. Senior Lieutenant V. Mikhaylov, commander of a department, for example, could not find the time to attend Komsomol meetings or sessions of the department Komsomol bureau. "I would like to," he said, throwing up his hands, "but I just can't: The equipment... takes all of my attention." Nuzhdin heard statements like this from the other officers-and-communists as well. And the more he thought about them, the more he became convinced that questions pertaining to improving the ideological and indoctrinal work needed to be treated with greater urgency. A great deal has been done in this area, to be sure. The communists on the ship are more responsible with respect to one of their most important regulation duties, that of being an active party fighter and participating constantly in the political and indoctrinal work. But then some of them, it seems, "do not have enough time" for this. And, like Mikhaylov, they have a ready excuse--"The equipment is the main thing for me...."

Many people were stung by Nuzhdin's speech at the next party meeting. He spoke of the fact that not all of the subunit communists on the ship concern themselves with indoctrinating subordinates or with taking an individual approach to them. He talked about how every party member and candidate member needs to assess his own work more demandingly, as required by the party, needs to try to get closer to the men and to study their feelings and needs.

That discussion at the meeting was timely and pointed. And as time demonstrated, it was useful. The communists began to take a more active part in the ideological and indoctrinal work, and their influence upon the men was increased.

"Request permission to enter." Senior Lieutenant Ye. Solovyev entered the room. "I shall only be a minute, Yuriy Feliksovich. It is about tomorrow. Do you foresee any changes? Is everything still according to plan"?

The next day they were seeing off sailors being discharged into the reserve. It was an important event for the entire crew. Naturally, they were making

thorough preparations for it. The commander issued an order commanding the best seamen and petty officers. The party and Komsomol activists had prepared a special issue of the radio newspaper. Nuzhdin felt that the send-off should take place in a cordial and at the same time, formal atmosphere. Naturally: Some men would be leaving, and others would receive from them the combat watch baton in order to carry the homeland's flag over the ocean expanses in a worthy manner.

Senior Lieutenant Solovyev, the Komsomol secretary, had also worked hard to prepare for the activity. It was apparent that he was worried. He had come to the political officer for advice, first about one thing and then another. Solovyev's concern was to Nuzhdin's liking. Yuriy Feliksovich also noticed something else, however. The secretary was sometimes too rigid.

"There are no changes, Yevgeniy Viktorovich," Nuzhdin answered. "Incidentally, how are things with Sheremet? I haven't inquired about his work in a long time."

Yuriy Feliksovich was being cunning. He frequently checked on the department in which Seaman Sheremet served. He had plenty of things to do there. He talked with the officers and petty officers and briefed the aktiv. At the same time, he would check on Sheremet. The seaman unquestionably had a talent for technical things. He rapidly mastered his area of work. His colleagues would sometimes come to him for advice. This is most likely what affected Sheremet's attitude toward the service. The seamen figured that he had already achieved a great deal and therefore no longer had to strain himself particularly. In short, the individual's sense of responsibility was dulled. This is what caused the trouble: Sheremet violated discipline while standing watch. Solovyev witnessed the incident. He at once took the young seaman to task, so to speak. You're letting the team down, was his attitude. We shall discuss your conduct at a committee meeting. Sheremet was indignant: What was he, some sort of inveterate wrong-doer? His area was one of the best in the department.

Solovyev subsequently explained vehemently to Nuzhdin that such incidents should be evaluated with complete strictness, that he would get the committee to meet on the incident and see to it that the Komsomol member was strictly punished. Nuzhdin talked with the Komsomol secretary a long time. He agreed that what had occurred had to be assessed. But why did it have to be at a committee meeting? And how did the Komsomol members of the department react to the infraction? Finally, did Sheremet have any previous infractions? Was not the Komsomol organization partly to blame for what had happened? Had it not relaxed its demandingness of its members?

Solovyev admitted that he had not given any thought to these things. Indeed, he reasoned with some surprise, it is easiest of all to punish the individual. It is more difficult to look into the cause of his infraction, to understand what has made it possible. On the other hand, if the Komsomol organization does not take to account those guilty of deviating from the regulation requirements, then this is a deficiency of the committee as well....

Solovyev subsequently told Nuzhdin frankly that the conversation had prompted him to think about the committee's style of working, about his role as the organizer of the elected organ's collective work, and made him aware of the need to constantly study the situation in each collective, to study the people, their personalities and needs.

To be close to the people, to know the feelings of the youth, to know how to approach each sailor. The political worker had actually always attempted to lead Solovyev to an understanding of this, one of the most important commandments of the Komsomol leader. He himself had been employed in Komsomol work for several years and was now passing on his experience to the young officer in bits and pieces. He was disappointed at blunders and sincerely glad for the successes. He felt satisfaction from the fact that the secretary of the ship's Komsomol committee spent most of his time among the youth, endeavored to learn the situation in the subunit Komsomol organizations and attempted to find a way to approach specific individuals.

More about Sheremet's case. Solovyev took a most active part in the seamen's situation. He suggested to the Komsomol activists that they give Sheremet an assignment to present a report on new developments in the area of equipment. That is what they did. The sailor carried out the assignment diligently and willingly. The report was interesting, and the sailors received a great deal of useful information. Things went from there. Even Solovyev went to Sheremet and suggested that he take part in a discussion on technical subjects. He commented, as though in passing, that the sailor's colleagues spoke well of his technical training but that he needed to improve in matters of discipline, to be more demanding of himself. This had its effect on the seamen. He now tries to do everything possible to earn the respect of his commanders and comrades.

The next morning, at the signal for general muster, the ship's crew formed up on the poop deck to bid farewell to the seamen being released into the reserve. Many of them felt a sense of excitement. The political worker also felt it. It would seem to be an ordinary happening--release into the reserve. The ceremony touches the heart every time, however. Captain Lieutenant Nuzhdin looked at the seamen standing in front of the formation. Sharp, tanned and with confidence written on their faces, it was difficult to believe that only 3 years ago, when they had arrived on board the ship, all of them had been timorous young men. How the time had flown. It was already time to say goodbye.

The political worker saw Petty Officer 1st Class I. Stepanov smile at him and drop his head as though to conceal his embarrassment. What was Stepanov thinking about? Was he thinking about the beginning of his service? Nuzhdin recalled the time very well. The opinion had developed at once that Stepanov was a shirker. And the seamen had indeed not been conscientious about studying his specialty. He also had problems with discipline. In short, he became the talk of the town.

They had found a way to him, however, to influence him--with both persuasion and demandingness. And imperceptibly the individual pulled himself up, so

to speak. He became a rated specialist and was awarded the badge "Outstanding Member of the Navy."

Slightly past Stepanov in the formation stood Petty Officer 1st Class V. Kuznetsov and Petty Officer 2nd Class I. Nedov. It was a pity to have to part with them. Nuzhdin recalled how, upon learning that both of the seamen had been interested in physics before serving in the fleet, he had suggested that they give talks in classes in the technical group on problems related to the study of scheduled subjects for technical training. Kuznetsov and Nedov set about the project with great enthusiasm. They actively assisted the group instructor in organizing the classes. The classes were interesting and helped the seamen thoroughly study the equipment.

Many of the seamen had served conscientiously. The ship commander expressed words of gratitude to them in a speech.

Nuzhdin feels proud that a small part of his work also is reflected in the fact that the young men have become real seamen, that they have grown strong physically and developed morally. It could not be otherwise!

Both the combat skill and the character of the men are molded in the difficult, everyday naval service, on the long cruises. The political worker is therefore confident that the combat watch baton will be received, as always, by strong and reliable hands. The hands of such seamen as Sheremet, Vlasenko and dozens of other seamen with whom Nuzhdin has linked his destiny and his duty here on the ship.

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MILITARY-POLITICAL ISSUES

TRAINING SHORTCOMINGS -- INEXPERIENCE OF JUNIOR OFFICERS

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 11, Jun 85 (signed to press 20 May 85) pp 40-44

[Article by Maj P. Ivanov, secretary of the party committee in a motorized rifle regiment: "Corrections on the March"]

[Text] The "enemy" was resisting stubbornly, attempting to halt the attackers. At the same time reserves were being brought up from the depth of his defense to conduct a counterattack.

The regimental commander decided to forestall the opposing side. He ordered Captain V. Gerasimov's battalion to capture an advantageous line and repel the counterattack by the defenders from that position with fire support from attached tanks and artillery. The motorized riflemen successfully carried out the mission. They advanced at high speed to the designated line, accurately destroyed the targets and inflicted considerable damage upon the "enemy" reserves. A determined attack then completed the defeat.

The offensive by other subunits was also crowned with success. The regiment won the training battle due to the good tactical and fire training of the personnel. Those who distinguished themselves in the exercise included the subordinates of Captain A. Zubarev, Senior Lieutenants I. Valyayev and S. Arkhangelskiy, and other officers.

The good rating received by the regiment was a sort of summation of the multifaceted work performed by commanders, political workers, party and Komsomol organizations during the winter training period and confirmed the correctness of the course elected around 6 months before.

At that time, in the fall of last year, certain platoons and companies made a poor showing in test exercises. To be more specific, the subunits commanded by Captains V. Zhukov and M. Derepasko and by Senior Lieutenant I. Valyayev were among the lagging ones.

I shall not conceal the fact that this kind of finale took many people in the regiment by surprise. Later, however, after carefully studying the causes of the failures by those military collectives, we could see that it would have been difficult to expect anything else from them. The breakdown

in the tactical fire training of the motorized riflemen and tankmen was a natural result of errors in the organization of the training and indoctrinal process and in the work performed with the officers. These included errors of the party committee.

It cannot be said that the party committee did little to influence the attitude of the officers-and-communists toward the job or the improvement of the personnel's fire skill. Questions having to do with enhancing the effectiveness of the tactical fire training were regularly discussed at party meetings and party committee sessions. Reports and accounts were heard from party members directly involved in organizing the party process. We also summarized and disseminated advanced know-how and devoted attention to technical military propaganda.

A study showed, however, that the weak spot in our work was its all-embracing nature, if one can put it that way. That is, we very frequently set about resolving many problems at the same time and dissipated our efforts, forgetting that success is produced by skillfully singling out the chief element and concentrating the main effort on it. Sometimes, instead of preventing the development of a negligent attitude in a CPSU member toward the organization of the combat training and the fulfillment of his party and service duty, the party committee would take action after the fact.

Substantial adjustments had to be made in the work. Within the shortest possible period of time. We had to do this in the interest of the regiment's combat readiness and of the complex tasks for the new training year, the year of the 40th anniversary of the Great Victory and active preparation for the 27th CPSU Congress.

The regimental commander, his deputies, the staff officers and the chiefs of branches of troops and services, based on the nature of the deficiencies revealed, outlined and implemented a large number of steps aimed at correcting them. They mainly involved increasing demandingness of the officers directly involved in organizing the combat training, increasing attention to the training of the commanders and teaching the company and platoon commanders how to conduct rifle (tank gunnery) drills, firing practice and tactical exercises. Instructional and demonstration classes and firing skill tests were conducted for this purpose, in which the professional skill of the officers was determined and an assessment was made of how well they handled the organic weapons of the platoon or company. Lieutenant Colonels B. Polyakov and V. Nikitin, Major V. Andriyevskiy and others, the best methods experts in the regiment, shared with the young officers their experience in organizing tactical fire training for the personnel and presented several lectures on various problems having to do with methods.

The party committee also revised its work style. First of all, we decided to exert a planned influence upon the effectiveness of the training and indoctrinal process and the tactical fire training of the fightingmen by enhancing the militancy of the party organizations and insuring on this basis that every communist set a good personal example and demonstrated responsibility. The members of the party committee focused their efforts

directly in the company and battalion party organizations and began making more frequent visits to the field, right where both the fire and tactical skill of the personnel is formed. The problems troubling the men became clearer in the vital communication with the officers, sergeants and soldiers. And the men themselves would sometimes show an unexpected side.

One of the companies, as an example, is commanded by Lieutenant Yu. Cherepanov. He is a young officer and it is perfectly natural that in the beginning he committed numerous mistakes in training methods, in the organization of combat and in his control of the platoons in exercises. He was therefore given help, and he was held accountable. At first, he accepted both of these calmly. Later, however, he began reacting unhealthily to critical comments. This is when the opinion developed that Cherepanov had become conceited upon assuming command of the company.

Lieutenant Colonel B. Polyakov, a party committee member, cautioned those who believed this against drawing hasty conclusions and suggested that they observe the young commander more closely. The communist and leader began to visit Lieutenant Cherepanov's company more frequently and to be present during the exercises and the summation of the results. He became convinced that the officer's errors stemmed not from conceit but from inexperience. The senior comrade helped the lieutenant to fill in the most serious gaps in his training and advised him how best to organize the workday, to correctly distribute the time and to set up tactical-drill training for the personnel and classes on instructional methods for the platoon and squad commanders.

The young company commander's situation is now improving. The subunit commanded by him successfully passed the final test of the spring. Lieutenant Colonel Polyakov continues to watch the communist-and-officer, however, and to further the development of the promising commander.

As they looked deeply into the organization of the tactical fire training in the platoons, companies and battalions, the party committee members were able to spot many valuable things, things which were helping many of the commanders to achieve good results in the training of their subordinates. We attempted to make every officer aware of these methodological finds and various innovations, to help the commanders, particularly those lacking experience, to adopt them in their work.

Captain V. Gerasimov's battalion, for example, has been the acknowledged leader in the socialist competition in the regiment for a long time now. Its level of fire training is higher than in the other subunits. The motorized riflemen ordinarily receive good ratings also in the firing practice and tactical exercises involving live firing. Where do their consistent successes derive from?

In order to find the answer to this question, Major V. Andriyevskiy and Senior Lieutenant A. Zinchenko, members of the party committee, worked several days in the battalion. Their conclusion: Today's increased demands of the field training for the personnel and of their fire skill are

taken into full account when the tactical and fire training is organized. Proceeding from these demands, the battalion commander and the company and platoon commanders teach the motorized riflemen how to destroy the target with the first round, shot or launching. They concern themselves with bringing the fire training into closer conformity with tactics and strive to see that their subordinates do not simply mechanically perform the firing exercises but accomplish the fire missions in an instructive tactical situation, reconnoiter the targets, independently determine the distance to them and master target designation skills.

The value of experience lies in its repetition. Proceeding from this fact, we told about the experience of Captain Gerasimov and other commanders at an officers' meeting, in speeches to the communists at party meetings and in personal talks with them. The party committee subsequently returned to this matter more than once. As an example, party committee members more than once attended drills and firing practice in the companies commanded by A. Zubarev, Senior Lieutenant A. Smirnov and Lieutenant Yu. Cherepanov, made a study of how progressive experience is put into practice there and helped the officers to apply certain new things which had been tested in Captain Gerasimov's battalion.

Assisting those who need assistance, summarizing and disseminating the experience of the best are only one way the party influences the quality of the tactical fire training of the personnel, however. Another, no less important area involves principle and demandingness and the development in the officers-and-communists of a sense of great responsibility for the fulfillment of their service and party duty. There is no denying the fact, after all, that it was precisely a lack of conscientiousness on the part of certain subunit commanders, their low level of demandingness of themselves and their subordinates which caused many of the shortcomings revealed in the inspection.

Take M. Derepasko and Senior Lieutenant I. Valyayev, for example. They did not fully learn their lesson from their previous errors. This year, in the subunits commanded by those officers, there was unjustified switching of fire training classes to later dates and cases of personnel being taken away from the combat training. Essential aids and training monitoring devices were not always provided for the firing drills and practice.

During the winter training period the regimental commander and staff increased their demands of commanders such as Derepasko and Senior Lieutenant Valyayev. The party committee in turn increased its demandingness of the communists-and-officers. We try to see that no manifestation of unconscientiousness or negligence escapes party action. Furthermore, we hold not only those specifically to blame for the shortcomings strictly accountable, but also the communists in charge who did not take steps at the right time to correct them.

As recommended by the party committee, for example, Major V. Medvedev, chief of staff, rendered account on his fulfillment of his service and party duty at a meeting of the party bureau of the unit directorate. The

communist was forced to listen to numerous critical comments from his colleagues for lowering planning discipline, for inadequate demandingness of those in charge of the training and of staff officers of the battalions, and for poorly monitoring the methodological preparation of the subunit commanders. I would point out that this discussion, like the constant attention which the work of the communist-and-leader receives from the party committee and the party bureau, produced perceptible benefit.

We have attempted to direct the work of company and battalion party organizations on a daily basis toward enhancing the responsibility of the communists for the quality performance of the tactical fire training tasks and for the complete and absolute fulfillment of socialist commitments accepted in honor of the 40th anniversary of the Victory and of the 27th CPSU Congress. Many of them have become more active in influencing the process of improving the effectiveness of the training and enhancing the methodological skill of the officers and uncovering deficiencies with greater boldness. This is especially apparent in the example of the party organization of the motorized rifle battalion commanded by Captain A. Yamkovoy.

At their meetings the communists in that subunit regularly discuss questions pertaining to increasing party influence upon the tactical fire training of the personnel and persistently implement collectively outlined steps. Specifically, shortcomings in the organization of the combat training in Lieutenant G. Gamzatov's platoon were discussed at one of these meetings. The communists spoke of methodological gaps in that officer's training and about the fact that he does not always prepare for the classes conscientiously or set an example for his subordinates in mastering the skills necessary for accurate firing. Captain Yamkovoy asked to speak.

"All of this is true," he said. "But is Gamzatov the only one with such shortcomings? Unfortunately, he is not. They exist to one degree or another in many young officers. This means that it is not a personal problem. We must therefore exert an influence upon the development of all the platoon commanders."

That meeting was a sort of take-off point for intensifying the work performed with the young officers. Demonstration classes and classes on instructional methods are now conducted more frequently in the battalion, methods skills are developed more purposefully in the subunit commanders, and an effort is made to improve their fire and tactical skill. The party activists helped the commander to prepare for and conduct a fire conference, at which the experience of Major A. Shevtsov, Captain V. Gerasimov, Senior Lieutenant S. Arkhangelskiy and others, the best methods experts, was discussed. They have done everything possible to support the young officers, to point out their successes and to help correct deficiencies as rapidly as possible. The secretary and the bureau members have made a considerable effort to motivate personnel in the subunits commanded by the young officers to perform the fire and tactical training tasks well. All of this has produced results: In the battalion we are discussing, the time required for the development of the platoon commanders has been reduced considerably, their methodological level has risen and the effectiveness of the combat training has improved.

We know that the effectiveness of party-political work is directly dependent upon the prestige of the one who organizes and conducts it. Its prestige in turn depends in great part upon the professional and combat skill of the deputy company or battalion commander for political affairs, a party activist. This is why we decided to achieve a situation in which all of the political workers, secretaries and members of party bureaus are masters of accurate fire, have mastered the subunit's organic weapons and have thorough tactical training.

For this purpose the party committee assumed control over the combat training of the political workers and party activists. It has become a rule in the regiment that they are among the first to perform the firing exercises. This increases the officers' responsibility, contributes to their more purposeful and persistent training and increases their prestige and consequently, enhances the effectiveness of the party-political work they perform. This has been clearly confirmed by the experience of Captains A. Yamkovoy and A. Ozdoba and Senior Lieutenant A. Zinchenko, who accurately fire a machine gun, a sub-machine gun and a sniper's rifle, thereby setting an example of good firing skill for the motorized riflemen and motivating the latter to make a total effort.

The regimental party committee and its party organization thus exerted their influence to enhance the tactical fire training of the personnel day by day. To a certain degree this contributed to the success achieved in a recent tactical exercise. Despite the fact that improvements are evident and that the intense commitments accepted for the winter training period were basically fulfilled, we have still been unable to resolve certain significant problems. We are still not making full use of the great indoctrinational possibilities of socialist competition, for example. In a number of sub-units its effectiveness leaves something to be desired. Not all of the most effective practices employed in the tactical fire training are being persistently and seriously adopted in the training process everywhere. The party committee members recently studied a large body of information summarizing the experience of the best specialists. It was discovered that the information mainly deals with the personal qualities of those out front and enumerates their merits but frequently contains nothing about how they achieved the good results. And this is a manifestation of formalism.

In short, a great deal of work remains to be done. At the present time the most important thing for us, as we carry out the directives issued at the April 1985 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, is to strive to further enhance militancy in the work of the party organizations and to create a climate of responsibility, principle and demandingness in them. We regard this as a sure way to assure that the communists take an avant-garde role in the tactical fire training, in the struggle waged by the personnel to greet the 27th CPSU Congress in a worthy manner and in keeping the regiment at a high level of combat readiness.

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MILITARY-POLITICAL ISSUES

MILITARY LAW AND LEGAL UPBRINGING

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 11, Jun 85 (signed to press 20 May 85) pp 56-60

[Article by Lt Col Justice I. Vashkevich under the rubric "Military Pedagogics and Psychology": "In Strict Conformity With the Law"]

[Text] A large role goes to legal indoctrination in the system of communist indoctrination of the personnel in the Armed Forces of the USSR. It is a process of developing in the fightingmen socialist legal awareness and firm conviction about the need always to observe the requirements of Soviet laws and military regulations in all matters. The effectiveness of the legal indoctrination depends to an enormous degree upon thoroughly explaining the nature of Soviet military law to the servicemen and its competent application, as well as upon the establishment of a climate of strict legality and firm regulation order in the units and on the ships, and upon the daily example set by commanders and chiefs with respect to the precise observance of legal directives.

Legality and law and order are very important parts of socialist democracy and are the basis of our society's normal life. "The Soviet State and all of its agencies operate on the basis of socialist legality and safeguard law and order, the society's interests and the rights and liberties of citizens," states Article 4 of the Constitution of the USSR. Guided by the legal standards, commanders and political workers implement the CPSU's policy in the area of strengthening the nation's defense capability, the training and indoctrination of the servicemen. Military law and order are maintained by means of the legal standards.

Just what is military law? It is defined as part of the state's legal system, which regulates public relations in the building of the armed forces, in their activities, their organization and control, and the procedure for performing service duty, as well as relations among agencies of military command and control and between those in charge and the servicemen. It also defines their duties, rights and responsibility. ("Sovetskaya Vojennaya Entsiklopediya" [Soviet Military Encyclopedia], 1978, Vol. 6, p. 489)

Like our socialist state's entire legal system, military law expresses the will and interests of the Soviet people in the form of laws. Its content is defined

*This article is recommended for use in the seminar on Soviet law in the commanders training system for officers. The subject: "Military Law and its Role in Strengthening Military Discipline, Law and Order: The Personal Example of Commanders and Chiefs in Observing the Requirements Set Forth in Soviet Laws."

entirely by the class nature of the Soviet State, by its socioeconomic structure and by the policy its conducts.

The basic functions of military law must be individually defined in order to thoroughly understand the essence of military law and its role in the life of the society and the armed forces. Soviet military law governs the duties of state agencies, public organizations, officials and all citizens with respect to safeguarding the nation's security and strengthening its defense capability. It strengthens and governs the organization of the Armed Forces of the USSR and defines the organization, the authority and the principles underlying the functioning of military administrative bodies, the procedure for manning the Armed Forces and for the performance of military service by the personnel, the legal status of servicemen, the organization and procedure for providing the Armed Forces with materiel and the material provisioning of the servicemen.

Military law also regulates the rights of military authorities in areas where martial law is declared, the requirements of military discipline and the conditions and procedure for the application of disciplinary, administrative, criminal and material liability of servicemen.

The need to defend the socialist homeland and to create the Armed Forces in conformity with the nature of the Soviet State determined the shaping and development of Soviet military law.

V.I. Lenin personally helped prepare the first military laws. He called for "all laws on the Red Army and all orders to be implemented not out of fear but as a matter of conscience, and for discipline to be maintained in it in every possible way" ("Poln. sobr. soch." [Complete Collected Works], Vol. 39, p. 152). Soviet military legislation was based on Lenin's ideas on defending the socialist homeland, on the law and legality.

The Constitution of the USSR is the main source of Soviet military law. The military oath, general military regulations, the laws on universal military duty and criminal liability for military crimes and other documents are the normative legal instruments.

Military legal standards are directed toward building up the combat strength of the Armed Forces of the USSR, enhancing their combat readiness, maintaining firm military discipline, assuring legality in military command and control and observance of the rights and legal interests of the servicemen, and contribute to the communist indoctrination of the personnel.

The work of implementing the provisions and requirements of Soviet military law is a mandatory and significant part of all the work of commanders, political organs, staffs, party and Komsomol organizations. The training process, the service, the life, rest and relaxation of the personnel and equipment maintenance demand precise and coordinated actions on the part of the servicemen. Each decision adopted for the accomplishment of these things must conform to the spirit and the letter of laws, regulations and other normative documents, because the organization, discipline and unity of action of many people and collectives so essential in military affairs can only be achieved on the basis of rules applicable to all. The shaping of the fightingman and his political and

moral development occur more rapidly in a climate of legality and firm regulation order, and he becomes more fully aware of his patriotic and international duty and his personal responsibility for the homeland's defense.

Unfortunately, we still have frequent cases in which certain officers consider legal work to be exclusively the domain of the legal experts with no direct relation to their own daily practical work. This is an incorrect standpoint. When one assumes that certain actions or decisions of an officer do not involve the state's general legal precepts, it is easy to lose one's concept of what can and cannot be done, of what benefits and what harms our cause. Looked at another way, it is not difficult to ruin even an obviously good cause by consciously or unconsciously attempting to achieve it by illegal means and methods. This occurs also in the case of an elementary lack of conscientiousness in an officer's performance of his official duties and as a result of legal "slips of the pen" in documents which he considers not to be legal due to a lack of competence on the part of the individual who draws them up.

In one of the units in the Belorussian Military District tankmen who had raised their ratings did not receive the monetary reward they had coming for almost 2 months. It turned out that when the subunit commanders had prepared the document, they had not provided the necessary information in their memoranda. The omission was not detected at unit headquarters. An incomplete document was thus sent to the finance organization. Naturally, it was then returned to the unit for correction and sent through the chain of command again. Time was passing, and the tankmen kept waiting to be rewarded for their diligence in the service.

All of the multifaceted work of commanders, chiefs and others in charge is of a legal nature. They are acting not in their own name and not on a personal basis, but under assignment from the state. Consequently, they are also required to act only in the state's interest, exclusively within the framework of the authority granted them by the state and only by methods approved by the state.

The personal example set by the man in charge has a large role with respect to the absolute observance of Soviet laws, legal and moral standards by the servicemen. "...If we conscientiously teach discipline to the workers and peasants," V.I. Lenin said, "then we are obligated to begin with ourselves" ("Poln. sobr. soch.", Vol. 50, p. 63). When the people see a gap between the words and the actions of the teacher, this harms the cause of indoctrinating them more than anything else. If the figheingmen hear fine words about legality in the classroom or at a special discussion evening and then immediately see that regulation order is being violated, some of them may actually get the idea that the law is something which has nothing to do with life....

The sole-commander directs the unit or subunit on the basis of the law, and he is the main agent assuring strict legal order. The military regulations require that he set an example of precise observance of Soviet laws and the requirements of discipline. Commanders (chiefs) and political workers are the main organizers of legal indoctrination for the personnel and effect it themselves. Consequently, the officer-and-indoctrinator himself must have irreproachable legal competence, set an example with his conduct for those around him and always take into account the sociopolitical and indoctrinational aspects and the consequences of his service performance and legal activities.

The law grants commanders (chiefs) authority to issue orders which are mandatory for subordinates, to issue instructions and demand that they be absolutely fulfilled, to use forcible means when necessary and to be in charge of the fate of people. This is a great deal of authority, but it also involves great responsibility. Orders must not only be well based and expedient from the military standpoint, but must also be legal. This is reliable assurance of an increased role for military law in the strengthening of discipline and law and order in the units and subunits.

The legal means established by law are used along with ideological-political and moral means, military indoctrination and organizational measures for accomplishing these tasks. They are designed to ensure law and order and the standards of military discipline, to safeguard them and prevent violations, and they include both the use of incentives and the application of force.

The legal means employed by commanders (chiefs) include incentives, disciplinary penalties, measures to halt violations of military discipline and the review of infractions by comradeley courts of honor made up of officers, shore-based and seagoing warrant officers and other career personnel, and comradeley courts of military construction workers. A commander has the right to hold subordinates materially liable and to raise the issue of criminal liability. The provisions and the procedure for applying these means are regulated in detail by military legal documents.

Commanders (chiefs) are vested with disciplinary authority for maintaining military discipline and firm regulation order, which is a part of the authority granted them by the state for the fulfillment of their functions. This authority is known as disciplinary authority, which is exercised primarily through disciplinary praxis. It must strictly conform to the demands of legality. Disciplinary power can only be applied when there is a basis for this, in the interest of the service, for maintaining military discipline and regulation order and for encouraging proper conduct on the part of the servicemen, to the degree authorized by military regulations for the specific chief and only with respect to those servicemen to whom it extends.

It is very important for the commander (chief) to adhere to legal principles in his disciplinary practices. Here are the most important of them: justification of rewards and penalties (only the individual guilty of the infraction is punished), consideration of the individual qualities of the serviceman (his general level of development, his psychological features, his knowledge of the service and so forth), commensurability of the incentives or penalties, consistency in encouraging zeal in the service and in the application of penalties, promptness and purposiveness for indoctrinational measures and the publicizing of such measures. Finally, in order for disciplinary practices to be highly productive, it is necessary to have unity and coordination of action on the part of all commanders (chiefs) of the subunit or unit and for them to take the same approach to the employment of incentives and penalties.

A great deal of attention is being given to perfecting legal work in the units and on the ships. This process is being aided by the fact that the graduates of higher military educational institutions possess a more solid body of legal knowledge, which is constantly enhanced in classes conducted within the system of

commander's training and Marxist-Leninist training for officers and at schools for the acquisition of legal knowledge. The units and garrisons have begun conducting more frequent scientific and practical conferences on urgent problems of maintaining regulation order, strengthening military discipline and the legal indoctrination of the servicemen. A number of military districts and fleets have adopted the practice of conducting special classes and discussions with the officers assigned as commanders or deputy commanders of units or as commanders or executive officers of ships.

The more effectively commanders, political workers, party and Komsomol organizations organize legal indoctrination right in the sub-units and the more effectively the legal propaganda is conducted, the better military law performs its disciplining and organizing role. All of the legal work and the legal propaganda is based on explaining to the servicemen the premises on socialist legality contained in V.I. Lenin's works, in decisions adopted at CPSU congresses and Central Committee plenums, in the Constitution of the USSR and in decrees issued by the Soviet Government. Clarification of the legal substance of the military oath, military regulations, manuals, statutes and instructions also has a large role.

A great range of forms and methods of legal indoctrination are successfully employed in the units and subunits. They include political instruction sessions, lectures and reports on legal subjects, group and individual talks, evenings of questions and answers, evenings of discussion on special subjects and filmed lectures, legal consultations and legal information rooms. Visual agitation is extensively used in the legal propaganda work. Experience has shown that clarification of the laws is only effective when it is tied in with the tasks being performed by the military teams or those lying ahead. It is also important to take into account the specific nature of the work performed by the personnel and the conditions under which it is being performed, to see that they are reflected in the legal indoctrination activities. Legal propaganda is conducted in precisely this kind of systematic and focused manner in the antiaircraft missile regiment commanded by Lieutenant Colonel N. Bochkovskiy. Strong discipline and exemplary regulation order have been maintained, and the military collective has achieved good results in the socialist competition there for many years now as a result of this.

The party and Komsomol organizations and the legal aktiv of the unit play an important role in the legal indoctrination of the personnel. Success in the combat training and the service performance of the fightingmen is greater where the communists and Komsomol members react sharply to deviations from Soviet laws and military regulations, where they work painstakingly with violators of discipline and order, where they thoroughly and convincingly explain the essence of legal enactments and assure the absolute fulfillment of orders issued by commanders.

Along with legal propaganda aimed at assuring strict observance of order and the rules defined in the regulations by the servicemen, the army and navy attach great importance to the work of preventing infractions of discipline and crimes. This work only produces the greatest effect when it is conducted systematically and in a competent manner, when the commanders, political workers, party and Komsomol organizations and military legal experts perform it jointly. Special mention should be made of the role of the latter. Possessing extensive special

training and practical, the military legal experts are expected to do everything possible to enhance the legal competence of all participants in the indoctrinal process in the military collectives, to teach them forms and methods of exerting a legal influence upon the personnel.

The work of preventing infractions of discipline is based on the study, the detection and elimination of factors contributing to unlawful behavior on the part of the servicemen. Preventive measures directly involved in the work performed with the personnel are legally set forth in military regulations, and their application is a service duty of commanders and other immediate chiefs.

Among other things, these measures include the following: predicting possible infractions of the law on the part of subordinates by studying their personal qualities, indoctrinating the fightingmen in a spirit of strict adherence to the Constitution of the USSR and Soviet laws, the absolute fulfillment of the demands contained in the military oath, military regulations and orders, the maintaining of military law and order by immediately halting and eliminating violations of the regulations governing the performance of service duty, and so forth.

Articles 4 and 5 of the Disciplinary Code define in general terms ways to create objective conditions which preclude the possibility of unlawful behavior on the part of fightingmen in the unit, on the ship and in the subunit. With these as their guidelines, the commanders, political workers and other immediate chiefs perform preventive work in the following main directions: developing a communist world outlook, good moral-political qualities and fighting efficiency in the personnel, maintaining irreproachable regulation order in the military collective, assuring day-to-day demandingness and personal exemplary discipline on the part of commanders (chiefs), skilfully combining and correctly applying measures of conviction and of force, and achieving absolute observance of legality by those in charge in the establishment of regulation order.

The law in the socialist state reflects the main political, economic, moral and other interests of the people. Its requirements are therefore understood and accepted by the fightingmen, by their minds and hearts, so to speak, when the social, moral and purely practical significance of those requirements are explained to them. The individual who is aware of the interrelationship between the interests of the Soviet society and his own personal interests, the unity of the laws and standards of communist morality and the practical resolution of specific situations in life as set forth in the statutes, cannot fail to be convinced of the need to act only in accordance with the law in all cases. It becomes perfectly obvious to him that only such conduct, such action or decision will always be just and highly moral, the only expedient way.

Enhancing the legal sophistication of the servicemen and concern for the precise realization of their rights and duties constitute one of the most important areas for strengthening discipline, law and order in the units and subunits.

The party defines the matter sharply and precisely in the Leninist manner: Any infractions of the laws or violations of the rights and interests of citizens are intolerable. Violations or circumvention of the law must not relieve

individuals who do not consider the law of legal, disciplinary, service, party or state liability. "...Determined steps will continue to be taken toward the further establishment of order," the special March 1985 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee stressed, "to cleanse our lives of alien occurrences, of all encroachments upon the interests of the society and its citizens, and to strengthen socialist legality."

The study of military law and the assurance of precise, undeviating daily adherence to Soviet laws and the requirements contained in the oath and military regulations by all of the personnel, regardless of their service position or military rank, is a tested and realistic way to implement our party's decisions with respect to strengthening the homeland's defense capability and maintaining and strengthening aware discipline and firm regulation order.

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MILITARY POLITICAL ISSUES

MILITARY ENGINEER AND SCIENTIFIC-TECHNICAL PROGRESS

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 27 Jul 85 p 2

[Article by Col Gen Avn V. Filippov, professor, chief of the Military Air Engineering Academy imeni Professor N. Ye. Zhukovskiy: "Time Dictates that a Military Engineer Be Competent, Efficient and Innovative:"]

[Text] Recently, the Military Air Engineering Academy imeni Professor N. Ye. Zhukovskiy graduated its sixtieth class. Looking over the happy faces of the officer graduates and sensing the emotion with which they receive the engineering diplomas, I try to picture the military engineer of yesterday. But at first I reflect on our contemporaries. Here twin brothers Capts Vasiliy and Vladimir Oleksenko and Capt A. Bublik receive honors diplomas and gold medals... Honors diplomas are presented to Lt Cols V. Kochetov and V. Serapin, Maj N. Maksunov, Captains S. Dobritsa, N. Litvinov, A. Chupakhin and many other graduates who are faced with difficult, but honorable and important duty in the troops. What does the future hold in store for them? How will their officer destinies take shape?

It has been my fortune to know many prominent men of science and technology: aerodynamics specialist Vladimir Sergeyevich Pyshnov, engine designer Boris Sergeyevich Stechkin, aircraft designer Vladimir Sergeyevich Ilyushin... All of them, in spite of their many honorable titles, considered themselves to be and were, first and foremost, engineers. Fate has also brought me together with such brilliant representatives of the next generation of Soviet engineers, genuine leading figures of domestic and world technology, as Sergey Pavlovich Korolev and Oleg Konstantinovich Antonov. I must say, they themselves and their talented assistants were very similar to their teachers in work style and in their grasp of things. What does this style and grasp of things involve?

They knew much and knew it deeply and thoroughly. But the main thing, perhaps, is that they were not so much bearers of knowledge as they were workers, persistently carrying their ideas through to practical implementation. In addition, they possessed to a greater extent such qualities as intuition, "an engineer's eye," a sense of the new and personal responsibility.

I do not at all mean to say that these qualities have been lost by today's generation of engineers. The tasks are different, and life puts forth different demands. It is not by chance that at a conference in the CPSU Central Committee on problems of accelerating scientific and technical progress attention was directed at raising both an engineer's prestigiousness and the output from his labor. This party instruction has a direct bearing on military personnel as well.

Today, the military engineer is a central figure in the ranks of the armed defenders of the Motherland. He is called upon to implement into the troops everything new and progressive which is at the basis of modern combat equipment and to ensure it is maintained at a high operational readiness. He must tirelessly search for the best methods of combat application of military equipment and weapons and their operation and repair, and be a propagandist of scientific and technical knowledge among personnel. The troops are waiting for not simply engineers, but engineers with initiative, creative thinkers, broad-minded people.

Scientific and technical progress, and this was also noted at a conference in the Party Central Committee, and its acceleration require from us not only an engineering education and engineering competence, but also engineering prowess. In the army this arises primarily from two circumstances. First of all, the pace of renovating combat equipment in the troops has increased considerably; it is constantly being modernized. Secondly, the army and navy are receiving new models of combat equipment which embody the latest achievements of such scientific specialties as microelectronics, applied mathematics and others.

In military aviation, for example, among the changes which have taken place in the last 5-10 years, one should make special note of electronic computer equipment. It has become a wide part of ground and on-board automated command and control systems. The use of electronic computers for carrying out engineering calculations makes it possible to reduce substantially the time for performing them (we are not talking minutes here, but seconds), increases accuracy and expands considerably the selection of possible alternatives from all the variety of variants being examined. Moreover, it is possible to automate the solution of a number of key problems with the aid of computers, and direct interfacing with computers in the so-called "interactive mode" expands the possibilities of searching for optimum results even more.

Although the primary "users" of automated command and control systems are commanders and staffs, military engineers act as their first assistants here. They are completely responsible for the working order of automated control systems, the correctness of their functioning and processing of information being fed into them, and timely repair after "failures" and possible damages.

Finally, computers, today comprising the basis of on-board automatic control systems, increase the combat capabilities of aircraft and helicopters: navigation precision, accuracy of hitting air and ground targets, the use of electronic warfare equipment and others.

Today, interfacing with computers is a "second literacy," and the engineer of today must master computer equipment as fluently as he mastered, let's say, the slide rule in the past.

But another thing is also important. A military engineer must not only be a skilled "user" of information systems, but also a "formulator" of problems. It appears that this also requires a sharp intensification of scientific methods work in military VUZes as a basis for improving the teaching and educational process and the primary means for increasing academic activeness and developing the creative thinking of future engineers.

So, it is as though the military engineer is a connecting link between the achievements of modern science and the combat equipment in which these achievements are realized. This status of today's military engineer, under the conditions of acceleration of scientific and technical progress, demands of him comprehensive training, that which today contributes to a brief, but capacious concept--competency.

One can hardly conceive successful activities of a military specialist without profound engineering knowledge. It is acquired in VUZes. That is why, in our opinion, the thought of stepping up the instruction of fundamental disciplines, especially in the first years of instruction, merits support in order to develop the ability to think openmindedly and independently and constantly master the new.

The range of problems which military engineers encounter is great. In the troops, at repair enterprises and at scientific centers they may become process engineers, designers or production organizers. These duties obviously will expand with the development of science and technology, and situations can arise which were not covered in VUZes. What is to be done? There exists a similarity in methods of solving seemingly different problems. This similarity is in the fundamental nature of engineering education.

Acceleration of scientific and technical progress demands of engineers constant self-improvement. Constant!

Day by day scientific and technical progress makes serious amendments not only to the design of the combat equipment itself, but also to its operating, repair and combat application processes. The hitherto unprecedented rate of replacing equipment has brought the process of operating it in the troops closer to testing and has required a daily study of its characteristics during combat application, the development of suggestions for its improvement and, in a number of cases, abandoning the usual system of maintenance according to service life and switching to maintenance according to condition.

The military engineer in aviation is, as a rule, a unit (chast') deputy commander, chief of a service or subunit (podrazdeleniye) commander. He must be a skillful organizer and educator of subordinates and a highly qualified leader. The diploma for completing an academy or higher engineering school only gives him the right to fill an engineering position, but he can become a true leader, fully up to the requirements of the times, only in constant

contact with personnel, having acquired practical experience, overcoming the difficulties which arise and persistently working to improve himself.

A VUZ cannot provide ready "recipes" for all instances in life. But in presenting certain courses, instructors usually turn to special problems, and the skills of intuitive thinking, which are developed in the process of instruction, acquire tremendous importance in solving them. Engineering intuition is a great thing. But it is found through years and experience. A deep and objective analysis of the observations of the engineer himself as well as the observations of flight personnel is required in order to draw sound conclusions connected to servicing and operating complex modern equipment.

Again I want to talk about one quality which is absolutely necessary for today's engineer--a sense of the new. A search for the new and progressive must always accompany the activities of a military engineer of any rank: from the chief of the smallest subunit to the leader of large importance. The new does not come by itself. One must discern, feel and evaluate it, and not only for oneself. One must develop and maintain a creative atmosphere in the collective and direct the initiative of people to search for the most effective ways of increasing the operational readiness of equipment, weapons and combat systems, to be able to make the most of the combat capabilities of modern military equipment, to conserve the service live and to use expendable materials and other material valuables sparingly. Of course, it is up to the engineers to set the tone in inventive and innovative work.

It is not easy to be an innovator in engineering. This is a great honor, but also a great responsibility. A person who has embarked on the path of innovation is urged to foster in himself the qualities of high civic spirit, collectivism, business-like efficiency and enthusiasm. There are many such people in the troops, who are the reliable support of commanders. Officers S. Yevdokimov, V. Kravchenko and V. Lavrentyev, graduates of our academy, have become highly qualified specialists and teachers, skilled leaders and educators of subordinates. They have distinguished themselves in carrying out their internationalist duty in the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan and have been honored with high state awards. Military engineers Yu. Anisimov and V. Fukatov, specialists on aviation equipment and radio electronics, enjoy great prestige in the troops.

The party requires the stepping up of engineering work and political acuity in interpreting and solving the most important problems of today and tomorrow. Regardless of where a military engineer works--in a line unit, at a repair enterprise, in a science laboratory or in an administrative apparatus--he is obliged to understand his role in hastening scientific and technical progress and his purpose.

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EDITORIAL EMPHASIZES 'VIGILANCE'

Moscow SOVETSKIY PATRIOT in Russian 24 Jul 85 p 1

[Editorial: "Instill Vigilance"]

[Text] "Having begun our peacetime construction, we will do everything in our power to see that it continues without interruption," V. I. Lenin said at the very outset of Soviet power. "At the same time, comrades," he emphasized, "be on the alert and cherish the defensive capability of our country and our Red Army as the apple of our eye..." The great leader of the working people taught the party and the people to display a high degree of revolutionary vigilance and discipline.

Following Lenin's legacy, in its activities the party proceeds from the fact that one of the most important ways to strengthen the economic and defensive might of the Motherland is constantly to increase vigilance and educate the working people in the spirit of constant readiness to repulse any aggressor. Delivering the report "The Immortal Feat of the People" on 8 May 1985, M. S. Gorbachev emphasized with special strength that today, more than every before, this involves watchfulness for the schemes of those who are pushing the world toward the brink of war, this time a nuclear one.

DOSAAF organizations are faced with a task to deepen and expand anti-imperialist propaganda, decisively expose the aggressive essence of American imperialism and its NATO allies and instill in Soviet people high revolutionary vigilance and personal responsibility for the historical fortunes of the Motherland.

In greeting the 9th All-Union DOSAAF Congress, the CPSU Central Committee turned the attention of the members of the many-million-strong defense society to the fact that, in connection with the aggravation of the international situation through the fault of the aggressive circles of imperialism, it is necessary to be constantly concerned about strengthening the security of our state and to heighten education of the Soviet people in a spirit of high vigilance. The party assigns an important role to the defense society in completing this task.

The theme of vigilance, concentration and efficient and disciplined work must constantly be heard in the reports, lectures and talks given by DOSAAF

propagandists and lecturers of the defense society. It can take its proper place in methods studies of DOSAAF clubs and in visual agitation put up in primary organizations and in the Lenin Rooms of schools and clubs.

In Moscow, the capital of our Motherland, a group of speakers of the Moskvoretskiy DOSAAF Raykom is famous. Jointly with the rayon organization of the "Znaniye" Society, propagandists of the defense society regularly deliver lectures and reports at labor collectives and educational institutions and establishments.

The theme of vigilance and active preparation for defending the socialist Fatherland is constantly clearly reflected in the addresses of defense society activists I. Bulychev, M. Glinskiy, V. Konkov, I. Orlov and other propagandists. Revealing Lenin's behests concerning vigilance and maintaining constant readiness to repulse imperialist aggressors, the lecturers always find striking and convincing examples from the experience of labor collectives. In so doing, they turn to the pages of the life of those who fought at the fronts in the Great Patriotic War years and who have shown their worth during the postwar period in performing their international duty.

"Military vigilance and strictness, steadfastness in taking all precautions!" These words of V. I. Lenin especially apply today, when the imperialists continually force tension in international relations, advocate an ideology and policy of "rejecting socialism," "massed influence," and "balancing on the brink of war" and constantly conduct subversive activities directed against the USSR and other countries of the socialist community.

American militarism is especially zealous in this. The imperial claims of the US to "zones of vital interests" and to the "right" to interfere into the internal affairs of other countries and "encourage" or "punish" sovereign countries and nations depending on Washington's whims account for a lot!

Aware of the magnitude of the military threat, M. S. Gorbachev emphasized in his report dedicated to the 40th anniversary of the Great Victory that, realizing our responsibility for the fate of the world, we will not allow the military-strategic balance between the USSR and the US and between the Warsaw Pact and NATO to be broken. We will adhere to this policy in the future as well, for we have learned firmly, once and for all, that which the past has taught us.

In the work to educate the working people, especially young people, in the spirit of adherence to traditions and in the spirit of high vigilance, a great role belongs to the DOSAAF clubs. In Belorussia and Azerbaijan and in the Crimean, Kuybyshev and Odessa oblast DOSAAF clubs, the theme of vigilance is found constantly and is developed with the proper intensity and comprehensiveness. Participating in training young people for service in the Armed Forces, workers of the DOSAAF clubs prepare substantive methods councils and illustrations for propagandists and for tutors of DOSAAF schools and clubs. Films on vigilance and literature on the feats of DOSAAF alumni performed while carrying out their international duty in Afghanistan help to raise bold, courageous and vigilant defenders of the Motherland.

Vigilance is our weapon. Instructors and masters of the Ekibastuz Motor Vehicle School (Pavlodar Oblast) constantly remind students of the importance of this slogan. Take, for example, instructor N. Belousov. At lessons and during conversations with his pupils outside of classes, he continually stresses the importance of discipline and vigilance for the future military driver.

Talks about events in the country and party and government decisions, meetings with veterans of the revolution, war and labor and with soldiers discharged into the reserve invite vigilance and a conscientious attitude toward labor and encourage the young people to prepare as well as they can for defending the Motherland.

Well thought-out, lively work to educate young people in the spirit of high vigilance and readiness to defend the Motherland is being conducted by the primary organizations of DOSAAF, the Zavety Iliche Kolkhoz of Uritskiy Rayon of Orel Oblast, Naryshkino Middle School No 2 (Udmurt ASSR) and the motorships General Bagration and Tsezar Kunikov of the Georgian Steamship Line (city of Batumi). Here much work is underway to prepare for the 27th CPSU Congress and, in particular, to instill in youth a readiness to defend the Motherland with dignity and honor.

A colorfully designed DOSAAF corner, a defense organization wall newspaper, viewing a film on a military-patriotic topic, a well-prepared discussion of a book read or a film viewed can give a reminder about the importance of vigilance and the need to be always on the alert and to strengthen the defensive capability of the Fatherland. These and numerous other forms will help strengthen high patriotism and love for the Motherland and instill a burning hatred for the enemies of peace and socialism and those who seek to kindle the fire of a new world war.

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MILITARY POLITICAL ISSUES

DOSAAF CC ON SCIENTIFIC-TECHNICAL PROGRESS

Moscow SOVETSKIY PATRIOT in Russian 31 Jul 85 p 1

[Editorial: "With a Policy of Acceleration: Horizons of Technical Progress"]

[Text] A conference was held in the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee (CC). Chairman of the DOSAAF CC, Flt Adm G. Yegorov, gave a report "On the Results of a Conference in the CPSU Central Committee on Problems of Hastening Scientific and Technical Progress." He emphasized that successful completion of the tasks on speeding up scientific and technical progress depends primarily on people who are the makers of new equipment, on their conscientious and responsible fulfillment of their duties and on their understanding of the importance and significance of changes occurring in the country's economic system. For this it is necessary to bring about a fundamental change in the psychology of people, their minds and mood, and to focus attention on unresolved problems.

The capabilities of the press and propagandist of the defense society must be fully set into action in solving this problem.

The speaker further noted that an indispensable condition of practical implementation of scientific and technical developments is the state approach to planning with a mandatory consideration of the end results of the activities of all subdivisions of the society. Also necessary are the further improvement of the management system and improvement of the qualitative indicators of production enterprises whose output does not yet meet modern requirements.

Yegorov addressed a number of critical remarks to scientific research and development collectives of the society which to date have not ensured a decisive turn to the needs of defense organizations. Long periods of development of new products results in these products becoming obsolete even before the start of series production.

Innovators and inventors must make their weighty contribution to speeding up scientific and technical progress, comrade Yegorov continued. In order to step up their work, it is necessary to raise the role of socialist competition and take steps to improve morale and material incentives.

Chief of the Directorate of Mass Organizational Work and Military-Patriotic Propaganda of the USSR DOSAAF CC, A. Mamayev, opened discussion on the report. He underscored the need for further dissemination of technical knowledge among the population, popularization of activists of scientific and technical creative work and establishing a most strict policy of economy, which must be monitored for observance by the auditing committees. Comrade Mamayev also noted that hastening scientific and technical progress imposes new, increased demands on management personnel.

Deputy chief of the Directorate of Aviation Training and Aviation Sports of the USSR DOSAAF CC, Yu. Novikov, talked about problems of further improving flight instruction and introducing new aviation, parachute and other equipment. Chief of the USSR DOSAAF CC Directorate of Capital Construction and Material and Technical Supply, V. Suvorov, directed attention to the problems of careful expenditure of assets and material resources (including fuel and lubricants) in the training and sports organizations of the society.

Deputy chief of the USSR DOSAAF CC Directorate of Naval and Radio Training, E. Brusilovskiy dwelled on such important reserves for raising the quality of training technical specialists as building trainers simulating functioning assemblies and mechanisms, making training films and introducing a special apparatus for selection to DOSAAF schools. Deputy chief of the USSR DOSAAF CC Directorate of Technical and Military-Applied Types of Sports dwelled on the state of domestic sports equipment and causes impeding its development.

Much attention at the conference was given to problems of renovating, technical re-equipping and structural rebuilding DOSAAF production enterprises and to improving the quality of products produced by them, especially specialized products. Deputy chief of the USSR DOSAAF CC Directorate of Production Enterprises, V. Kendzya, chief of the UkrpromDOSAAF Association, N. Rumyantsev, general director of the Patriot Leningrad Production Association, A. Klevtsov, and director of the USSR DOSAAF CC Kharkov Industrial Design Bureau, V. Moroz, talked about this.

Giving the closing remarks, DOSAAF CC Chairman Yegorov noted that a useful exchange of opinions had taken place and attention was once again concentrated on tasks of paramount importance which should be resolved in the 12th Five-Year Plan. He expressed confidence that the workers of the defense society, in welcoming the 27th CPSU Congress, will do everything in their power to put into practice the party requirements for hastening scientific and technical progress--a key factor for strengthening the economic and defensive might of our country.

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MILITARY-POLITICAL ISSUES

REVIEW: DOROSHENKO BOOK -- 'WHENCE THE THREAT TO PEACE'

Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian 25 Jul 85 p 3

[Review by Doctor of Historical Sciences V. Nemyatyy of book "Kto ugrozhat miru" (Whence the Threat to Peace) by V.S. Doroshenko, Politizdat Ukrainy, 1985]

[Text] In the struggle to prevent the nuclear conflagration which threatens all mankind, it is highly important to reveal who is truly to blame for the arms race and for exacerbating international tensions, and to show that the Soviet Union pursues a peace-loving course in its foreign policy. The book "Kto ugrozhat miru" by Candidate of Historical Sciences V.S. Doroshenko deals with precisely this subject.

The book debunks the myth of the "Soviet military threat," which occupies a central place among the militaristic concepts and doctrines of bourgeois propaganda. The author underscores the fact that monopolistic circles, primarily American, are using this myth in an attempt to reduce the intensity of class battles in the capitalist nations and to consolidate the forces of reaction for combatting democracy and progress in the situation of growing conflicts among the imperialists. An enormous build-up of the NATO bloc's military capability is being carried out under the cloak of malicious anti-Soviet fabrications.

The "Soviet threat" is a current disinformational stereotype in the campaign launched in the West to distort the peace-loving foreign policy course of the CPSU and the Soviet State.

This work proves that the legend of the "Soviet military danger" is being disseminated by imperialism's extensive and branching diversion and propaganda system, which includes propaganda and intelligence agencies themselves, military departments, the mass media and scientific research centers. Using the latest sources, including foreign ones, the author reveals in detail the "technology" used by the falsifiers for their subversive work and the refined mechanism for producing and disseminating slander.

The CIA and the intelligence agency of the U.S. Defense Department, to which goes a considerable part of the "credit" for whipping up the deadly nuclear arms race, have a special role in the disinformation strategy of the West.

The system of lies and juggling of facts--the deliberate exaggeration of the USSR's defense capability--is used for each new spiral of the arms race. The history of that race, however, the book underscores, exposes the falsity of the bourgeois concept of the claimed "equal responsibility" of the USSR and the USA, which is actually an attempt to lay responsibility for escalating the production of weapons of mass destruction equally upon the Soviet Union and the United States. It demonstrates the baselessness of various types of publications turned out by American and NATO militarists for purposes of "supporting" the deceitful versions advanced by them. The book reveals the detrimental nature of the methodology employed by U.S. secret services for "assessing" Soviet defense outlays.

The author exposes from the class standpoint the ugly role of the bourgeois mass media, which serve as an obedient tool in the hands of the strategists of psychological warfare. They all zealously serve the interests of the U.S. military-industrial complex, that dishonorable alliance of the military, weapons builders and the state bureaucracy.

The so-called "think tanks," which seek false "theoretical substantiation" for the thesis of the "Soviet military threat," are an inseparable component of imperialism's machinery for ideological diversion.

An important place in the book is given over to a study of the specific causes of the escalation of the arms race, which has assumed unprecedented scope today. They are rooted in the militaristic orientation of the foreign policy course of the United States, which is planning to establish its world dominance as early as World War II. For achieving this, it was counting mainly on a policy of operating from "a position of strength," which was directed primarily against the Soviet Union. Official documents cited in the book prove that the American imperialists were hatching up various alternatives for a nuclear attack on the USSR back during the first post-war years.

The author analyses the strategic military concepts and the doctrines of monopolistic capital's reactionary circles and reveals their stimulating role with respect to stirring up the militaristic psychosis. He cites facts illustrating the unceasing search for "optimal" methods for using the USA's enormous arsenals of nuclear weapons for resolving international problems to the benefit of American imperialism. The book exposes the aggressive nature of the American program for creating an antisatellite defense system and preparing for "star wars." It cites substantiated evidence, including the evidence of American specialists, which demonstrates that Washington's attempt to provide itself with a militaristic space shield, hoping to take shelter behind it against retaliation, has no basis from the scientific point of view.

Problems of nuclear disarmament have a significant place in the book. It tells about the two opposite approaches to this issue and convincingly proves that the United States and its NATO partners are attempting to turn Western Europe into an arsenal of the latest, increasingly more destructive nuclear weapons.

The arrival of young replenishments for the regiment's officer collective is a special time in this work. We ordinarily have a substantive talk with the military school graduates, in which the deputy regimental commanders, the battalion and company commanders participate. We attempt to learn as much as possible about the lieutenants. And we orient them toward the extensive and thorough study of the men.

We actively draw upon the chiefs of branches of troops and services to work with the young officers. As a rule, these are men grown wiser from experience, with a good understanding of pedagogics and psychology. Not all of them strive to pass their know-how on to the youth, however. Some of them also sometimes become so involved with the technical aspect of the job that they forget about indoctrination. Not so long ago, for example, Guards Captain F. Serpinskiy was a company commander. In that position, he knew how to reach the minds and hearts of his men. He has now been made chief of the unit's armored service, however, and he does not seem like the same officer. He feels that the equipment and the repair base are his chief concern. Those who are behind that equipment and that base, however, are like peas in a pod, so to speak, to Serpinskiy. And so, we have to remind some of the specialists that the equipment has no life without people.

Following the example of the aforementioned Guards Captain Syromyatnikov, many of the officers correspond with the parents of soldiers and sergeants. I myself correspond with them. I am convinced that this is beneficial. A letter from the parental home of a soldier or sergeant will sometimes tell you things which it would take you a long time to find out on your own. The following is just one example.

The mother and father of Guards Sergeant S. reported in a letter that their son had asked them to send him a considerable amount of money and a civilian suit. "Has something gone wrong with him?" the concerned parents asked. Since this was a subordinate of Guards Captain V. Kolodyazhnyy, chief of the engineer service, I assigned to him the task of getting to the bottom of it all and reporting on the matter.

The officer's talk with his subordinate brought exactly nothing: The sergeant, he said, conscientiously performed his duties, and there were no complaints about him. S. needed the money to buy his parents a present just before being released into the reserve, and he also wanted the suit by that time. A more thorough study of the matter, however, revealed that Guards Sergeant S. planned to get a leave on his next day off and leave the boundaries of the garrison to visit a female acquaintance. How would the story have ended, had we not succeeded in getting to the bottom of it in time.

I believe that this incident was a good lesson for the service chief, and not just for him. It has become the norm in the regiment for the service chief to be highly embarrassed if a check shows that the regimental commander or, his deputy for political affairs, as an example knows the chief's subordinates better than he does.

And so, the specialists at the technical level are gradually coming to take a more active stance in life. Questions sometimes arise in the work performed with them, however, whose resolution does not depend upon us alone.

The state of military discipline in the communications subunit once caused concern at headquarters. For a time we did not intervene. We hoped that Guards Lieutenant I. Sudak, the subunit commander, would himself take steps. Another infraction of discipline soon occurred, however. It did not take too much time for Guards Lieutenant Colonel N. Shchegolev, deputy regimental commander for political affairs, to get to the bottom of the situation and make the necessary recommendations to the young officer. The latter could not conceal his surprise: "And I have been racking my brains over this for many months"!

One cannot help wondering just what the future commander and indoctrinator was taught at the military school. Pedagogical experience comes with practice, of course. It is difficult for the cadet who has no one under him to acquire skills in getting to know personalities. The case of Guards Lieutenant Sudak also indicate something else, however: The military school graduate lacks not only experience in working with people, but even the knowledge of military pedagogics and psychology conforming to his special field. We now work with him as a team, so to speak. One senses that he is slowly acquiring experience and coming to understand the fine points of relations within the collective. A lot of what we are now working so hard to give him, however, he could and should have been taught at the school.

I believe that another error committed by many officers also stems from insufficient knowledge. We know that the platoon commander is supposed to know the first and last names, years of birth, kind of work performed prior to entering the military service, the family situation and so forth, of his subordinates. Unfortunately, we also have cases in which a certain platoon or company commander has a reputation for knowing his subordinates well only because he can give the first and last name of each of them without hesitation. When something happens, however, he gets off with the inconsistent excuse that one cannot see into the soul of every individual....

To be a "reference book" of first and last names is not the important thing for an officer. He must know what makes the individual tick, what makes him happy and what are his concerns, what he is striving for in the service, how he sees his future after being released into the reserve and a great deal more. If the commander does not have such knowledge, this means that he is not really close to his subordinates.

Working with and indoctrinating the men is an area of our work in which fascination with what has already been achieved is particularly intolerable. We only have to convince ourselves that things are going well and successfully, to weaken our efforts even for a short period of time, and a great deal can be lost. A constant knowledge of the true situation at any level in the regiment, objective assessments and reports, unity of decisions and action, being close to the men and understanding their feelings--this is the basis for political and indoctrinational work which makes it possible to maintain discipline and order at the level of today's demands.

Our regiment became an excellent one during the past training year. We are now striving for even greater achievements in the competition. Will we

achieve our goal! This will depend in great part upon how each of the officers indoctrinates his subordinates, influences their behavior with his words and personal example, gets to know and develops their personalities.

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MILITARY-POLITICAL ISSUES

BRIEFS

DRUNKENNESS ON SUBMARINE CRITICIZED--Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 23 August 1985 second edition carries on page 2, under the rubric "Discipline Is the Foundation of Combat Readiness" and the headline "Commander's Position," a 2,000-word report by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Captain 3D Class V. Pasyakin on a case of a "crew member's drunkenness" aboard a submarine. The boat in question had previously been front-ranking but is now a laggard. The reason for this metamorphosis, Pasyakin writes, lay in "certain cases of blatant violations of military discipline: the consumption of liquor, nonregulation relations among sailors, and so forth." The boat's commander, Captain 2D Class A. Chikin, is said to have permitted some sailors to "use liquor." Chikin received a stern reprimand and had his record card endorsed. Pasyakin also criticizes the various verification commissions sent to the submarine which failed to notice that the boat still carried a challenge red banner to which it had long ceased to be entitled. He concludes by stating that it is dangerous for temporary successes to result in attention to "educational work with the personnel and the persistent struggle to strengthen discipline" being sacrificed. 23 Aug PP/Marshall/ JB 28/0333Z Aug [Editorial Report] [PM]

GLAVPU JOURNALISTS CONFERENCE--A conference of workers of the central military press of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy was held. A report was given by chief editor of AVIATSIYA I KOSMONAVTIKA Col O. Nazarov on the editorial staff's work on dealing with questions of strengthening discipline and military and moral indoctrination of personnel in light of the requirements of the April (1985) CPSU Central Committee Plenum, the Party Central Committee resolution "On Measures for Overcoming Drunkenness and Alcoholism" and orders and directives of the USSR Minister of Defense and the chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy. Maj Gen N. Shapalin, deputy chief of the Propaganda and Agitation Department of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy addressed the conference. [Text] [Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 27 Jul 85 p 5] 12567

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MILITARY SCIENCE

U.S. MILITARY DOCTRINE 'AGGRESSIVENESS' DISCUSSED

Moscow ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE in Russian No 6, Jun 85 (signed to press 10 Jun 85) pp 7-13

[Article by Lt Gen I. Rudnev under the rubric "General Problems and Armed Forces": "Intensifying the Aggressiveness of U.S. Military Doctrine"]

[Text] Reagan's first term in office was marked by a sharp complication of the military-political situation in the world and in individual regions, by a stepping up of the arms race both in the United States and in the NATO bloc as a whole, by the breaking off of the talks to limit nuclear arms and by an intensification of the aggressiveness of American policy. As CPSU Central Committee General Secretary M. S. Gorbachev noted in an interview by the editor of PRAVDA, "In Washington they are counting on strength, and make no secret of that. They are also counting on superior strength, which would subordinate the rest of the world to America."

In accordance with the strategy of "direct confrontation" with the Soviet Union adopted by the Reagan Administration and the announced "crusade" against communism, the United States, its leading NATO allies and Japan have taken a number of political, ideological, economic and military actions aimed at undermining the Soviet Union's influence in the world, eliminating progressive and democratic regimes in developing countries and sharply building up their own military potential in order to achieve superiority and support the "from a position of strength" policy.

The beginning of President Reagan's second term has been marked by appeals from both the President himself and those closest to him for peace with their neighbors and allies and even with their enemies, and to look for solutions supposedly mutually acceptable to the Soviet Union for a substantial reduction and, in the end, total elimination of nuclear weapons on our planet.

These are their words. But what is Washington actually undertaking in this light in deed?

As appears from the speeches of the President himself and the main members of his administration--Bush, Shultz, Weinberger--U.S. policy is now being given a new, more powerful impulse, expected to last practically until the end of this century. It is directed at further intensifying aggressiveness in the

country's foreign policy and stepping up military preparations in order to achieve unquestionable military superiority over the Soviet Union on all indicators.

In the early 1980s, the US launched the most massive build-up of military might noted in the last several decades. Already in the Reagan Administration's first term it had obtained congressional approval of military appropriations amounting to \$906.7 billion, and for the coming 4 years it is planned to increase them by more than 54 percent to \$1.4 trillion. "Might and diplomacy," Shultz declared in his speech in the Senate Armed Forces Committee in February 1985, "are not separate aspects of policy; they are inseparably interlinked."

Such aims by the U.S. leadership in the area of the country's foreign and military policy have entailed a search for ways to improve the military doctrine which would serve the interests of American imperialism until the end of this century.

As we know, the military doctrine of any state has two interrelated aspects--socio-political and military-technical.

The first aspect in U.S. military doctrine has always had a reactionary, anti-democratic essence. As the military potential increases, it acquires an ever-increasing aggressive trend, primarily against the world system of socialism, and serves the economic and political subordination of other countries for the purpose of establishing world hegemony and diktat of American imperialism.

The military-technical aspect of the doctrine includes matters of immediate military construction, technical equipment of the armed forces, training and determining the forms and methods of conducting operations and war as a whole.

The continual growth of military potential in the US has systematically led to a revision of earlier adopted military-political aims, military strategies and concepts toward increasing their bellicosity and aggressiveness. In the 1950s the basis of U.S. military doctrine was the so-called strategy of "massive retaliation," in the 1960s it was "flexible response," in the 1970s--"realistic deterrence," and starting in the 1980s--"direct confrontation."

The present period is not exception either, characterized by the unprecedented scope of the arms race unfurled in the United States, based on using the latest scientific achievements and discoveries, including in the field of space equipment and space weapons, for military purposes. They are pursuing a course for a continuous, with a view to the end of this century, process of modernizing the entire arsenal of American warmaking weapons, including their deployment in outer space as well. More lethal and precision nuclear and conventional weapons systems with automatic and autonomous guidance are being developed. The newest types of weapons and combat equipment are being developed on a qualitatively new technological base, and the entire spectrum of command and control, communications, surveillance and electronic warfare (EW) systems as well as the organizational structure of the armed forces are being improved. All of these and other factors are assumed as the basis for further development of American armed forces in order to create a military

potential in the 1990s which would enable the US to wage any type of war--nuclear and conventional, global and limited, coalition and independent, fast moving and long wars--and win.

In this connection, Pentagon experts promoted a "scientific" search and engaged in substantiating new principles of employing the armed forces which would take into account the aggressive political aims of the country's ruling circles in the area of foreign and military policy. Their goal is to place a "scientific base" under an openly militaristic policy directed at an unrestrained arms race in the name of "national interests and the leading role of the US in the world."

As it appears from statements by Reagan Administration officials and the American press, it is not ruled out that for the 1990s the principle of so-called "guaranteed survival" or "guaranteed security" may become acceptable for the United States in place of the current "deterrence" or "restraint." More precisely, they are pursuing a course of creating a base for inflicting an unpunished disarming first strike on the Soviet Union which would be ensured by deployment of a reliable anti-ballistic missile (ABM) defense. Thus, the principle of "guaranteed survival" would be realized on terms advantageous for the West.

Just what fundamentally new substance are the theorists from Washington putting into the strategy of "direct confrontation" and the combat employment principles of both strategic offensive forces and general purpose forces?

First of all, they plan to legitimize the "crusade" against communism in the political essence of the "direct confrontation" strategy, but with a still greater accent on aggressiveness in implementing the global and regional foreign policy of the United States. In the opinion of certain members of the Reagan Administration, there should be a shift in U.S. policy from "selective" [dozirovannoye] to "massive" use of military force in order to ensure achievement of set foreign policy objectives in the shortest possible time.

Secondly, there is a tendency to replace the principle of "partnership" with "strategic partnership with the United States having the leading role." The idea of the latter comes down to having regional military-political blocs and alliances everywhere under the aegis of the US, based on a general anti-Soviet and anti-democratic platform. Now NATO is such a bloc, as American General Rogers, Supreme Commander Allied Forces in Europe, believes, in which it is necessary in the future "to preserve the leading role of the US."

In the East, according to the plan of Washington strategists, a new military-political bloc must be established--a Pacific Ocean association which would be the equivalent of NATO on the eastern boundaries of the Soviet Union. It is planned to include the US, Japan, Canada, South Korea, and ASEAN and ANZUS countries. Implementation of this plan is being persistently pushed by the leadership of the US and Japan under the pretext of needing to form at the first stage a regional trade and economic association of Pacific Ocean basin states, with its subsequent transformation into a military-political alliance allegedly for the purpose of countering the Soviet Union's influence in this region vitally important for the West.

At the center of the Reagan Administration's attention in the South is the recently created Council of Cooperation of Arab States of the Persian Gulf, which it is trying to turn into a regional military-political bloc. On Washington's part, a variety of military assistance is being given this organization, both for re-equipping the armies of the Council countries with American combat equipment and weapons and for improving the infrastructure of their territories, with the right of U.S. Armed Forces to use the military bases of these states. In the final analysis, the American leadership is counting on instituting its control and influence in this organization by drawing other states of the region into it.

In Central America, the diktat of the United States and its pressure on Latin American countries are intensifying for the purpose of forming a regional bloc whose activities would be directed against Nicaragua and Cuba and against national patriotic forces in this region.

Thus, the principle of "strategic partnership with the United States having the leading role" pursues the goal of forming new regional military-political blocs and alliances both in the East and in the South. Later on they could be combined with NATO into a single global coalition of imperialist forces operating against the Soviet Union, other socialist states and countries with progressive regimes. The principle of "strategic partnership," as never before, assumes making the maximum use of the economic and military potentials of all members of imperialist blocs and groupings in opposing the Soviet Union and other countries of socialism and democracy.

Thirdly, the principle of "negotiations," as appears from U.S. Secretary of State Shultz's statement during his Senate address in January 1985 on the question of the country's future foreign policy, must be replaced by the principle of "negotiations and strength simultaneously." The strength device in American diplomacy is nothing new. It has been present at all times, but now they intend to give it legal status. In this connection, both President Reagan and members of his administration openly state that for strengthening the American position at negotiations with the Soviet Union on limiting nuclear arms the United States must give a "green light" to all current and future programs in the area of developing and modernizing its strategic offensive arms in order to negotiate "from a position of strength." Such a course has found support in the country's legislative bodies.

The principle of "negotiations and strength simultaneously" has also started to find its practical application in U.S. relations with its allies. In particular, it was used with respect to Belgium, whose government resisted, but in the end was forced to concede its territory for stationing American first-strike cruise missiles. The United States also used the same principle with respect to their ANZUS ally--New Zealand. The country's government categorically forbid American ships carrying nuclear weapons to make port calls at New Zealand bases. In response to this, the Reagan Administration imposed a number of political, economic and military sanctions against New Zealand.

Overall, the foreign policy aspect of the new principles being developed in the United States, in all their fundamental tenets, will be based primarily on

strength and be conducted precisely from such positions. In this connection, in developing the U.S. military potential for the period up to the end of the current century, wide-scale military preparations are being carried out and planned, the essence of which boils down to the following.

In improving both nuclear and conventional arms, the central point is given to building precision guided weapons for various purposes for all branches of the armed forces, ensuring reliable destruction of targets with the minimum necessary amount of ammunition. According to estimates of the American leadership, such measures will increase considerably the striking power and combat effectiveness of both nuclear and conventional forces (without a significant quantitative increase). Furthermore, strategic offensive forces will remain, as before, the cornerstone of U.S. military might. In developing these forces for the period up to the end of the 1990s, priority is being given to central programs: building new intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and ballistic missiles for Ohio-class fleet ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs); modernizing strategic bomber aviation and developing new precision cruise missiles with increased operating ranges; improving strategic command and control, communications and surveillance systems. This entire spectrum of improving and further developing the American strategic "triad," in Reagan's estimation, has the objective of bringing the U.S. strategic forces in line with Washington's strategic policy. Practical work has been planned and is being accomplished in full swing on all these directions.

Primary attention in developing land-based strategic missile forces is concentrated on putting into service the new highly accurate MX missile beginning in 1986, claimed by U.S. military-political leadership to be "one of the principal elements of American strategy." Under current plans, 100 of these missiles are to be deployed in hardened Minuteman III ICBM silos by December 1989. The total cost of this program, as appears from American press reports, will be about \$21.5 billion. Development of another highly accurate Midgetman ICBM in a mobile variant will possibly continue, which is planned to enter the inventory of the Strategic Air Command in the early 1990s.

These missiles, possessing high accuracy (CEP of about 120 meters), will be first-strike weapons and are designed to hit point and heavily defended enemy objectives. Research and development for developing a new maneuvering, highly accurate nuclear warhead for these missiles which, Pentagon experts estimate, will increase considerably the probability of hitting any small, stationary target, including hardened ones.

Development of strategic bomber aviation is proceeding along the following directions: modernizing B-52 aircraft currently in service as long-range (up to 2,600 km) nuclear cruise missile platforms, putting in service the new B-1 strategic supersonic missile carrier beginning in 1985 (at least 100 of them), building in the early 1990s a new strategic bomber under the "Stealth" program and developing new long-range supersonic cruise missiles. All of this is being done in order for U.S. strategic bomber aviation to acquire the capability to deliver precision nuclear strikes from great distances without the aircraft platforms entering the kill zone of enemy active air defense weapons.

In sea-based strategic missile forces, main attention is focused on continuing construction of Ohio-class SSBNs (24 missiles each), for a total of at least 20 submarines, and on building for them the new, highly accurate Trident II SLBM which should come into service in the late 1980s. The first SSBN squadron equipped with Ohio-class boats has been formed in the Pacific Ocean. They have been on combat patrol in the northeastern Pacific Ocean since 1983 and are based at a specially built naval base at Bangor. A second such squadron is planned to be established in the Atlantic, based at Kings Bay (on the eastern coast of the US).

Compared to the U.S. Navy's SSBNs in the inventory with Poseidon missiles, as foreign press emphasizes, Ohio-class submarines have missiles with a longer range, which enables them to conduct combat patrols in waters adjacent to U.S. territory and to be under cover of stationary hydro-acoustical surveillance facilities and active air defense weapons. It is believed that this substantially increases their invulnerability.

Highly accurate medium-range missiles--Pershing II medium-range ballistic missiles, land-based (GLCM) and sea-based (Tomahawk) cruise missiles, having high accuracy for hitting stationary targets and an operating range of up to 2,600 km--are a fundamentally new element in U.S. nuclear armament.

Wide-scale deployment of them in Western Europe (108 Pershing II launchers in the FRG by the end of 1985, 464 cruise missiles in 1998) and of Tomahawk missiles on more than 170 nuclear submarines and surface vessels of the Navy by the mid-1990s will substantially increase the U.S. strategic potential. Furthermore, a significant portion of the sea-based cruise missile platforms will be part of forward groupings of the American fleet deployed in waters of the North Atlantic, the Mediterranean Sea, the western part of the Pacific Ocean and in the northern part of the Indian Ocean.

As a result, in the estimates of U.S. military-political leadership, the Soviet Union will be faced with the threat of using American medium-range nuclear weapons practically along the entire perimeter of its borders.

The U.S. strategic and medium-range nuclear weapons of the 1990s will, in the opinion of American experts, possess fundamentally new qualities compared to existing weapons and especially for capabilities of delivering precision strikes in short periods of time against enemy installations, including heavily defended ones. As foreign press emphasizes, the next stage in the development of American strategic nuclear arms has arrived, when nuclear weapons, owing to the considerable increase in accuracy and yield, have begun to acquire new utilization features. As Paul Nitze, adviser to the President and Secretary of State on arms control, stated in the U.S. Senate during his address on the MX program, "we must be able to threaten a number of targets having great importance for the Soviet leadership, including hardened silo launchers, command posts and other military installations."

The wide-scale R&D which has begun under Reagan's "Strategic Defense Initiative," or more precisely the 'Star Wars' program, is aimed at creating an American global missile-impenetrable shield with space-based components, under the protection of which Washington, as is underscored in American press,

could "take aim at the entire world, and not just the Soviet Union." Implementation of this program, according to a statement by U.S. Under Secretary of Defense Fred Ikle, pursues the goal of "creating a serious threat of using offensive nuclear weapons."

"Strategic MX missiles and 'Star Wars,'" stated U.S. Senator L. Weicker, "are not defensive arms: They are designed for conducting nuclear war and, being such, they undermine strategic security."

There should be hardly any doubt that in the White House and on Capitol Hill they understand that creation of a worldwide ABM system and militarization of outer space will inevitably entail an uncontrolled arms race in all directions and for many years to come. U.S. Secretary of Defense Weinberger said frankly that even after the United States "enters the framework" of research work on the 'Star Wars' program, it "will need nuclear arsenals anyway, including intercontinental ballistic missiles."

Such a policy of the American Administration towards an arms race with the inclusion of outer space is directed at achieving strategic military superiority over the Soviet Union and is being inserted into the overall ideology of political aims of the strategy of the 1990s being developed in the United States.

Giving American nuclear forces a first-strike potential also involves searching for a new concept of their combat use, which would replace the current concept of "active countermeasures." However, regardless of what it is called, at its basis is the idea of using the qualitatively new capabilities of American nuclear forces for delivering a "disarming strike" while protecting its own territory with an ABM shield against an enemy's retaliatory strike.

An important role in pursuing the aggressive policy of the US is given to general-purpose forces--ground forces and marines, air and naval forces, called upon to ensure implementation of the "geographic escalation" concept. All the programs for their modernization for the period up to the 1990s are subordinated to a single goal--a substantial increase in striking power and strategic and operational mobility, giving them the ability to conduct not only short and limited wars, but also prolonged and global wars simultaneously in several TVDs, both independently and with military-political bloc allies.

Prospects of developing in the US fundamentally new, highly accurate conventional weapons, and above all reconnaissance-strike complexes with a large operating range, have entailed the development of new concepts for conducting operations and combat both in continental and maritime TVDs.

The command of U.S. (NATO) Armed Forces have officially adopted a new concept of "air-land battle" ("follow-on forces attack" or "deep strike"). Its essence comes down to conducting highly mobile offensive actions, simultaneously striking not only the enemy's first-echelon troops, but also his second echelons, reserves and key fixed objectives located at a great depth. The initial operations against Warsaw Pact countries have already been planned in NATO HQ in accordance with the concept requirements. Foreign press

gives estimates and calculations of the number of potential priority fixed and mobile objectives at a depth of up to 800 km. Furthermore, targets located at a depth of 300 km from the FRG borders with the GDR and the CSSR have been defined in greatest detail.

Foreign press notes that in the border zone on the territories of these states, priority strike objectives include up to 830 mobile and more than 30 of the most important fixed targets (railway stations, bridges, motor vehicle and railroad intersections, command posts, depots, troop groupings and others). These objectives in this zone must be destroyed by fire weapons of ground forces and tactical aviation of NATO.

NATO experts believe that more than 130 mobile and 50 fixed objectives (various types of depots, control posts, airfields, transportation centers and so forth) may be located at a depth of 30-100 km.

It is noted that within 100-300 km (mainly for strikes by aviation and in the future by PLSS and Assault Breaker type reconnaissance-strike complexes) there may be up to 420 mobile and 200 fixed objectives (airfields, command posts, depots, transportation centers, troop groupings and others).

Altogether, in the Central European TVD alone at a 300-km depth on territory of Warsaw Pact countries, there are over 1,660 priority strike objectives in NATO plans.

The considerable renovation of the American Navy's ships, putting into service on a wide scale highly accurate medium- and long-range guided cruise missiles on them, including the usual equipment, and also deployment of automated target designation systems in maritime and, in the future, ocean TVDs for highly accurate weapons will entail certain changes in organizing and conducting maritime operations, based on the fact that the U.S. Navy is being given the capability to deliver precision strikes with conventional guided weapons at great distances against surface targets (over 500 km) and coastal installations (up to 1,300 km). It is believed that this expands considerably the capabilities of the American Navy to conduct highly effective, mobile, aggressive combat operations in maritime and ocean theaters. Equipping ships with the latest precision antiaircraft long-range missile complexes, taking into account the re-equipping carrier aviation with new types of fighters, substantially increases their air defense capabilities for combatting enemy aviation and cruise missiles.

A special role in implementing the aggressive plans of U.S. ruling circles with regard to developing countries is given to the recently created unified Central Command of the U.S. Armed Forces ("Rapid Deployment Force"). Main attention in their modernization is given to increasing strategic mobility. Specific measures are being conducted for this purpose to improve their organization and establishment, equip units (soyedineniya, chasti) with light-weight types of military equipment and weapons and set up mobile and fixed heavy armament and logistic support depots in overseas TVDs, primarily in Southwest Asia. The scale of their participation in special exercises on becoming familiar with the territory of countries where they are most likely to be used is expanding. The entire set of measures to modernize this "fire

"brigade" of American imperialism is planned to be completed in the second half of the 1980s in order to have the capability of rapid use of military force in any areas of the work in which events may develop in a direction not suiting Washington.

Thus, regardless of what name is given in the end to new principles and concepts of U.S. militaristic strategy of the 1990s, its aggressive trend will increase substantially, and the use of military force will become a determining factor in implementing the foreign policy of the ruling circles of the most powerful imperialist state. This inevitably will involve an increased threat of the US unleashing wars of various scale.

As opposed to American military doctrine, Soviet military theory arises from the peaceful policy of the CPSU. This also determines the defensive nature of our military doctrine. It is called upon to ensure the reliable protection and security of the USSR and other countries of the socialist community. "But the defensive nature of our military doctrine," emphasized USSR Minister of Defense MSU S. L. Sokolov, "not only does not rule out, but assumes the high combat readiness of the Armed Forces for delivering retaliatory strikes and the active, decisive actions of our Armed Forces should an aggressor decide to attack us."

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ARMED FORCES

EDITORIAL URGES GREATER ATTENTION TO TECHNICAL INNOVATION

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 20 Jul 85 p 1

[Editorial: "The Technical Creativity of the Fightingmen"]

[Text] Technical creativity in the army and navy has always been an important reserve for enhancing the combat readiness of the units and ships. It is of particular importance at the contemporary stage, however. The troops and naval forces today are being saturated with increasingly complex systems of weapons and combat equipment, means of automated control, microelectronics, computers and other devices, gear and equipment.

The times demand that the creative quest of the army of many thousands of innovators focus on accelerating the process of assimilating the new models of weapons and military equipment, enhancing the effectiveness of their use, reducing the time required to make them combat-ready and improving the training materials and equipment base in the units and subunits and on the ships.

The conference held in the CPSU Central Committee on matters of accelerating scientific and technical progress stressed the fact that while devoting our primary attention to strengthening the large scientific and technical organizations, we must at the same time actively support the work of inventors and efficiency experts, find ways of selecting significant technical proposals and seeing to it that they are applied as rapidly as possible. This party instruction pertains directly also to those who are responsible for technical creativity in the army and navy.

Workers at scientific research and planning and design institutions and the professors and instructors at military educational institutions are making a large contribution to the process of perfecting the weapons and combat equipment, enhancing their reliability and developing diagnostic equipment, control and measurement devices and technical training means. The inventions of Candidate of Technical Sciences, Colonel V. Omelchenko, which are used in the motors of contact electric drives, have increased the reliability of a number of military equipment models, for example. These inventions have also found a use in the national economy. Candidate of Technical Sciences, Colonel V. Bystrov has some valuable developments to his credit in the field of transformer equipment. Innovators of the Military Communications Academy imeni S.M. Budenny and of many units and ships have produced numerous important technical developments for improving communications and control facilities.

Experience has shown that the more persistently and intently commanders, commissions for inventions, party and Komsomol organizations strive to further focus the creative capability of the innovators for resolving the most difficult and largest tasks satisfying the current and future needs of the units and ships, and the more actively they promote the rapid and extensive adoption of innovations, the greater are the successes achieved in the innovators' quest.

Precisely that, rapid and extensive! This means that we need to resolutely reconsider the practice which has developed whereby the research and development end with the building of experimental models of machines, instruments and tools in some place or with the application of the innovations in one or two subunits. Sometimes, all of the "support" for initiative amounts to its approval in another decision or order. This is not enough, of course. The best results in the assimilation of the weapons and combat equipment are achieved with the intelligent and well-conceived formulation of special assignments for the innovators, with concern for their creative work and all-round encouragement of the quest for the most effective solutions. The main thing is to organize the work so that a good and useful undertaking, one which serves the interests of combat readiness, is made available to many.

Special competitions conducted on the scale of services of the Armed Forces, branches of troops, military districts, groups of forces and fleets are designed to play an important role in the accomplishment of urgent technical tasks. Several such competitions have recently been held in the Air Forces, for example. They were designed to help enhance the combat readiness of the formations and units, the skill and training of the personnel. The projects entered in the competition have included developments providing mobility for the TECh [technical maintenance units] and special groups of the units and subunits, mechanizing and reducing the amount of manual labor involved in the performance of periodic technical maintenance and repair work, reducing the time required to prepare and service the aviation equipment, and creating a better training materials base in the units and at military educational institutions.

Unfortunately, the providing of information on innovations proposed by the enthusiasts has not been properly organized throughout. As a result, useful developments which deserve to be extensively adopted frequently remain for a long time the property only of that unit in which they first appeared and were used. Specifically, not enough attention is given to these matters in certain subunits of the Ural, Volga and Central Asian military districts. This is the case despite the fact that the commanders and chiefs have been charged with taking steps to extensively disseminate the most valuable inventions and rationalization proposals.

The competitive review "For Large-Scale and Highly Effective Scientific and Technical Creativity" presently being conducted in the army and navy has confirmed the fact that the dissemination of scientific and technical achievements and advanced know-how, of all that which is displayed at the VDNKh [All-Union Exhibition of Achievements of the National Economy] of the USSR and is published in various sources of information, is expected not only to promote the adoption of various highly effective devices, mechanisms and technical

training means in military praxis, but also to expand the perspective of the innovators and improve the level of their developments.

The main criterion for technical creativity is that it serve the interests of combat readiness. It is the direct duty of commanders, staffs, service chiefs, political organs and party organizations to motivate the personnel and the aktiv of innovators to accomplish precisely these tasks. In this extensive work a great deal depends upon the ability of those in charge to activate that which is figuratively called the human factor in scientific and technical progress--enthusiasm, daring and the high level of skill of the cadres, and a patriotic desire on their part to greet the 27th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in a worthy manner.

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ARMED FORCES

THREATS, METHODS OF FOREIGN ESPIONAGE DESCRIBED

Moscow AGITATOR ARMII I FLOTA in Russian No 10, May 85 pp 20-23

[Article by Col K. Pashikin under the rubric "For Students and Assistant Instructors of Political Study Groups": "Be on the Alert!"*]

[Text] Junior Sergeant V. Rybakov was standing guard at an important facility. Not far away motor vehicles rushed along a noisy city street, and pedestrians dashed about there. Although this was commonplace for the sentry, it did not dull his vigilance. The junior sergeant noticed a black vehicle slow down as it passed the guarded facility, then travel a short distance and turn back. The fightingman spotted a camera in the hands of one of the passengers.

The sentry summoned the commander and the corporal of the guard and reported what he had seen. The vehicle was stopped. The passengers explained their strange behavior in broken Russian, claiming that they were only interested in the sights of the city. A film confiscated from the "tourists" contained numerous exposures of the building which was being guarded, however.

An attempt by enemy agents to obtain information on one facility was thus thwarted thanks to the sentry's vigilance. We could cite numerous such examples of vigilance on the part of Soviet fightingmen.

Just what is vigilance? It is an extensive and much-encompassing concept. First and foremost, it is one of the most important moral-political and fighting qualities of the Soviet fightingman. Vigilance has clearly defined political, military and moral aspects. In the political sense vigilance means a precise and clearly defined position for assessing social phenomena, intolerance of all manifestations of ideology and morals alien to us and of hostile intrigues by our ideological foes, and the ability to expose slanderous fabrications and provocative rumors, to deal a decisive rebuff to the ideological acts of diversion of imperialism and its henchmen.

Vigilance in the military sense is inconceivable without a high level of preparedness for armed defense of the socialist homeland. A high level of combat readiness on the part of the fightingman is the determining criterion and the highest manifestation of his vigilance. For the soldier or seaman, being

*This article is recommended for use in political classes on the subject: "Strictly Safeguard Military and State Secrets, and Be a Vigilant Sightingman."

vigilant therefore means being always prepared to take skilful and determined action against a powerful and technically well equipped enemy.

The moral aspect of vigilance on the part of Soviet fightingmen is manifested in their attitude toward their service duty and toward the demands contained in the military oath and military regulations, in an attitude of intolerance toward loose-tongued people, braggards and frivolous individuals who have lost their sense of responsibility for safeguarding military and state information entrusted to them.

The entire history of our homeland and of the Soviet Armed Forces has convincingly demonstrated that vigilance is our permanent, rustproof weapon. From the first days of its existence the young Soviet Republic found itself within a fiery ring of fronts. Invasions, intrigues, bandit raids, sabotage and attempts on the lives of party figures and active fighters for Soviet power were all employed by our enemies for inflicting maximum harm upon the world's first state of workers and peasants. Life and the fate of the revolution depended primarily upon its ability to defend itself, to be always on the alert and in a state of readiness to repel all intrigues of the class enemies, to promptly recognize and neutralize their criminal plans.

During that terrible time, V.I. Lenin pointed out that "military discipline and military vigilance taken to the highest limits are essential" in the struggle against a powerful and treacherous enemy. He stressed the fact that the first commandment of our policy, the first lesson which all of the workers and peasants must learn, was to be on the alert. Vladimir Ilich concerned himself particularly with the safeguarding of secret information on the Red Army, on its organization, its armament, supplies and combat readiness. He stated that we were in a situation in which military secrets were very important matters, most vital matters, for the Russian Republic.

Following Lenin's precepts, the Communist Party tirelessly indoctrinates the Soviet people and fightingmen in the army and navy in a spirit of unwavering vigilance with respect to imperialism's aggressive intrigues. Today, this involves a drastic increase in imperialism's aggressiveness and an intensification, unprecedented since the war, of the struggle in the international arena between the two social systems, socialism and imperialism, between the two diametrically opposed views of the world.

In the imperialists' aggressive plans a special place is assigned to subversive actions against the Soviet Union and the other socialist nations. This "secret war" is conducted on a broad front. It has been raised to the level of state policy and is carried out by powerful organizations. The system of intelligence agencies of the USA, for example, is composed of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), intelligence services of the State Department, a joint military intelligence agency and others. Espionage departments also function actively in other NATO nations.

What are they interested in? An extremely broad range of items. They attempt to gather information on the state of our economy, our industry, agriculture and transport, on scientific research projects, the adoption of new equipment, and

so forth. However, the enemy agents are particularly zealous in seeking information on the state of our army and navy, the stationing of our units and ships, tactical and technical data on weapons and combat equipment, the substance of our combat training, and other information with defense significance.

It follows from this that every soldier and sailor must constantly demonstrate a high level of vigilance, strictly safeguard military and state secrets, be able to expose the enemy and resolutely repel the enemy's intrigues. This demand of the homeland's defenders is fixed by law in the military oath and military regulations. As each soldier and sailor takes the oath, he formally vows to be a vigilant fightingman and to strictly safeguard military and state secrets. This is required of every fightingman also by the Internal Service Regulations of the Armed Forces of the USSR.

One can sometimes hear certain fightingmen make statements to the effect that secret are kept only in safes, sealed away, so just what kind of secrets could the soldier or sailor have?

Secrets are entrusted to them, however. Many secrets. For example, they know the numerical strength and the structure of their subunits, where they are stationed, the kind of weapons and combat equipment they have and their tactical and technical data, the substance of the combat and political training classes, the names of commanders and chiefs, the kind of rations they receive, the locations of firing ranges and training grounds, and so forth. All of this information is a military secret and is never to be divulged.

It should be borne in mind that servicemen are criminally liable for divulging military or state secrets. The law on criminal liability for state crimes covers the particularly dangerous crimes of passing military or state secrets to the enemy. Individuals guilty of this extremely serious crime are severely punished. The Law on Criminal Liability for Military Crimes also specifies strict liability for divulging military and state secrets and for loss of secret documents. Specifically, it states that the divulging of military information which is a state secret is punishable by imprisonment for a period of 2 to 5 years. If the crime has grave consequences, however, it brings imprisonment for a period of 5 to 10 years.

Enemy intelligence agencies have improved equipment: miniature cameras and radios, various kinds of sensitive instruments, sound-recording devices and so forth. They have radio devices disguised as fountain pens, matchbooks, lighters, cigarette cases, wristwatches, eyeglass frames and so forth. All of these things are used for obtaining intelligence by secretly receiving conversations occurring nearby, including conversations over telephone lines.

Take just radio communications, as an example. Every armored personnel carrier, tank and infantry combat vehicle has a radio set. No laxity, thoughtlessness or negligence can be tolerated in the use of this military equipment. Every word uttered into the microphone of a radio transmitter must strictly conform to the rules and the procedure for radio traffic. This depends in great part upon the discipline, the training and the technical sophistication of the fightingmen, of course. The equipment of the experienced specialist ordinarily functions

faultlessly under any, even the most complex conditions, and commands and signals are therefore transmitted precisely and discreetly. As a result, there is no need for repetition or elaboration. And various radio traffic infractions occur most frequently in precisely such situations.

Enemy agents primarily attempt to use blabbers, as well as unstable, decadent people, in their subversive work. It is said with good reason that a blabber is a real find for a spy. The instructions of one of the Western intelligence agencies contain the following: "Develop in yourself the ability to listen for hours to the rambling of some blabber. Without realizing it, he will give away strictly guarded secrets. Study people and force them to talk. Get the person drunk. Wine is your ally."

And the agents do use alcohol very frequently. Selecting an individual with a weakness for alcohol, the agent finds a pretext "to treat" him. Stupefied by the alcohol, the individual loses his sense of responsibility and becomes especially loose with his tongue. The people say with good reason that what the sober person thinks, the drunk person will say. Sad experience has shown that the babbling of secret information and the loss of service or personal documents most frequently stems precisely from the soil of frivolous acquaintanceships linked to drinking sprees.

The following sort of thing also occurs. A soldier or sailor, wanting to demonstrate his knowledgeability to relatives, friends or acquaintances blabs information which is not supposed to be divulged, apparently without any malicious intent. Before telling it, he will even caution them: "This is just between us...." It never occurs to such a blabber that he is essentially setting out on a path of crime, forgetting the rule: What the enemy is not supposed to know, do not tell even to a friend.

Naturally, we cannot see the enemy in everyone who talks with a soldier or sailor and enquires about the latter's life. This is most frequently simply a sociable person. But there is still no need to share information of a military nature with someone in a casual conversation.

Special vigilance is required of fightingmen who serve outside the Soviet homeland. Our foes are prepared to use for purposes of provocation any blunder made by a soldier, his slightest error or indiscreet act, any deviation from the requirements contained in regulations and the military oath, anything to discredit the Soviet fightingman, to defame him in the eyes of the local population, to undermine faith in the Soviet Army and in our nation. A high level of discipline, iron restraint and constant vigilance will help us to promptly expose all of the intrigues of the enemies and to prevent possible acts of provocation.

A high level of vigilance is very important in the standing of alert, guard and watch duty. These constitute the performance of a combat mission in peacetime. In this case the demand always to be on the alert is an inviolable law. Every fightingman in this situation must understand his responsibility for the irreproachable execution of the mission assigned to him and be in a constant state of readiness for action in the most complex combat situation.

Vigilance is a law of army and navy life, one of the crucial conditions of combat readiness and a reliable weapon against acts of ideological diversion. Thanks to the alertness and vigilance of the homeland's defenders, our Armed Forces are reliably guarding the peaceful labor of the Soviet people and the gains of socialism.

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ARMED FORCES

ARTICLE NOTES HEROES FROM TRANSCAUCAZUS MD

Moscow SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA INDUSTRIYA in Russian 16 Jul 85 p 2

[Article by special TASS correspondents V. Golovin and O. Moskovskiy: "At Exercise 'Kavkaz-85': A March in the Mountains"]

[Text] As was reported earlier, during the period 15-21 July of this year, an Transcaucasus Military District troop exercise nicknamed Kavkaz-85 is being conducted in the area of Rustavi, Akstafa, Tsiteli-Tskaro and Sagaredzho. The "East" and "West" forces, as the opposing sides will hereafter be termed, completed a march in difficult weather conditions in mountainous terrain. In the concentration areas, measures are being conducted for combat, logistic and engineering support of the upcoming troop operations. Party-political work to motivate the troops for exemplary accomplishment of the training missions has unfolded in the units (chasti) and subunits (podrazdeleniya).

...The heavy rain showers which had washed out roads were replaced by scorching heat. A high degree of skill was shown on the way to the concentration area by the tankmen of the Guards company, on whose rolls Hero of the Soviet Union Capt D. Teplyakov is listed in perpetuity.

"During the march," says company commander Gds Capt A. Khvostichenko, grandson of a front-line soldier, "the young soldiers aligned on those who had won in the competition for the right to drive at the exercise the tank inscribed with the name of the hero. Having arrived at the starting point, the tankmen made an appeal to all soldiers: 'Excellent Actions at Kavkaz-85--A Military Gift for the 27th CPSU Congress.'"

In the postwar period, troops of the district are persistently learning operations in the mountains and successful use of complex types of weapons and combat equipment. The combat skills of soldiers and their ideological hardening grow with each year. Now the district has 14 companies, batteries and squadrons which are named after and whose rolls permanently include the names of Heroes of the Soviet Union who died at the fronts of the Great Patriotic War. Soldiers of the Transcaucasus hold sacred and multiply the combat traditions of the Red Army soldiers-internationalists and front-line

hero-soldiers. Sapper Pvt N. Pyaskorskiy was awarded the Red Banner Order posthumously for clearing minefields in Algeria. The title of Hero of the Soviet Union was awarded to Col V. Neverov and Captains A. Chernozhukov and I. Ploskosnos for carrying out their international duty in Afghanistan. Courage and heroism in duty were displayed by pilots G. Yeliseyev and V. Kulyapin, paratroopers U. Cherkavichus and V. Svinarik and military construction worker F. Teymurov.

These days, stirring meetings are taking place in units and subunits. Students of the Baku Higher Party School have come to visit the soldier-motorists. The guests told about the successes of the working people of the Transcaucasus republics and became acquainted with the life and combat training of the international military collective.

Veterans of the Air Force visited the leading squadron which has been entrusted with the honor of participating in exercise Kavkaz-85. The meeting of the soldiers of different generations took place literally 1 hour after the aviators had successfully completed a mission on reconnaissance of the forward area of the hypothetical "enemy." During the conversations, the airborne warriors found out a lot of interesting things, not only from the experience of battles of the Great Patriotic War. A guest of the aviators was Col (Res) T. Nikolayshvili, a participant in exercise Kavkaz-76. He told about how preparatory work of flight and technical engineering personnel was conducted and how close coordination was organized with the ground forces.

Assembly of the units is coming to an end. The "East" and "West" forces are preparing for combat training operations.

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ARMED FORCES

CONCLUSION OF KAVKAZ-85 EXERCISE

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 23 Jul 85 p 1

[Article by special KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondents Col V. Moroz, Lt Col A. Vasilets and Lt Col N. Mulyar: "A School of Courage and Skill"]

[Text] The Transcaucasus Military District troop exercise in the area of Rustavi, Akstafa, Tsiteli-Tskaro and Sagaredzho, nicknamed Kavkaz-85, concluded on 21 July.

The objectives set for the exercise were achieved.

The troops participating in the exercise are returning to their permanent duty stations.

Foreign observers attending the exercise have left the exercise area.

Behind are the fierce battles in breaching the defenses, the swift actions of the flanking force which had penetrated into the rear of the "East" over the cliffs inhabited by eagles, the paradrop of tactical airborne assault forces and the forced crossing of the mountain river... Behind is the week whose days and nights were forged together, when the time count was by a special "H minus 10," "H plus 15," with a smell of gunpowder in the air... The dust raised by columns returning to the military camps is settling over the mountain roads. The big turbines of the combat aircraft no longer roar in the hot skies above the Iori plateau.

The training battles have ended, but traces of them will remain for years to come--in the professional skills of commanders, political workers, staff officers, chiefs of arms and services, logistical specialists and in the field and airborne training of all personnel. Such a major exercise is a great event in the life of each participant. Prior to the start of the active operations of the sides, we had the opportunity to attend meetings of sergeants and soldiers with those who had experience in participating in such exercises. You should have seen how attentively the soldiers listened to the talk by Lt Col L. Kondratyev, CWO G. Tskhovrebov and other officers and warrant officers who participated in Kavkaz corps troop exercise in 1976. They carefully retain the experience of that exercise in the district. Now

the experience of the Kavkaz-85 exercise will become the priceless property of commanders, political organs, staffs and party and Komsomol organizations. Its concept was interesting, the dynamics intense. The mountains gave a distinctive quality to completing any training task.

"In the past," motorized rifle regiment commander Lt Col N. Senyuk shared fresh impressions of the results of the training battles, "personnel did not often have to interact so closely and on such a scale with aviation. At times it seemed that the helicopter gunships and fighter-bombers were an integral element of the regiment's battle formation. In the decisive moments of an attack there was not a second that we were without air cover. How important it is in such a situation to ensure complete coordination and synchronism in actions! By improving the professional training of officers, taking into account the experience of exercise Kavkaz-85, we will pay serious attention to these problems."

Gds Col A. Pokhodin, commander of a Guards fighter-bomber regiment, appraised the results of the combat work of subordinates in this way:

"From now on, the short phrase 'He participated in exercise Kavkaz-85.' will be convincing written recommendation for the regiment's pilots. They gained invaluable experience. As for the cooperation with units (chasti) of the ground forces, we will try most thoroughly to summarize and retain for years everything they gained in this area. The training was in earnest."

Much attention is given to mountain training in the Red Banner Transcaucasus Military District. We saw how the personnel of many subunits (podrazdeleniya) confidently and with skill negotiated complex obstacles and showed high physical and psychological endurance.

"It cannot be otherwise," Lt M. Skoryatin, deputy commander for political affairs from one of the companies, said in a talk with us. "Where else would you engage in mountain training if not in the Transcaucasus? If you take your job responsibly, you can take a person who was brought up on the plains and teach him much which he cannot get along without in the mountains. I use myself as an example. Many of the soldiers who saw mountains for the first time after coming into the service now feel at home on the rocks. We practice long outings to the mountains, both for special purpose training and simply for adaptation. As a political worker, I would note with satisfaction that the personnel are returning from Kavkaz-85 even more united and friendly. Anyone in our multi-national company is ready to use himself as a shield for a comrade during a rockfall, to heavier load on a march, to be the first to descend to a ledge where no one has been before..."

The participants will remember the exercise not only for the intense training battles and interesting tactical movements. During these days the party-political work was distinguished by a special activeness and diversity of forms. There were many exciting meetings with residents of cities and villages. Veterans, working young people of the Rustavi Metallurgical Plan and participants of the Great Patriotic War visited the units. Representatives of the units were dear guests at sovkhozes and kolkhozes whose lands were located in the exercise area. Mass rallies sprung up, where every

word echoed in the hearts, where a worker, kolkhoz worker, young writer, officer and soldier talked about the same thing: the need to protect vigilantly and reliably the creative labor of the people and about the fervent wish to welcome the 27th CPSU Congress with successful fulfillment of production plans, socialist commitments and combat and political training programs. This is already a tradition: The Soviet people regard major troop exercises as a review of the combat readiness of our Armed Forces.

The following fact is says a lot. After exercise Kavkaz-85 was announced in the press, nearly every soldier from the Transcaucasus received a letter from home--from their father, mother, friends at work or school--with a wish for success in their military labor and with kind parting words.

...The exercise has concluded. The work on summarizing its results and the experience gained by the participants continues.

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CSO: 1801/282

ARMED FORCES

'TWO-YEAR MAN' BECOMES SUCCESSFUL CAREER OFFICER

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 7 Jul 85 p 2

[Article by Lt Col B. Tvardovskiy, deputy regimental commander: "A Great Calling: Into the Formation From the Reserve"]

[Text] While home on leave, I met former fellow students from the Krasnodar Politechnic Institute. The conversation would always turn to the service. My former classmates would ask me knowledgeable questions about the army: They were reserve officers and had also been in the military ranks and commanded sub-units at one time. All of them recalled the service with gratitude. It gave them many things. It helped them to acquire the organizational skills so essential also in production and to strengthen their character and will, and accustomed them to efficiency of the highest order. When one talks with many of the comrades, one has the feeling that their memories of the army are dear to them. Why did they not remain in the formation, not link their lives with the officer's career? The answers to this question vary. They most frequently have to do with the fact that it is difficult for an institute graduate to measure up to the graduate of a military school in the performance of practical tasks, knowledge of military affairs and the ability to train and indoctrinate subordinates. It was precisely a lack of self-confidence and uncertain prospects, in their opinion, which prevented many institute graduates from deciding to take such an important step in life and remain among the cadres in the Armed Forces.

I have learned from my own experience that many things in the service are indeed difficult for the officer called up from the reserve after completing a civilian VUZ. After being inducted for active military duty I was appointed commander of the headquarters platoon of a mortar battery. In the beginning, I have to admit, I did not feel very confident. The complete and unconditional responsibility for the state of affairs in the platoon and for the conduct of my subordinates was particularly unexpected for me. Prior to that, matters of indoctrination had concerned me, a machine-building engineer, somehow very little. A major inner transformation was necessary.

I was lucky: Alongside me were sensitive, understanding chiefs prepared to help with their good advice, to explain the way to accomplish this or that task, not sparing the details. While Captain Albert Aleksandrovich Chistyakov, battery commander and my immediate chief, helped me master the regulations, so to speak, Lieutenant Colonel Nikolay Fedorovich Pichulo, deputy regimental commander, and Colonel Vladimir Pavlovich Brusnetsov, division artillery chief, gave me, a platoon commander, a great deal of attention with respect to mastering myself. How many extra classes they conducted with me and how much personal time they

devoted to me! A great many things about the service were revealed to me--military comradeship and strict but at the same time, warm and heartfelt interrelations.

The first thing I learned in the army formation was not to give in to difficulties. My timidity, which was preventing me from taking a creative approach in organizing the classes, gradually disappeared. When I became better acquainted with the men, I found active assistants in the persons of Sergeant Ivan Popovich, Junior Sergeant Aleksandr Pervyy and Private 1st Class Aloyar Ashirov, radio-telephone operator and Komsomol activist. I did not think it beneath me to seek their advice in difficult situations. The platoon became more united and coordinated.

I will not conceal the fact that I was proud when I was appointed senior battery officer during my first year as an officer. This meant that people had faith in me. I performed the duties of senior officer more than a year. The senior chiefs offered to retain me in the army cadres. I thought about the offer a long time. My doubts, typical for many "two-year men," ultimately got the best of me: Could I prepare myself to perform even more difficult duties? After all, I honestly had not been able to measure up to the military school graduates in all respects. I refused the offer and was released into the reserve.

I worked as an engineer at a plant around 18 months. I was considered to be a good, promising specialist. The schooling which I had received in the army also helped. No one knew how troubled I was inside, however: My dreams were always about the same thing, the service. My memory kept taking me back to the barracks, and the winds on the range called to me. I thought that this would pass. It did not. I went to the military commissariat.

Eight months later I was appointed commander of a rocket battery. Like the first time, not everything was easy. We were competing for first place with a battery commanded by Captain A. Yuvzhenko. I envied Aleksandr Vladimirovich in a good way. He was a fine methods expert and performed the fire missions with conspicuous ease. I gave myself an order: Since I had become a regular officer, I had an obligation to improve my professional skill each day. Just that, each day. No matter how difficult and busy the day was, I always found an hour or so to work on myself, to study on my own. I also set for myself the goal of raising my class rating every year. I stuck to the course I had set. I became a master in exactly 4 years. I was twice the winner in firing and in fire control in a competition among the commanders of district artillery batteries. As one drafted from the reserve, this helped me to gain self-esteem and come to believe in myself.

I was soon appointed a battalion chief of staff, and a year later I was made battalion commander. I am now deputy commander of an artillery regiment.

Life itself has convinced me that if an officer inducted from the reserve loves the service and is prepared to work persistently to perfect his knowledge and skills, he will most certainly become the equal of his comrades who have graduated from military educational institutions. I base this opinion, among other things, on the experience of officers with whom I became acquainted while taking correspondence courses from a military academy. Major V. Traktirshchikov, like me drafted from the reserve, was chief of regimental staff until recently. He

is now an instructor in a military department. Major A. Zababukha successfully commands an artillery battalion. It is doubtful that any one of them today recalls the time he was called a "two-year man."

I could not fail, however, also to mention the fact that not all of those inducted from the reserve shape up successfully. Sometimes an individual will be drawn to the service, appear to find his calling in it, only to become disappointed himself and disappoint others.

Back in the unit in which I commanded the battalion, Senior Lieutenant A. Trofimov was made a battery commander at my recommendation. I believed that in his new position the officer, called up from the reserve, would work even more responsibly and accept the appointment as a sort of advance indication of our confidence. Unfortunately, however, my hopes--and not just mine--were not justified. When I recently visited the unit I learned that Trofimov had not been able to handle the battery and had been transferred to a less difficult assignment. Aleksey Pavlovich had stopped working to improve himself.

Several officers drafted from the reserve after graduating from institutes now serve in our regiment. Senior Lieutenants S. Plotnikov and A. Borisov have already been promoted. Senior Lieutenants A. Gorshkov and V. Sharapov diligently perform their duties. Do I need to mention the fact that I watched them with special interest. I have to say, unfortunately, that the comrades have not yet fully demonstrated their capabilities. Again, it is not a matter of inadequate military knowledge. The young officers are well prepared theoretically. They are hampered by a lack of initiative, a preparedness to bear full responsibility for the area of the service entrusted to them. Not so long ago Senior Lieutenant A. Borisov received an unsatisfactory rating in a test exercise. I talked with him and learned that he is satisfied just to perform the scheduled studies in the officer training system. Senior Lieutenant V. Sharapov was given an assignment having to do with developing the regimental training base. He became flustered and threw up his hands: First one thing and then another was lacking. I had to explain to him where to begin, how to organize the job. This is important, you see, not just for performing a specific task, but also for indoctrinal purposes. Is independence valued only in the army, after all? Is it not needed to an equal degree by the engineer in production?

We helped Sharapov find the key to accomplishing the specific task, and he coped with it. Advances are also to be seen in Senior Lieutenant Borisov's professional training.

I have been convinced over and over again that much depends upon who is in command of the young officer as he develops as a commander. If Senior Lieutenant S. Plotnikov stands out among the other officers called up from the reserve, all of the credit does not go to him, of course. His chiefs also deserve a word of praise. Majors V. Sokolov and V. Peshekhonov know how to spot talent in a subordinate and to help strengthen it. When they indicate shortcomings, they do it in such a way that the individual wants to correct the deficiencies without delay. This is something Major A. Mironov lacks. The officers under him, and they include Senior Lieutenant A. Borisov, sometimes lose confidence in their own abilities. And this is not beneficial to the work.

It is my opinion that officers called up from the reserve require especially sensitive handling. It is important to create a climate in the unit in which they do not have even the slightest reason to think about their "inadequacy."

Institute and university graduates are drafted for a period of 2 years. Most of them return to the plants, to kolkhozes and sovkhozes or to scientific research institutes. Many of them find a new calling in the army formation, however. May they always find success and happiness in the performance of their duty in such an honored occupation as that of defending the homeland.

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CSO: 1801/268

ARMED FORCES

BOOK REVIEW: MARSHAL I. S. KONEV

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 24 Jul 85 p 2

[Review by Army Gen P. Lashchenko, Hero of the Soviet Union, of book "Marshal I. S. Konev" by R. Portugalskiy, Voenizdat, 1985, 254 pages]

[Text] The tremendous educational role of biographical works reconstructing the character of a hero of his era is generally known. This is primarily what determines the value of Col R. Portugalskiy's book "Marshal I. S. Konev,"* published by Voenizdat in the series "Soviet Military Leaders and Commanders." The life of I. S. Konev, typical for people of his generation and striking for its saturation with deeds, inseparably linked with the Communist Party and the Soviet Army, of which he was a member from 1918 on, reflects to a considerable extent the biography of the Soviet Armed Forces.

Many pages of the narrative are devoted to analyzing Marshal I. S. Konev's military leadership prowess during the Great Patriotic War years. It originated in the Smolensk Battle in 1941 and ripened in the battles of Moscow, Kursk and for the Dnieper. It reached its prime in encircling and defeating the Korsun-Shevchenkovskiy enemy grouping and in the Lvov-Sandomierz, Vistula-Oder, Lower and Upper Silesian, Berlin and Prague operations. As is justifiably emphasized in the book, I. S. Konev was the military leader who proved to be capable not only of thoroughly understanding and correctly assessing a situation, but also of predicting the enemy's actions. A comprehensive assessment of available manpower and weapons and consideration of all situation factors and conditions enabled him to choose the most feasible methods of defeating the enemy.

Thus, the book tells about the Lvov-Sandomierz Operation, where it was decided by Konev to commit successively two tank armies over a narrow six-kilometer corridor penetrated by rifle units (soyedineniya) when the Hitlerites were conducting counterblow in order to cover a breach in their defenses. The degree of risk for the marshal was especially clear to me as a participant in that battle. Another thing was also clear--the risk was well-founded,

*R. Portugalskiy, "Marshal I. S. Konev", Voenizdat, 1985, 254 pages with illustrations. ("Sovetskiye polkovodtsy i voyenachalniki" [Soviet Military Leaders and Commanders]). Cost 45 kopecks.

reinforced by all-round support of committing the tank armies whose subsequent actions also predetermined the defeat of the fascist grouping.

The book's many pages disclose the most typical characteristics of Konev's style of organizational activities: the ability to find the main thing in a set of tasks to be completed and unite the labor of the collective he led by a common goal; the aspiration for personal contact with those who were to carry out the concepts and plans of the operations being conducted; the constant rendering of assistance to subordinates in the most efficient use of forces and weapons; support by the staff, political and other control organs and party and Komsomol organizations; and personal participation in training and educating troops.

Marshal I. S. Konev had a high regard for the role of morale. This is viewed as the military leader's strong point.

...Years pass. A new generation is growing up. In mankind's forward movement towards a bright future, people starting out in life are often faced with the question of what to be and whose example to follow for spiritual strength, purposefulness, ideological hardening, loyalty to duty and devotion to the Fatherland. That is when attention turns to the people who actively participated in events of historical significance. Each person in his own way passes on to the coming generation a small part of his heart and his labor, leaving memories of him behind: some by the brilliance of revolutionary enthusiasm, some by discoveries in science and technology and others by participating in the great building up of communism. Ivan Stepanovich Konev went down in the country's history as a prominent military, state and public figure, a man of Lenin's era, of high party duty and Bolshevik honor. His example can and needs to be followed. It has something to teach and something to imitate in order to be of use to one's beloved Motherland. After looking through this interesting book dedicated to the prominent military leader, the reader is convinced of this.

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CSO: 1801/282

ARMED FORCES

DECREE DESIGNATED MSU SOKOLOV AS MINISTER OF DEFENSE

Moscow VEDOMOSTI VVERKHOVNOCO SOVETA SOYUZA SOVETSKIKH SOTSIALISTICHESKIKH RESPUBLIK in Russian No 27 (2309) 3 Jul 85 p 428

[Decree No 484 of USSR Supreme Soviet Ratifying the Ukase of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet "On Marshal of the Soviet Union S.L. Sokolov's Appointment as Minister of Defense of the USSR"]

[Text] The Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics hereby decrees:

That Marshal of the Soviet Union Sergey Leonidovich Sokolov is appointed Minister of Defense of the USSR as of 22 December 1984.

Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet A. Gromyko
Secretary of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet T. Menteshashvili

Moscow, the Kremlin, 3 July 1985
No. 2769-XI

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CSO: 1801/290

ARMED FORCES

MEDICAL OFFICERS HONORED

Moscow VEDOMOSTI VVERKHOVNOGO SOVETA ROSSIYSKOY SOVETSKOY FEDERATIVNOY SOTSIALISTICHESKOY RESPUBLIKI in Russian No 27 (1393) 4 Jul 85 p 717

[Decree No 971 of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet Awarding the Honorary Title "Honored Physician of the USSR" to Officers in the Medical Service of the Soviet Army]

[Text] For service in the field of public health and their successes in treatment and preventive medicine, the following are awarded the honorary title

"Honored Physician of the RSFSR"

Colonel of Medical Service Ivan Ivanovich Dochkin;
Colonel of Medical Service Aleksandr Aleksandrovich Kachanko;
Colonel of Medical Service Vladimir Trofimovich Kuchminov;
Colonel of Medical Service Ulfat Safich Sadykov;
Colonel of Medical Service Nikolay Fedorovich Sergiyenko;
Colonel of Medical Service Aleksandr Ivanovich Sidelnikov;
Colonel of Medical Service Valeriy Anatolyevich Timakov;
Colonel of Medical Service Ivan Vladimirovich Yakovlev.

Chairman of the Presidium of the RSFSR
Supreme Soviet V. Orlov
Secretary of the Presidium of the RSFSR
Supreme Soviet Kh. Neshkov

Moscow, 26 June 1985

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CSO: 1801/290

GROUND FORCES

PARTY COMMITTEE ON SHORTCOMINGS OF NIGHT, MOUNTAIN TRAINING

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 9 Jul 85 p 2

[Article by Lt Col N. Lavreshin, member of the party committee of a motorized rifle regiment, Red Banner Transcaucasus Military District, under the rubric "Party Life: Toward the Congress": "It Is Being Discussed in the Party Committee"]

[Text] "I believe that we have still done far from everything possible to intensify the training process, that we are showing little concern for improving the night and mountain training. What are the reasons? Take the planning. It lacks coordination in many respects. For example, one of our battalion companies recently arrived at the moving target gunnery range for BMP [infantry combat vehicles], only to find it occupied by another subunit. Considerable training time was wasted." Captain S. Stolyarov mentioned several facts which reinforced his opinion that order and organization are primarily what is needed to conduct the training more intensively, in keeping with the heightened requirements.

"It is easy for Sergey Yevgenyevich to discourse on lofty matters, on intensification," Major E. Israfilov commented. "His battalion has engaged in mountain training more than the others and acquired experience. Furthermore, his men were specially selected."

"Well now, you're wrong," Major V. Milkov, secretary of the regimental party committee, objected. "The men are the same as yours. And they were trained right in the battalion. So we are not talking about lofty matters, so to speak, but about something specific...."

It was a meeting of the party committee in our motorized rifle regiment. The discussion was about ways to improve the mountain and night training. The results of a recent demonstration regimental exercise in the mountains involving nighttime live firing were one of the reasons for the discussion. Frankly, the results were not good. There was a lack of coordination in the performance of certain subunits, and many of the mechanics-and-drivers of the infantry combat vehicles and the gunners-and-operators became confused in the complex situation. It was also apparent that Major Israfilov's battalion was only approaching the level of skill which Captain Stolyarov's battalion had already achieved.

After talking with many of the officers following that exercise, Major Milkov raised the issue of mountain and night training at the next party committee meeting.

Practical conferences are highly important in the practical work of any party organ. They are a good way to draw upon the collective intellect and know-how, to arrive at the most correct decision. The party committee's collective decision-making is refined in the process. The true collective decision-making which Lenin spoke of must be refined any time there is even the slightest opportunity to do so. It must be reduced to the briefest discussion of the most important issues within the smallest possible group. We must conduct our meetings and sessions in the Leninist manner, without phony idealization, without bickering, in a serious manner, in an atmosphere of criticism and self-criticism, in order to discuss questions pertaining to the life of the collectives and ways to eliminate everything retarding the work. We must always keep in mind the purpose of a specific meeting. Afterward, we must think about whom it has helped, and in what way. This was voiced with special force at the April 1985 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee.

"As a member of the party committee," Valeriy Viktorovich told the regimental commander, "you are assigned to make a report at the meeting."

The report was a brief one, but the commander prepared for it with great thoroughness in order to extensively describe the tasks facing the regiment communists. To tell the truth, he had previously not concerned himself especially with the time factor when he spoke at meetings or sessions. He had felt that he would be given exactly as much time as was necessary to share his thoughts. Once, however, at a meeting of our party committee, Lieutenant Colonel V. Morondel tactfully stated:

"I feel that a regimental commander also should adhere to a time-limit."

It seemed to me that the remark offended him, but after thinking about it he realized the comment had been perfectly justified. During my time in the service I have more than once observed different commanders address party meetings, bureau and committee sessions. Their talks were long and verbose. In addition, they frequently brought up issues which were related only remotely to the agenda or were entirely under the jurisdiction of the command element or of administrative bodies, as an example. People even developed the opinion that no time-limit should be set for the commander or chief, or else they should be given two or three times as much time as the other speakers. It would not be overdoing things, I believe, to mention how strict Vladimir Ilich Lenin was about the observance of time-limits for both himself and comrades.

The commander visited classes in several subunits prior to the party committee meeting. There were numerous significant shortcomings. One was absolutely amazed at the complacency which reigned in the classes conducted by Senior Lieutenant V. Kosarev for his subordinates. One had the impression that the regimental commander was viewing a slow-motion film. Lieutenant Ye. Ganitskiy organized the exercise with the same indifference. And they are both communists.

And so he discussed in his talk the communists' avant-garde role in the accomplishment of the tasks facing the regiment with respect to enhancing the mountain and night training. He commented that party-political work needed to be stepped up in the field, during the exercises. Then came the discussion of "lofty matters," with which I began these comments. And it led to the logical decision.

"I understand your difficulties, Eldar Yakubovich," Captain Stolyarov said, "and I want to offer my assistance. The officers in our battalion are prepared to conduct demonstration classes with your men and to exchange know-how."

"Now you're talking!" Major L. Sika, deputy regimental commander for political affairs, said at once in support. "Incidentally, Sergey Yevgenyevich, I viewed your training films made by Lieutenant Reutskiy. In my opinion, all of the regimental personnel should see them."

Lieutenant A. Reutskiy, an involved individual, has now made several reels of film of training exercises conducted under various conditions and added sound, which includes comments made when the performance of the fightingmen was studied. The screen has become an excellent visual aid in Captain Stolyarov's battalion. The party committee decided that this aid should be used by all of the unit personnel.

"The discussion of intensification cannot be separated from the state of the training materials base," Senior Lieutenant L. Linetskiy entered the discussion to say. "It is long since time for us to have our own rifle range and to modernize the moving target gunnery range for the infantry combat vehicles and certain of the training sites for the mountain training exercises. Specifically...."

The officer named the sites and offered specific proposals for improving them. The party committee members unanimously supported him. We cannot move forward, master the modern equipment or perform skilfully in the complex situation of modern combat without filling the classrooms and the ranges with the new items, without making every possible use of the work of our efficiency experts. Today, as we study materials from the conference in the CPSU Central Committee on the acceleration of scientific and technical progress, we feel that this work should be conducted even more vigorously, utilizing all of our reserves.

"I would like to point out," Major Sika said, "that we have discussed improving the training materials base more than once. The terms 'equip,' 'introduce into the formation' and 'adopt' have also drifted from one resolution to another more than once. We need to back up our decisions with precise organizational measures."

The session indicated the extent of the basic work to be performed at the range and in the classrooms and specified which of the communists were to report back on the completion of the work, and when they were to report.

New aspects of the problem were brought out during the discussion. For example, it was pointed out that the technical groups, the practical conferences and the quizzes needed to be made more effective. The rear service subunits received some serious criticism. There had been a case of disruption of the scheduled

exercises due to the late delivery of fuels and lubricants, as well as delays in providing the subunits with mountain equipment. Lieutenant Colonel A. Yevseyev, deputy regimental commander for rear services, and his subordinates were to blame for these and a number of other shortcomings.

Major Milkov proposed that he render account at a party committee meeting and be held strictly accountable.

The secretary was tough in his handling of the matter. But then it had to be that way. Yevseyev did not always follow through on what had been started, and the man in charge of rear services was not always aware of the political importance of his management.

The issue on the agenda was discussed thoroughly and analytically. The discussion brought out bits and pieces of experience, possibilities for enhancing the mountain and night training and improving the general state of affairs, and specific ways to achieve this. There was a spirit of self-criticism throughout the discussion.

Major Sika said, for example, that the regimental commander had correctly raised the issue of the quality and productiveness of party-political work in the field exercises, particularly in the mountains and at night. Little was being done to adopt the dynamic work methods, and certain officers were having difficulty in ridding themselves of the habit of performing by rote. Adjustments had to be made in our plans.

The overall, main conclusion drawn by the party committee members from everything said was that in order to accomplish the mission it would be necessary to drastically improve efficiency. And efficiency begins with the ability to conduct meetings. It is with good reason that the party calls for a struggle against empty words.

From the atmosphere in the meeting, the attitude of the people and the specific nature of the proposals put forth--just from these signs one could draw the conclusion that our discussion would develop into action, into practical results. The proposals justified themselves. The party committee began strictly monitoring the fulfillment of each point in the resolution. The communists worked with greater initiative, vigor and responsibility in all the areas. The result was the good, solid rating received in one of the subsequent inspections. I want to stress the term "solid." I have to say that not all of the senior chiefs, not even everyone in the regiment, believed that we were capable of achieving more than satisfactory. I also want to stress the fact that the level of mountain and night training in the subunits improved markedly. The party committee's resolution was thus implemented.

...The other day Major Milkov came to me and the other party committee members to discuss the agenda for the next meeting. It was briefly stated--"On the Monitoring System"--and stemmed from the thesis set forth at the April Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee to the effect that not a single party organization, not a single worker could go without being monitored. We shall try to thoroughly prepare for the subject. We need to raise the action level of the communists to the maximum during the period of preparations for the party congress.

11499
CSO: 1801/268

GROUND FORCES

FURTHER EXAMINATION OF NEW BMP-2

Moscow VOYENNNYE ZNANIYA in Russian No 6, Jun 85 (signed to press 6 May 85) pp 30, 36

[Article by Col (Res) V. Knyazkov under the rubric "Talks with Draftees": "Infantry Fighting Vehicle"]

[Text] In all the time since the appearance of firearms, the soldier has not been protected against lethal metal, but today's motorized riflemen are reliably sheltered by the armor of the special vehicle in which they are located. It has a simple and understandable name--the infantry fighting vehicle (BMP-2). Our story is specifically about it, a light, maneuverable and reliable vehicle.

The BMP-2 is one kind of armored equipment, but it doesn't resemble a tank, a tracked armored personnel carrier, or a self-propelled gun. Frankly speaking, Soviet designers succeeded in developing a vehicle which generally is unique in the totality of its combat features (mobile, capable of operating on the battlefield with nuclear weapons being employed). The offensive might of motorized rifle subunits substantially increased with its appearance.

This vehicle has a 30-mm caliber automatic gun. There is a double-belt and separate feed of rounds. The rate of fire varies widely: fire can be delivered in single rounds or at a low rate of 200-300 rounds per minute. The rate is increased to 550 rounds per minute if necessary. The sighted range reaches 4,000 m and flat-trajectory range with a target height of 2 m is 1,000 m.

The BMP-2 has an antitank guided missile weapon system, the so-called ATGM system.

The PKT [Kalashnikov tank machinegun] coaxial with the main gun has a caliber of 7.62 mm. The cartridges are belt-fed. The usable rate of fire from the machinegun is high, up to 250 rounds per minute.

All these weapons are contained in the vehicle's fighting compartment, which occupies the middle part of the hull and the entire turret. The gunner-operator's place also is incorporated here on a suspended rotating platform.

But the BMP-2 weapons are not exhausted merely by the models enumerated. Two handheld [ruchnoy] antiaircraft systems or a handheld antitank rocket launcher can be accommodated on its side, and this is not all. The combat team has at

its disposal two PK light machineguns, six Kalashnikov submachineguns and 12 F-1 grenades.

The vehicle's combat team consists of ten persons. Of these, there is a crew of three (commander, driver-mechanic and gunner-operator) and seven mounted riflemen, six of whom are accommodated in the assault compartment and the seventh next to the driver-mechanic.

Now it is possible to picture how great the firepower is at the disposal of a motorized rifle squad. The gunner-operator himself can make the decision to engage a target directly in the dynamics of combat saturated with diverse armored weapons, or he can do this at the commander's instruction. There is a rule in effect here: "See and shoot!" If all weapons of the BMP-2 were activated, the density of fire in a given sector would be very high. Figuratively speaking, the infantry fighting vehicle is a real "firing hedgehog."

Let's look for a minute at the assault compartment. Six mounted riflemen sit three each along the left and right sides. Ports with ball mounts have been installed and a vision device with glass having electric heating has been mounted for each of them, so that the glass is transparent in any weather, winter or summer, which permits the mounted riflemen to deliver confident aimed fire. It was thanks to design solutions that a substantial increase was achieved in the BMP-2's firepower. The mounted force can use weapons without emerging from the vehicle, on the move or from short halts. In addition, the vehicle turret rotates 360° and the gunner-operator has the opportunity of firing in any direction.

The BMP-2 has high offroad capability. The ground pressure of its tracks is only 0.64 kg/cm^2 , approximately the same as a person of medium weight. Hence an important conclusion: the BMP-2 is light enough to cross marshy and snowcovered sectors of terrain.

The design of the track links is interesting. They are light and have small sections, and the track links themselves are interconnected by rubber and metal joints. The tracks unfold on the ground like endless bands, forming a unique even path, as it were, along which the road wheels roll unhindered. This is why the vehicle is capable of moving at an average speed of 45-50 km/hr over a dry dirt road and developing a maximum speed of 65 km/hr on the highway.

It is common knowledge that the range on one fueling is one of the most important performance characteristics. Just what is the BMP-2's mileage without refueling? It turns out to be up to 600 km. We automatically recall the scenes showing episodes of the Great Patriotic War. The infantry is moving... One day, another, a third... In the rain, in the slush, in intense cold... Their speed? Well, probably no more than 4 km/hr. Estimate just how much time it took the infantry to cover those 600 km.

This 13-ton fighting vehicle easily negotiates various obstacles, both natural and manmade. For example, it is capable of taking an upgrade of 35 degrees on sod-covered soil, and the very same downgrade. A vertical wall 77 m high also is no obstacle for it.

What if a ditch is encountered along the path of movement? Will the BMP-2 be able to cross it? Definitely, if the ditch is no more than 2.5 m wide, and the vehicle will jump over a trench simply with ease.

A water obstacle always is a serious barrier. The infantry fighting vehicle crosses rivers afloat and it uses the very same track drive for this that speeds the vehicle over land. Isn't this a paradox? It turns out that it is not. The designers very wisely used the reaction of the water flow arising during the turning of the tracks. The vehicle floats forward, developing a speed of up to 7 km/hr. Could the infantry of Great Patriotic War times dream it would be possible to cross water obstacles directly from the line of march, and not on improvised means, up to your neck in icy water, but without getting out of the vehicle? That was another time.

The infantry fighting vehicle has armor protection all around. Thus the vitally important systems and assemblies, the vehicle crew and the mounted force are reliably protected. The fragments of rounds, let alone bullets, which hit the BMP-2 will do it no damage.

Now let's look at a special case. The enemy has employed nuclear weapons in combat. Just how does the BMP-2 "react" to its casualty-producing factors? An anti-atomic protection system is triggered.

Under those combat conditions where the personnel are delivering intensive fire directly from the BMP-2 a seemingly small subsystem is at work. It accomplishes a local but important task of ventilating the manned compartments, removing powder gases from them; in cold weather it warms the air entering the vehicle and additionally regulates the gas composition of the air in the crew's respiration zone when organic weapons are being fired. Comfortable conditions for the combat team thus are established in the closed space of the manned compartments. The personnel become less fatigued and can carry on combat actions for a long time.


Of course we will not be revealing a big secret in saying that not one model of combat equipment is ensured against destruction. The burst of a heavy-caliber machinegun may strike the vehicle hull or, finally, a shell may hit it. In this case there is great danger of a fire breaking out and it must be fought immediately and decisively under combat conditions. The engine compartment must be protected against fire above all. One of the principal assemblies of the BMP-2 is located there: its engine, the vehicle's unique "heart."

The designers called on the help of automatic equipment in order to fight fire successfully. It is general knowledge that this presumes the presence of sensors and actuators. That is what was done in the BMP-2's firefighting system as well. It consists of heat sensors, relays, and sprayers which are connected to cylinders with a fire-extinguishing fluid with the help of a main pipeline.

As soon as fire breaks out in the engine compartment the air temperature quickly rises in its closed space and one of the heat sensors will be triggered without fail. The sensor produces an electrical signal which activates the entire system. The vehicle hull is fully sealed, the exhaust blowers of the

BMP-2

1. Engine
2. Driver-mechanic's vision device
3. Mounted rifleman's vision device
4. Gun
5. Turret
6. Machinegun coaxial with gun
7. Sight cover
8. ATGM launcher
9. ATGM stowage in fighting compartment
10. Antenna
11. Canvas cover
12. Mounted force seat back
13. Ball mounts for submachineguns
14. Rear door
15. Road wheel
16. Gun ammunition belt magazine
17. ATGM stowage in hull
18. Mounted rifleman's seat
19. Driver-mechanic's seat
20. Idler wheel
21. Fender-float
22. Armored covers
23. Smoke grenade launcher
24. Headlights
25. Rear view device



turret and assault compartment are turned off, and the engine stops. An explosive charge of one of the cylinders is triggered simultaneously, thus penetrating its diaphragm and supplying fire-extinguishing fluid to the sprayer nipples. The flame is beaten down and goes out--the fire has been eliminated...

It has long been known that camouflage in warfare is a paramount job. If you have camouflaged well, that means the enemy doesn't see you, and at times this is already half the success in combat. When it is parked the vehicle can be covered with branches or it can be removed to shelter, hidden in a ravine or gulley, and so on. But how can it be camouflaged in the dynamics of combat? Sometimes it is tactically very important to execute a concealed maneuver or even simply get out from under enemy fire with a dash. It is in such a situation that the TDA--the reusable thermal smoke apparatus especially intended for laying down smoke screens--comes in very handy.

Soviet specialists found a successful technical solution. One thing is required: just for the BMP-2 engine to function. The diesel fuel on which the engine operates and exhaust gases released into the atmosphere are used to form the smoke screen.

The length of smoke screens which is impenetrable to the view can be up to 100-150 m and the persistence is at least one minute. The vehicle crew and especially its commander must bear in mind that the length of continuous operation of the TDA equipment must not exceed five minutes. If necessary the smoke screen can be laid using smoke grenades--six 81-mm launchers are mounted on the side of the BMP-2 for this purpose. They project smoke grenades to a distance of up to 200-300 m.

Well then, the BMP-2 infantry fighting vehicle has high firing and operating capabilities and it reliably protects the crew against the effects of various kinds of weapons. The motorized rifle subunits operating in the BMP's can successfully accomplish diverse, difficult missions under varying combat conditions.



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6904

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GROUND FORCES

REVIEW: PEREDELSKIY--ARTILLERY BATTALION IN COMBAT

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 23 Jul 85 p 2

[Review by Lt Gen A. Lebedev, chief of the Combat Training and Military Educational Institutions Directorate, deputy commander-in-chief of the Ground Forces Rocket and Artillery Troops, of book "Artilleriyskiy divizion v boyu" [Artillery Battalion in Combat] by G. Peredelskiy, Voenizdat, 1984, 216 pages]

[Text] Such is the title of the book* published by the Military Publishing House. Its primary subject-matter is practical recommendations for employing an artillery battalion in combined arms combat, showing the work of the commander and staff in organizing and planning combat operations and controlling the battalion in various types of combat, on the march and in conditions of the enemy using weapons of mass destruction or only conventional weapons.

The value of this printed work is that it does a good job of passing on modern views for combat employment of a battalion, based on the qualitative changes in combat tactics which have taken place in the postwar period. I especially would like to underscore the author's desire to communicate the acute need for the closest cooperation of artillery with motorized rifle and tank subunits (podrazdeleniya) in combat, which is the basis of combat employment of the battalion. The book reveals in an easy to understand form ways to improve artillery tactics in connection with its being supplied with qualitatively new models of self-propelled artillery systems and command vehicles. It is shown that in modern combat, battalion fire accounts for 55-60 percent of all targets hit by artillery, artillery group fire--for up to 25 percent, and fire from batteries and detached guns--for only 15-20 percent of the targets. Thus, the battalion accounts for a large part of the fire missions; in the true sense of the word, it has become the center of fire preparation and fire control.

The author talks about combat capabilities and the battalion's position in an artillery grouping and shows elements of a battle formation and types of fire

*G. Peredelskiy, "Artilleriyskiy divizion v boyu" [Artillery Battalion in Combat], Voenizdat, 1984, 216 pages, cost of 60 kopecks.

used by the battalion in combat. The book goes into detail on questions of command and control of the battalion in the process of preparing for combat actions, in adopting a plan, working on the terrain, tasking subunits, planning combat actions, organizing communications, checking readiness and, finally, battalion fire control. A separate chapter, in detail and with corresponding model plans, reveals the content of party-political work in a battalion.

The distinctive operating characteristics of an artillery battalion on an offensive, in a meeting battle, in a defensive and on a march are revealed later in subsequent chapters.

Very important and instructive in the materials cited is the fact that the book examines a battalion's combat actions in various types of combat and on the march in accordance with the basic regulations in effect, taking into account the experience of the Great Patriotic War and troop exercises of recent years.

In these terms, it appears the author has found a successful form of arranging a sufficiently large amount of material. Theoretical propositions, practical recommendations and conclusions, tactical examples with tables and diagrams and samples of combat documents are successfully alternated with combat episodes taken from the collections "Deystviya artilleriyskikh podrazdeleniy v Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyni. Boyevyye primery." [Actions of Artillery Subunits in the Great Patriotic War. Combat Examples.]. All chapters of the book make considerable use of materials and advanced experience of tactical exercises and take into account the changes in equipping artillery subunits with armament and combat equipment and also in the conduct of combat operations by subunits and units (chasti).

An interested reader will find much useful practical advice and recommendations in the book. It uses vivid, specific examples to show skillful actions of batteries and battalions, creative fulfillment by artillerymen of tasks received and a combination of their high military skill, fearlessness and heroism. These examples are instructive and will help subunit commanders to assess more fully the complexity of command and control of a battalion in a combat situation.

It should be noted that the book is a valuable aid not only for artillery commanders, but also for officers of other branches of arms. It helps to expand the outlook on the fundamentals of combat employment of an artillery battalion in modern combined arms combat.

On the whole, the book is written with intelligible and lively language and is well illustrated with diagrams, tables, episodes from the front and examples from tactical training and exercises. Some of them by themselves can serve as a valuable methods study aid for artillery officers when preparing for training and in independent work.

Unfortunately, the book also has a number of shortcomings. Thus, problems of combat firing support and fire control are not duly reflected. After all, an artillery battalion is that link in which topogeodesic, meteorological,

ballistic and technical preparations are conducted, firing settings are calculated, the most advantageous methods of firing for effect are determined, and interaction with target surveillance and fire correction equipment is organized.

A substantial shortcoming of the book is the fact that all the examples and the descriptive portion are based on actions of a towed artillery battalion. In the next edition of the book it would be desirable to outline, if only briefly, the distinctive features of operations by self-propelled and rocket artillery battalions having command vehicles in their inventory.

However, in spite of the noted shortcomings of this book, its value is obvious. It will be widely used by artillery officers in the practice of combat training. The book can also serve as a good study aid for artillery school students.

12567
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AIR/AIR DEFENSE FORCES

AWACS SAID TO BE NATO STEP TOWARD 'LIMITED WAR' IN EUROPE

Moscow SOVETSKIY VOIN in Russian No 12, Jun 85 pp 42-43

[Article by Lt. Col. V. Roshchupkin: "Washington's 'Flying Gunboats'"]

[Text] - Observation or espionage? - Where the AWACS planes are flying - Sinister spider web - New twist in age-old diplomacy - vigilance is our weapon.

Do not feed the masters of the Western "free press" bread - give them a sensation. And when the reporters for the bourgeois publications accredited in Oslo learned that a former major of the Norwegian Army, Sven Blindheim, was going to speak at a press conference, they livened up. The thing is that in the West, and in certain Scandinavian countries in particular, the subject of the mythical "hand of Moscow", "Russian spies", unidentified submarines, etc. is very fashionable. And Blindheim by the nature of his past work was linked with the special services, so he might give out some interesting information.

The ex-major did "give out." It was, however, not at all what the lovers of sensations expected. His tale caused confusion in NATO military circles and deep alarm and indignation in the progressive public. Blindheim testified that he personally had taken part in the subversive activity of the NATO special services against the Soviet Union. These services, in particular, attempted to infiltrate their agent network into the territory of the USSR.

And what kind of information interested the NATO spies? Mainly about military targets. One of the primary tasks of the NATO intelligence organs, as indicated by reports that were obtained by certain foreign publications, was the acquisition of secret information for determining the basic targets within the Soviet Union and its allies against which to launch nuclear missiles in the first place. The network of American Loran-C and Omega radio navigation stations, whose menacing silhouettes sprang up like mushrooms along the Norwegian coastline, are intended to guide the missiles from American nuclear submarines. In addition a network of communications and electronic intelligence stations has begun operations on Norwegian territory.

Not long ago the Norwegian Minister of Defense A. Sjaastad admitted in an interview to the English Reuters Agency that full cooperation exists between

the Pentagon and the Norwegian military department in conducting espionage operations against the USSR. He also did not hide the fact that one of the most important tasks assigned to Norway by the NATO Command was observing the activity of the Soviet Armed Forces.

"Observing." This word is not used accidentally. In the language of the NATO strategists this is nothing more nor less than undisguised espionage. "The word 'spy' calls forth a lot of associations. I would prefer to say that everywhere a place for observation can be found," W. Casey, Director of Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) once said. And they "observe", i.e. spy on the USSR, other socialist countries and on the young state of Asia, Africa and Latin America that have set out on the independent path of development. The "observation" is conducted intensively from Norway, which has been transformed into a military and intelligence bridgehead of NATO directed against the USSR.

The NATO and overseas strategists have tied their greatest hopes to the development of the AWACS espionage system on Norwegian soil. Aircraft outfitted with very complex equipment for radio and radiotechnical intelligence, or as it is called in the foreign press, electronics intelligence, constitute the basic element of this system.

A huge airplane with the characteristic radome of the radar antenna in the form of a gigantic "platter" towering over it rolls out on the landing strip of the Orlandet air base near the Norwegian city of Trondheim. After pulling away from the ground the plane sets a course for the north.

This is the spy plane equipped with the AWACS antenna system for long-range air radar detection and control. As the Norwegian newspaper FRIHETEN testifies, AWACS planes have been making regular reconnaissance flights, once a week, from the territory of Norway along the northern border of the USSR since August 1984. But how did all this start?

The staff at one of the air bases in the Federal Republic of Germany was more than a little surprised when a whole cavalcade of cars shiny with chrome and black lacquer rolled out on the runway. High-ranking officials of the Bundeswehr got out of them and went over to an aircraft of unusual shape with a "platter" above the fuselage. This is the way one of the first demonstration flights on the European continent of the E-3A, which is a basic component of the AWACS system of airborne radar detection and control, took place several years ago. At that time the plane with the West German generals on board made a flight along the border with the German Democratic Republic, and they could see with their own eyes the capability of the spy plane.

In designing the aerial superspy the passenger liner Boeing 707 was used as the basis. Its specifications are as follows: weight - 150 tons, cruising speed - up to 670 km/hr at an altitude of 10,000 meters, flight time without refueling - 11 hours. The airplane, which was given the military designation E-3A, was equipped with a radar set having an antenna nine meters in diameter in a radome above the fuselage. On board there are nearly 3.5 tons of electronic equipment: radar set, computer system, communications and IFF

equipment. According to the calculations of the Pentagon experts the E-3A flying radar is supposed to stand patrol at a distance of up to 300 km from the front lines and "survey" a zone up to 80 km deep lying beyond it.

At the present time, according to reports in the foreign press, the US Air Force has 24 AWACS planes. The Air Force command plans to increase their number to 34. The Pentagon has allocated 2.5 billion dollars for the creation and development of this superspy undertaking.

Most of the countries participating in the North Atlantic bloc have also made a decision to buy aircraft with the AWACS system. The total cost of this NATO project as reported in the press amounts to a gigantic sum - 3.8 billion West German marks. This is the largest program in the area of military aircraft ever financed by the Western European NATO countries. At the beginning of 1982 a ceremony commemorating the transfer to the NATO command of the first airplane equipped with the AWACS system for collecting intelligence data took place at the West German military aircraft company Dornier near Munich. In accordance with the order received the Dornier company will outfit 17 American Boeings with electronic spy equipment especially made "for European conditions." For the implementation of this large-scale NATO program other large companies of the Federal Republic of Germany have been recruited. And soon the first Boeing 707 with the AWACS system of long-distance radar detection and control arrived at the NATO air base in Geilenkirchen (the West German Land of North Rhine-Westphalia).

Geilenkirchen (FRG) became the main operational support base for all 18 aircraft of this type. In the summer of 1982 despite the protests of the local inhabitants an official ceremony took place there proclaiming this NATO air base to be the center for supporting operations of the AWACS spy planes. The highest NATO officials came to Geilenkirchen: the Secretary General of the North Atlantic bloc and the defense ministers of this aggressive alliance. The parliamentary state secretary at the Ministry of Defense of the FRG, W. Penner, did his bit towards pumping up the military psychosis at this assemblage. He announced that the AWACS planes were intended to strengthen NATO's capability for deterrence.

The English Nimrod system aircraft, which is also designed for conducting aerial electronic intelligence, will be subordinate to the NATO headquarters in Geilenkirchen too. As is known, England is developing its own system for aerial espionage on the basis of the aircraft mentioned above. As far as France is concerned it initially refused to participate in the deployment of AWACS, announcing its desire to pay for spy information obtained by the "flying radars." Recently, however, Paris revised its plans. A decision was made to buy planes of the above-mentioned system in the United States. As reported by the INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE the French Air Force will acquire three E-3A aircraft from the Boeing corporation. It is planned to deliver them in 1986.

Thus a sinister espionage web using AWACS has been woven in Western Europe by the NATO militaristic spider. As was noted in the West German press,

what is intended here is to make the system of espionage on the territory of the socialist countries more effective. According to the calculations of the atlanticists the re-outfitted Boeings are supposed to play a leading role in this, along with the electronic intelligence services on the ground.

Judging from press reports the crews of the E-3A aircraft will perform patrol duty around the clock along the borders of the socialist states. Right now already, however, planes based at Norwegian and West German air fields are conducting communications and electronic intelligence against the German Democratic Republic, Czechoslovakia and Poland. This was reported in detail in the pages of the Belgian newspaper LE SOIR.

The radar equipment installed on the AWACS planes makes it possible for NATO to observe everything that goes on in the air space of the German Democratic Republic, a large part of Czechoslovakia and approximately 80 kilometers to the east in the depths of the territory of Poland. Besides tracking "air targets" within a radius of approximately 400 km AWACS is capable of intercepting radio conversations, plotting the location of radar stations and observing sites on the ground.

It should be noted in particular that another, even more ominous mission has been assigned to the "aerial spies." The AWACS planes are intended to guide the medium range American missiles that the United States and NATO have deployed in the countries of Western Europe to their targets. These planes can also be used for battle management as airborne command posts. It has been reported in the press that the on-board computers can coordinate and guide the course of several encounters simultaneously and create interference for radar centers and the communications operations of the "enemy."

Observers remark that the deployment of the AWACS planes, which is planned to be completed by 1987, is an unprecedented step by NATO in preparing for a "limited" war in Europe. And not only in Europe. After all, AWACS planes carry out flights in Southwest Asia, in the Far East, everywhere the American militarists and their assistants are building up military preparations. Since August 1982 the "flying radars" have been participating in joint American-Japanese military maneuvers near the Far Eastern borders of the USSR.

The ruling circles in the USA also make wide use of the AWACS planes as a tool of politico-military pressure and the "demonstration of military presence." Today's "flying radars" constitute a new twist in the age-old American "gunboat diplomacy." "Sending AWACS planes to create the impression of an American presence in a region where the situation is unsettled (for the USA) is quicker and simpler than sending warship or Marines there," the WASHINGTON POST newspaper frankly admitted.

When President A. Sadat was assassinated in Egypt Washington was disturbed not so much by the death of a fellow participant in the Camp David deal as by the possible weakening of the position of the United States in the region. Without delay two AWACS planes were sent to Egypt. Foreign observers

assessed this as a new development in American diplomacy - "the expansion of the use of modern reconnaissance planes simultaneously as a tool of military and foreign policy." More than once AWACS planes appeared in other regions too where Washington found "a threat to its vital interests."

Let's take another explosive region - the Korean Peninsula. When the population of the South Korean city of Kwangju rebelled five years ago in May 1980 Washington was very disturbed by such a development, seeing in it a threat to its positions in the Far East. A special conference in connection with this was held in the White House. Carrying out the decision of this conference the Pentagon sent a carrier task force of six ships to the shores of South Korea. And by air they sent the "flying gunboats" - the AWACS planes. Thus the aircraft carriers plus the AWACS planes constitute a menacing symbiosis of the infamous policy "from a position of strength."

The black shadows of the American spy planes sneaking along the borders of the socialist and young developing countries are a reflection of the general aggressive policy of the United States and NATO: fanning war hysteria and intensifying the arms race. The provocative flights of the spy planes may have the most serious consequences and draw the European countries into dangerous military adventures. This is why the participants in the anti-war movement in Western Europe ever more frequently include among their slogans the demand to remove the AWACS planes, which spread their predatory wings over Europe, the Near and Far East - regions that even without this are larder with weapons by Washington and its accomplices.

At the April (1985) plenary session of the CPSU Central Committee it was especially emphasized that the United States openly claims the "right" to interfere everywhere, ignoring and often trampling on the interests of other countries and peoples, the traditions of international relations and treaties and agreements in force. The United States creates hotbeds of conflict and military danger, heating up the situation first in one region of the world and then in another.

The diplomacy of the "flying gunboats" also fits the pattern of this dangerous policy. The aggressive and provocative preparations of the Pentagon require high alertness and constant improvement of combat readiness on the part of Soviet military personnel.

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12893
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AIR/AIR DEFENSE FORCES

ARTICLE PRAISES WORK OF FLIGHT RECORDER ANALYSIS UNIT

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 24 Jul 85 p 1

[Article by Capt M. Lisovskiy, Group of Soviet Forces in Germany: "Reading the Flight"]

[Text] We are at the aircraft turn-around area. A multiple-ton missile-carrier, obeying the signals given by technician Sr Lt S. Machenas, made a sharp turn and came to a stop near the central refueling pump.

Having first put a ladder up to the side of the missile-carrier, WO A. Timashov, a mechanic from the aircraft equipment maintenance group, climbed up. He opened up the cover plate of the automatic flight parameter recording system (SARPP). A compact cassette shined in the specialist's hands. A few minutes later, Timashov was already opening the door of the objective monitoring laboratory.

The mechanic-laboratory assistant Pvt S. Sokolov took the cassette and disappeared into the processing room, which is what they call the room where the SARPP film is prepared for interpretation. The film quickly undergoes the entire cycle of operations in Pvt Sokolov's skilled hands--from developing to washing. After intense drying in a special cabinet, a translucent tape, streaked with fine lines, ends up on WO A. Melikhov's interpretation table.

The most important and crucial phase of the work begins--"reading the flight." This is the interpretation of the SARPP data. WO Melikhov puts the film in the take-up reel of a special apparatus remotely resembling a photographic enlarger. Before our eyes a screen comes alive, whose field is intersected by recording lines of the flight parameters.

...How many times have I myself had to closely examine the film on which the picture of a flight which had just concluded was printed down to the smallest detail in encoded form. Sensitive sensors, reacting to all the changes in the engine power conditions, deflect to one side or another a light beam incident on a moving film. Arbitrarily intersecting lines, dotted lines and line segments remain on it after developing and drying. According to them, given specific skills, it is not difficult to learn a wide variety of characteristics of the completed mission--aircraft speed, altitude and the amount of vertical and horizontal acceleration. The automatic flight

parameter recording system operates in such a way that not one of a pilot's actions or his mistakes in the air can hide from the all-seeing eye of the impartial examiner.

"Look here," Capt N. Grozov, chief of the test instrumentation data servicing and processing group, points to the screen. "The pilot exceeded vertical acceleration during the landing."

The officer instructs WO Melikhov to inform the senior flight engineer about this.

"In such cases it is necessary to inspect the landing gear very thoroughly," Capt N. Grozov explains. He again runs the tape, commenting in a low voice about what he sees:

"The takeoff is good, and the climb is made as it should be. At level flight every thing is normal as well. But here over the range there is a problem; the altitude at dive recovery is on the verge of being dangerous. I will have to report to the squadron commander to have the pilot practice this phase more thoroughly in the simulator."

Capt Grozov has no more comments. He picks up the telephone and reports the results of the analysis to the flying control officer.

No much time had passed from the moment the cassette was removed from the aircraft until this report was made. The objective monitoring data analysis was performed exceeding the established norms. This is the rule in the work of Capt Grozov's subordinates.

The training of the airborne fighters depends largely on the skills of the group's specialists, their experience and conscientiousness. These specialists do not fly and do not work around the aircraft during takeoff preparation, but their work is no less important than that of the rest of the aviators. They are the ones who make it possible for their comrades to identify opportunely shortcomings in piloting technique, to prevent aircraft equipment failures and to organize combat training more purposefully.

In such a responsible position the people must also be especially highly trained, not indifferent, and have a thorough understanding of flying. Capt N. Grozov is just such a person. He likes his profession very much. One day he and I made a calculation, and it turned out that if all the SARPP films which he has examined were stretched out in one line, it would be several hundred kilometers long.

And his subordinates are a match for him. The group chief calls WO A. Melikhov a true expert at his job. The leading specialist has not only mastered the specialty of interpretation in all its minutest details, but, if necessary, can substitute for the officer and skillfully organize the work of all the group's aviators. He has devoted a lot of efforts to teaching mechanic-laboratory assistant Pvt Sokolov the specialty. Before serving in the army, Sokolov had a very vague idea about the fine points of handling photographic materials. Now he works confidently in the processing room.

Together with all the regiment's aviators, the soldiers of the group are working strenuously to fulfill socialist commitments and preparing to welcome properly the 27th CPSU Congress. Capt Grozov's subordinates have decided to arrive at this momentous event only with excellent indicators.

...Our talk with the officer was interrupted by the growing drone of the engine of an aircraft taxiing to the parking ramp. In a matter of minutes the film which will "tell" everything about the completed flight would once again end up in the hands of the specialists.

12567

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AIR/AIR DEFENSE FORCES

AUTOMATION IMPROVES PVO TARGET DESIGNATION PERFORMANCE

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 12 Jul 85 p 2

[Article by Mj V Chigin, staff officer in a radiotechnical unit, under the rubric "In the Interest of Alert Duty": "The Specialist's Responsibility"]

[Text] It appeared to be the most ordinary air situation. It contained nothing to alarm the radar subunit's duty crew. Private V. Kuznetsov, operator, detected a group target and reported this to Captain Yu. Taratin, tactical control officer. The latter in turn reported to the higher command post. Information on the target was now being handled by an automated control system, and the target's route, altitude and speed were now being displayed on screens and illuminated boards.

An alarming blip suddenly flared up on one of the command post screens, however. The flow of information on the target had been disrupted and was not renewed. There was no time to waste in the situation, and the commander directing the drill switched the mission to a different radar station. What had caused the stoppage?

An investigation showed that when the target had abruptly lost altitude, Private V. Kuznetsov, operator, had continued for some time to work with the other, secondary zone, not daring to shift his focus of attention. Captain Yu. Taratin, the tactical control officer, could and should have anticipated his blunder. He trusted the operator, however. The officer was also reassured by the fact that the target was being tracked automatically by means of the automated control system.

The main cause of the incident was thus the inadequate preparedness of those in charge on the duty shift to promptly get their bearings in the situation and make the correct decision.

Electronic computers, automated control systems and computerized devices are now performing an ever more important role in the accomplishment of the complex and multifaceted missions facing the air defense troops. While making the military work of the fightingmen easier, the automation equipment at the same time makes heightened demands of their professional training, of their ability to perform resolutely and resourcefully in combat. Naturally, this is prompting the commanders and chiefs to devote more attention to the special and technical training

of their subordinates. But are we thinking seriously about how the adoption of automated control systems and electronic computers is affecting the tactical thinking of those in charge of the duty shifts and crews, those who will be the first to encounter an airborne enemy?

Take that operator as an example. Previously, when the targets were tracked manually, his work could be monitored and backed up by the crew chief, by the tactical control officer.... Today, with the use of automated control systems, the situation has changed. The speed at which the information is processed and passed on has increased. But the speed at which possible inaccuracies pass through the communication channels has also increased. If a specialist makes an error, it is extremely difficult to retrieve it from the "bowels" of the automated control system. Sometimes, it is even impossible.

All of this has significantly increased the responsibility of the operator and other specialists in the target detection and tracking system.

An unidentified target was once detected in the unit's zone of responsibility. A decision had to be made without delay. Private E. Pashayev, the operator, went into particularly precise action during this initial stage, perhaps the most important. The target was flying at an altitude of around 10,000 meters. It could easily have been taken for a dense rain cloud from the blip on the screen. The soldier was alarmed by the intensity of the target's illumination, however, and he immediately informed the officer. The reflecting surface of the object was efficiently calculated by the formula, and the necessary data were fed into the automated control system. By the time the commander had arrived at the command post, the fightingmen had tentatively identified the type of aircraft, its speed, altitude.... This made it easier for the commander to adopt the decision for tracking the target.

An acute shortage of time will be experienced in modern air defense combat. Instantaneous assessment of the situation and prompt and efficient action are essential. This is why the operators and the tactical control officers today must possess not only the ability to perform their immediate duties, but also to co-ordinate these with the missions of the subunit or unit for adopting decisions. Despite the high level of saturation of command posts with automated control equipment and electronic computers, after all, everything will ultimately be determined by people. This is not a new idea, of course. We do not forget to re-iterate it in the exercises, however, in which special attention is given to the operators. We begin working with them when the young fightingmen arrive in the unit. We use special tests and exercises to assess their visual memory, reaction speed, emotional stability.... This makes it possible to select the most suitable fightingmen and then assign them to positions in keeping with their abilities and inclinations. Officers S. Dubov, N. Novozhilov and others perform a great deal of work. They have worked out the methodological aid "300 Questions--300 Answers," which helps the specialists to select the optimal alternatives in complex situations, and they conduct demonstration exercises in the subunits with simulators, automated control systems and objective control equipment.

Short tactical exercises with the operators and tactical control officers have also become a regular thing, as have drills in which the specialists perform

duties a level above their own position. All of this combined with the practical standing of alert duty and party-political measures develop in the fightingmen good moral qualities and fighting efficiency and the ability to objectively assess a situation, obtain complete information on the targets from indirect data and work with automated systems. Most importantly, however, it develops a sense of great responsibility for the position entrusted to them and a readiness to make bold decisions and carry out the assigned mission.

The training of tactical control officers has its own problems. Specialists with good schooling in combat work in the forces ordinarily become tactical control officers. However, even the candidates selected by us in the subunits sometimes have an inadequate level of operational and tactical skill and lack skills in working with modern automated control equipment. It cannot be said that any of the young officers are lazy when it comes to the job. However, one often hears them say that since there is automated equipment everywhere, there is no room for creativity. For example, a tendency to count on the "omnipotence" of the automatic equipment had a definite negative effect in the situation in which Captain Taratin, the tactical control officer, found himself.

In order to avoid this sort of thing in the future, we reassessed the effectiveness of our existing system for training tactical control officers. We now help each of the candidates selected to compile a personal plan for shaping up in the position and set optimal schedules for raising his rating. We give special attention to the study of advanced know-how in working with automated control systems and electronic computers and of the best officers in the unit in accomplishing the alert duty missions. We make extensive use of analyses of extreme situations for this purpose. In one of the recent exercises, for example, we analyzed the situation and the performance of Senior Lieutenant A. Pomerantsev, tactical control officer. It proved to be similar to that in which Captain Taratin had once "malfunctioned." What did Pomerantsev do?

It was at a time of mass migration of birds, and Senior Lieutenant Pomerantsev's attention was taken by one of the blips on the screen. It would flicker and disappear, and it was moving at the speed of the wind. "Is it birds or something else?" the officer asked himself. Before answering the question and reporting his decision, however, the officer studied the synoptic situation and requested a report on the air situation in the area from the superior command post. Only after carefully assessing these and other data did Pomerantsev conclude that he was observing a weather-balloon. This made it possible to avoid the use of additional facilities and to conserve energy. Most importantly, however, it made it possible to objectively assess the existing situation.

The unit has many officers who, despite their youth, have extensive experience and are well familiar with the entire process of working with targets in lower subunits and at remote "sites." Their training cannot be improved without special literature, however. And we have a shortage of methodological plans and aids. While there are special tests and exercises for selecting and training the operators, there are none for the tactical control officers. So far as I know, each unit resolves this matter on the basis of its own experience and the specific nature of its service. And this system has some shortcomings.

The universal adoption of electronic computers and automated control systems has made it essential for us to use in the combat training, innovative principles of control, exercises in the theory of games, the mathematical modeling of combat operations, programming.... This could not fail to leave a certain mark on the way the specialists think in a combat situation. That is, I would say, there is a process of reverse effect from the automation of the military work upon the functioning of those in charge of the alert shifts. I believe that this problem, as well as others, needs to be studied. There is no disputing also the fact that the progressive experience which has developed in the forces needs to be more thoroughly studied and summarized, and we need to work out new recommendations and methods for training alert duty officers on the basis of that experience. We need to thoroughly and objectively assess the moral, psychological-physiological and professional qualities of candidates for tactical control positions, using tests and exercises and simulation equipment. I believe that such an approach will conform to the demands of the times and to the missions which we are performing. Today, it was stressed at the April Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, greater demandingness is being made of each worker with respect to the irreproachable fulfillment of his official duties. Competence, a feel for new things, boldness and a preparedness to assume responsibility are moving to the fore. These demands are particularly important for us air defense fighters, who perform the combat missions involved in protecting our homeland's air borders in peacetime.

11499
CSO: 1801/268

AIR/AIR DEFENSE FORCES

INTERVIEW WITH 1ST DEP C-IN-C OF AIR FORCE, LT GEN KOROLKOV

Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 17 Aug 85 p 3

[Interview with Lieutenant General of Aviation B. F. Korolkov, First Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the USSR Air Force on the occasion of 18 August Air Force Day; interviewed by V. Lukashin: "There Beyond The Clouds"]

[Text] The career of Lieutenant General of Aviation Boris Fedorovich Korolkov is in many ways typical of the military leaders of today. Higher Aviation Institute, service in aviation units, the Red Banner Military Air Academy imeni Yu. Gagarin and the Military Academy of the General Staff imeni K. Voroshilov. Korolkov is forty nine years old and has served in aviation for thirty of those years. He has spent approximately three thousand hours in the sky during those years.

Our conversation took place in the General's office. There is a large map on the wall and models of airplanes on the book shelf. There is a globe in the corner.

[Question] Our country solemnly celebrated the 40th Anniversary of Victory in the Great Patriotic War and in a few days 40 years will have elapsed from the day we routed militaristic Japan. Please relate to us what Soviet military pilots contributed to victory in the Far East.

[Answer] The yoke of aggression was broken with the rout of Fascist Germany, but the war in the Pacific Ocean Theater still continued to blaze. This is why on 9 August 1945, faithful to its obligation to its allies, our country entered the war against Japan.

Soviet soldiers had to conduct combat operations against well-equipped enemy forces that were located in heavily reinforced areas. The route to that area crossed over difficult to pass mountain ridges and deserts, wide rivers and impassable taiga. Certainly all of this significantly increased aviation's role and importance in gaining victory.

As is known, the major event in the Far Eastern Campaign was the Manchurian Strategic Offensive from 9 August to 2 September and aviators had serious

tasks to resolve during that period. This is why the Transbaykal Air Army and the First and Second Far Eastern Fronts were reinforced with major units that had a lot of combat experience. Transport divisions and regiments were given special attention. I will give a few facts and figures. By the beginning of combat operations the totals in our aviation group were 3,800 airplanes in air armies and more than 1500 airplanes in naval aviation. There were about 2000 airplanes in the Japanese Air Force. I must add that Soviet fighters and bombers had combat qualities that were significantly better than the Japanese and I must add to this that the enemy had no ground attack aircraft.

Soviet pilots helped our ground forces break through the Japanese defensive line with powerful attacks on enemy defensive positions and forces and equipment that were massed. They disrupted enemy communications and played an important role in repulsing counterattacks. During the entire offensive operation our aviation delivered more than 16,500 soldiers and officers, about 2,780 tons of fuel, 563 tons of ammunition and 1,496 tons of very diverse loads to their appointed locations. Soviet pilots carried out about 23,000 sorties and dropped about 3,000 tons of bombs on the enemy. They completely carried out all missions assigned to them.

[Question] It is apparent that in recent years not only has military equipment changed, but VVS [Air Force] capabilities have also increased. What is modern military aviation today?

[Answer] The most characteristic feature in VVS development has been the increase in its combat power. The scientific-technical revolution had great impact on the development of all services of the Armed Forces and it also affected aviation. Thanks to the steadfast work of Soviet scientists, designers and workers in the aviation industry our units are receiving more modern equipment and weapons.

Today the VVS of the Country of Soviets has missile-armed airplanes equipped with the most advanced weapons, the newest equipment for detecting the enemy and controlling fire and precise navigational equipment. We have multi-purpose airplanes with variable wings and powerful vertical take-off and landing airplanes. The arsenal of military transport aviation includes the latest airplanes and various types of helicopters with high lift capabilities. VVS technical equipment allows us to defeat all enemy attack equipment, to reliably support ground forces and to successfully fight for air superiority.

The VVS is the most maneuverable service in the Armed Forces and it has the strongest strike force.

[Question] Comrade General, please explain what qualities a contemporary military pilot must possess?

[Answer] Naturally the extensive change in military equipment and weapons is making great demands on the moral-political, combat, psychological and physical training of our aviators. To put it concisely, the Soviet military pilot is a man absolutely dedicated to the Motherland, a highly qualified specialist, able to quickly and completely master complicated aviation equipment. He has an inherently quick mind, concentrated will, solid

character, valor and courage and certainly a readiness to take risks when necessary. One cannot do anything in modern aviation without these qualities.

It is totally understandable that one must have an extensive mental outlook to control aviation systems. The successful conduct of aerial battle is unthinkable without thorough, specialized knowledge of equipment, aerodynamics, tactics and the theory of tactical use. Judge for yourself. Modern battle is characterized by great spacial expanses, a rapidly-changing situation, intense enemy PVO [air defense] activity and the extensive use of radio-electronic equipment. Aerial reconnaissance has become an important mission for our aviation, as have rocket and bomb strikes on small targets and supporting air assaults. All of this requires initiative, decisiveness and maximum use of all physical and moral abilities.

I dare assure IZVESTIYA readers that Soviet military pilots are ready to carry out any order from the Motherland.

[Question] And how did you come to join the aviation, Boris Fedorovich?

[Answer] What happened was that I saw my first airplane flight in 1946 over the town of Beloretsk in Bashkir and that is how it all started. I was also pulled into the sky. I mastered the ABC's of flying in the Magnitogorsk flying club and later there were years of training at the Orenburg Red Banner Higher Military Aviation School for Pilots imeni I. Polbin. I studied there along with Yuriy Alekseyevich Gagarin.

[Question] What achievements are military pilots meeting the important event in the life of our party and country, the 27th CPSU Congress, with?

[Answer] You certainly know that summer military training is in full swing. Military aviators are struggling for high marks in military and political training and are steadfastly mastering modern aviation systems and the art of simulated aerial combat and accurate rocket and bombing runs. There is a lot of work. Pilots are learning to destroy targets with the first run both day and night, under difficult weather and tactical conditions. Aviator cockpits are becoming areas for military work.

Participating in All-Army socialist competition under the slogan "Our Selfless Military Duty For The 27th CPSU Congress", military collectives commanded by officers Yu. Temnikov, A. Zemlyanoy, V. Zakharov and A. Kirichenko are attaining the highest marks. Initiatives such as developing the best flight relief, providing interchangeability among crews and teams, struggling to conserve resources and increase labor productivity in aviation repair enterprises and others were conceived during this competition.

The initiator of socialist competition in the VVS, personnel of the Guards Bomber Red Banner Aviation Regiment commanded by Guards Colonel A. Tsarkov, is successfully resolving military training missions. The CPSU Central Committee and the Soviet Government have high regards for the military work of Soviet soldiers and the rank of Hero of the Soviet Union has just recently been awarded to officers Ye. Zelnyakov, V. Kot. V. Miguonov, V. Pavlov, P. Ruban and others.

The aerial warriors of the Eighty's are continuing the finest traditions of the older generation of Soviet military pilots in a worthy manner and are increasing their military glory.

NAVAL FORCES

YEARS OF CONFLICT BETWEEN CAPTAIN, CREW OF RESCUE SHIP

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 20 Jul 85 p 4

[Article by Capt 3rd Rank A. Tkachev, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent: "Vanity"]

[Text] A conflict, which was not promptly assessed from a standpoint of principle, has continued for several years on the rescue vessel "Georgiy Titov"....

If we go back to the very beginning of the long history of this episode, it becomes clear that the cause of the conflict was a desire by one officer, Captain Lieutenant A. Larin, group commander, ostensibly to do everything possible to help strengthen order on the vessel and an alleged disinclination to do so on the part of a second person, Captain 3rd Rank Yu. Lango, executive officer on the rescue vessel "Georgiy Titov."

That friction, which naturally did not improve the situation on the vessel, subsequently developed into a conflict in which not only the command element of the vessel and the unit was caught up, but larger groups as well. And those involved in the conflict themselves suffered perceptibly. They have been held in their positions, and neither of them has been promoted in rank. Each of them has had a party reprimand and several service penalties.

After having had the falling-out with Lango, Captain Lieutenant Larin then became mad at many people. He began dividing the crew up into those who were "for Lango" and those who were "for the truth."

A. Larin's waste of energy on the confrontation over a period of many years has been sustained by his conviction that he is being persecuted for criticism. This prompted him to appeal to KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in letters and in person. He reported that his problem had repeatedly been investigated by the unit political section, the political section of the fleet's rear service, the Political Directorate of the Northern Fleet and a party commission under the fleet's political directorate. There have been decisions, recommendations and organizational conclusions. The captain lieutenant is still inclined to be extremely active, however. Having begun with criticism, he went on to accusations and attempts to settle personal accounts with his opponents.

This might appear to be an unpleasant but localized situation, which perhaps should not even be discussed. It should be. For the very reason that a critical view is constantly needed for making our life wholesome. Our own life, that of our comrades and of the collective. Unfortunately, however, vanity, greed, personal dislike... are still frequently passed off as criticism for the common good.

Captain Lieutenant Larin offers his 18 service penalties and his party reprimand as irrefutable proof of "harassment for criticism." That is, for letters written to higher echelons. In fact, the negative incidents reported by Larin were ordinarily confirmed. The captain lieutenant makes certain that there is an official statement from the unit commander or the chief of the political section for every fact he reports. This is not done in the interest of the job, however, but for purposes of "self-protection." He gives voice to the "dosier" as soon as he needs to justify a personal blunder or deficiency or to "protest" a penalty. This occurred, for example, when Communist Larin's personal case was being heard at a meeting of the battalion party committee, and he was asked what had caused gross infractions of discipline committed by his subordinates. Communist Larin answered: "It is impossible to create a microclimate when there is disorder on the whole ship."

We can see that there is not even a hint of an attempt at self-critical evaluation. It is impossible, that is all there is to it, so long as on the ship.... But who is responsible for the ship? They are the ones Larin demands to be punished for the infractions of his subordinates: "The commander and executive officer need to be removed, and then there will be order." The party committee members asked Communist Larin what he had proposed or done to establish proper order on the vessel. "I haven't proposed anything to anyone," Larin answered, giving them to understand that he does not have the time to engage in this matter personally. He chose to do something else: to reveal and inform. This is viewed as a matter of principle. It soothes his vanity. Aleksey Grigoryevich rigorously demands that someone come and finally establish "order."

It is in fact long since time to establish order on the vessel. Conflicts of this kind are simply impossible where everything in the life of the military collective goes smoothly, where everything serves to further the work. And this vessel has indeed been suffering for several years. Captain 3rd Rank Yu. Lagno, the executive officer, does in fact not overly burden himself with the concerns of the ship. It is disappointing that there have not been people among the communists who were able to assess the situation promptly and from a standpoint of principle, to call upon the party organization to make a determined shift in its work and correct the shortcomings. Instead of this, there appeared a "seeker of the truth" who took advantage of a situation calling for criticism to justify his own inaction, to establish a reputation for himself as a zealous champion of the vessel's interests.

This kind of criticism, even if it contains a bit of the objective, most frequently evokes rejection. A conflict arises. Furthermore, the conflict is of a personal order, although it becomes established in the minds of the participants as a campaign for high principles conducted in the interest of the job.

Captain Lieutenant Larin began demanding accountability from the executive officer. And the more vigorously and extensively he demanded accountability, the more perceptible became the reverse effect and the more the conflict moved out of the area of personal relations between the two individuals into the area of service and party relations among a broad circle of people on the vessel and in the unit.

Up to a certain point, of course, it would not have been so very difficult to halt that process, normalize the situation and truly establish order on the vessel. The initial attempt by the vessel's command element to brush aside the acrimonious issues, to hush up the matter without getting to the core of it, to halt it without publicity or consequences, however, seemed to add fuel to the fire. Captain 3rd Rank Yu. Parfenenko, the vessel's commander, and Captain 3rd Rank N. Sivushkin, now replaced as deputy commander for political affairs, neglected their service and party duty. Interpreting their passive reaction in his own way, Larin went to the political section.

An investigation established both facts which apparently "worked" in Larin's favor and facts which went against him. For some reason, those involved did not consider it necessary to review the facts in their interrelationship or to assess them objectively. I shall quote from a document: "The unit headquarters and its political section have limited themselves to brief inspections and to the issuing of orders for punishing the guilty parties instead of painstaking organizational work on the vessel to establish strict regulation order." This was the conclusion arrived at by the Political Directorate of the Northern Fleet when it came time for it to deal with the conflict. The unit political section and its command element thus also performed their duty in a superficial and formal manner in the beginning and did not really engage in a serious investigation of the situation on the "scandal-ridden" vessel.

For a rescue vessel, on which the service involves particular responsibility, such things as solidarity of the crew, cohesion of the officers and a spirit of trust, comradeship and mutual assistance are extremely necessary. And discord, suspicion, squabbles... are extremely undesirable.

"For 6 months now things have been improving on the 'Georgiy Titov', " Captain 1st Rank A. Kulik, unit commander, told me when we met. "Changes for the better are not being made as rapidly as we would like, but they are occurring. The number of gross infractions has dropped, and the organization of the service has improved. In order to reinforce this process, we naturally need not a climate of intrigues but moral unity on the part of the crew, firm regulation order and a wholesome moral climate. We once overlooked deficiencies on the 'Georgiy Titov'."

And what about Larin's letters? They continue to call for the establishment of order. Their factual element is now clearly weak, however.

While the situation on the crew is becoming normal, Larin is getting no satisfaction from this. Still attempting somehow to keep the heat on, he is trying

to "negotiate" redemption for his former sins and to obtain... a new assignment. The officer now describes himself as having suffered for criticism, claiming that he is refused the assignment he wants. This is in revenge, he alleges, for helping to establish order on the vessel. The assignment Larin is trying to get involves a great deal of responsibility. Candidates for the assignment are selected with great care. Larin does not possess the necessary qualities was the conclusion drawn after talking with him, observing and testing him.

The conversation with Captain 3rd Rank V. Lyakin, deputy chief of the unit political section, was mainly about Larin's position and his conduct as a communist.

"There are different kinds of criticism," the political worker said. "There is criticism for the good of the job, whereby the communist reveals shortcomings because this is demanded by his conscience and by his stance in life. Then there is criticism made as though in the common interest but which primarily has the personal objective of getting even, of spiting someone, of protecting oneself against justified reproach. The conscientiousness, constructiveness and objectivity of the criticism constitute the criterion. But Larin demands the maximum from everyone but himself (unfortunately, we find such people now and again in our midst). He is intolerant of the slightest criticism directed at him. Everyone knows, however, that when an undisciplined officer demands that others establish order but is in no hurry to take part himself, this smacks of demagogery, does it now?

Of course it does! Why did this not become clear until several years after the conflict arose, however? To put it mildly, Larin's position does not evoke sympathy. That is true. But how is it that the commander, the staff and the political section permitted the conflict to survive?

I recall a situation which has only now, in retrospect, become acutely clear. The situation was similar to the one which apparently arose when Larin made his first critical statements. On the ASW cruiser, however, in its healthily collective, the situation took a different course.

Deficiencies in the work of Captain 3rd Rank V. Gridnev, divizion commander, were being discussed at an officers' meeting. Lieutenant A. Yemets, his subordinate, was severest in his criticism. Despite the facts cited and what appeared to be logical conclusions, however, the meeting received the lieutenant's speech with disapproval. Everyone knew, after all, that during the time Lieutenant Yemets had served as group commander, he had proved to be an inefficient and undisciplined officer who performed his duties in an irresponsible manner.

When the lieutenant made his critical speech, everyone understood that it was actually the fate of another individual which was troubling him. He was quite simply glad to have the opportunity "to settle up" with a chief from whom he had received several penalties.

The officers did not avoid the delicate situation. The lieutenant received a proper lesson in human decency.

Materials of the April 1985 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee stress the following: "We must increase our demandingness of each party member with respect to his attitude toward his public duty... with respect to the honorable and pure image of the party member." It was no doubt with good reason that this statement was made precisely now, when the moral aspect of what is done and what is occurring at each enterprise and establishment, in each military collective has become a crucial factor of public opinion in assessing both those in charge and the rank-and-file communists.

It was stated straightforwardly at the plenum that demandingness on the part of the party member must begin with demandingness of himself, that the party member must have an honorable and pure image, because neither the society as a whole nor each specific collective has ever been indifferent as to who exercises the right to criticism, and for what purpose. We know that criticism carries the moral charge imparted to it by the individual. The very same words coming out of different mouths can therefore sound like the truth or like a product of personal arrogance.

11499
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NAVAL FORCES

CAPT 2ND RANK TSYMBAL ON NAVIGATOR TRAINING

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 2 Aug 85 p 2

[Article by Capt 2nd Rank V. Tsymbal, deputy chief navigator of the Red Banner Northern Fleet, under the rubric "The Fleet and the Ocean": "The Navigator's Responsibility"]

[Text] The small missile ship "Tucha" was returning to base. In order to enter the base it would have to pass through a narrow strip relatively difficult to navigate. Captain 3rd Rank V. Filippov, ship commander, had done this many times before, and it appeared that there would be no difficulties this time as well.

A dense wall of snow unexpectedly moved in, however. Visibility dropped to zero. This is where weaknesses began to appear in the performance of those expected to assure the ship's navigational safety. At the reference point Senior Lieutenant V. Melnik, navigator, reported the time for turning onto a new course, but he did not indicate the new rudder angle or the reading for the new course. He descended to the chart room to make the entry in the navigation log. In the meantime, Captain 3rd Rank Filippov, holding the ship on an interim course as he was accustomed to do in good visibility, suddenly "lost" the situation. When Senior Lieutenant Melnik returned to the fore bridge and looked at the navigational radar screen, he could see at once that the ship would not make the turn. His report to the commander came too late, however.

What was the cause of this unpleasant incident? At first glance it would appear that an entire chain of accidental circumstances had led to it. A more thorough investigation of the occurrence, however, showed a perfectly definite pattern. The errors committed by the commander and the navigator were programmed, so to speak, by the fact that the officers had counted upon their good knowledge of the sailing area and calculated the ship's maneuver by sight. They had not made the preliminary plot of the route, had not gone through in advance alternatives for passing through the narrow area necessitated by the deterioration in the weather situation....

Unfortunately, slips like this still occur. When one studies cases of navigational near accidents, one is surprised by something which appears at first glance to be paradoxical: Most of them occur not while sailing in some remote, unfamiliar area of the ocean, which one would expect to be more

difficult to navigate, but in thoroughly familiar fairways. It is this very familiarity with the area of navigation, however, which produces self-assurance and sometimes, even a basic lack of thoroughness and discipline in certain navigators, particularly the young ones.

It would probably not occur to anyone to pass through the English Channel, for example, using only visual estimation and intuition. While entering or departing the base, however, or when travelling to the range where the ship ordinarily performs its combat training missions, certain individuals permit themselves to navigate in precisely this manner, forgetting that the ocean is ever ready to produce the most unexpected situations.

Many years of experience in marine navigation has produced the navigator's golden rule: Wherever you sail--far from the native shores or only a few miles from them--whether you are familiar with the sailing area or are in the area for the first time, a preliminary charting of the navigation ahead must be performed in advance by the navigator and approved by the commander, taking into account the missions assigned for the cruise, hydrographic and navigational and weather conditions. I would like to mention, as an example, Captain 2nd Rank V. Sergeyev, commander of the large ASW ship "Marshal Timoshenko," and Senior Lieutenant S. Vikhrov, commander of its navigation division. Even when they are only to make a brief trip out to sea, they select the route most carefully. They plot on a map all of the courses which the ship will be sailing and indicate the bearings for turns, reference distances, typical reference points, dangerous depths and individual obstacles. The necessary reference information is prepared, and many other things are done.

It is very important for such scrupulous preparation to be made for sailing. The preliminary plotting is not merely a particular detail in the navigator's work. It is a very significant phase of the work, without which none of the subsequent phases can be complete. It is an indispensable element of high-caliber navigation--of the navigator's discipline, if you please.

But how are we to get the navigators to fulfill the requirements ensuring navigational safety in the manner dictated by life? This depends in very great part upon the superior chiefs. Unfortunately, not all of them are consistent or principled in this matter. We sometimes find cases in which the preliminary plotting is performed poorly or even not at all, but the commander of the formation or unit, or the navigating officer nonetheless gives the ship a "Good" for the cruise.

Is there any need to point out that this sort of connivance does not add to the navigators' sense of responsibility, that these "little" indulgences only lead to laxity and lack of discipline and can also turn into great disasters? I believe that the flag officer and the staff officers must take an absolutely definite stance in this matter: No matter how well trained the crew is as a whole, the ship must not be sent out to sea if there are serious deficiencies in the navigation division.

This is precisely the way things are done, as an example, in the unit in which Captain 2nd Rank B. Degtyarev was navigating officer until recently. Thanks to the demandingness and unwillingness to compromise of the superior chiefs with respect to the preliminary plotting, it has now become a habit for the commanders and navigators. The officers can simply not conceive of going out to sea without it. And it is not surprising that this unit has long had no navigational near accidents.

With respect to the causes of the formal attitude of certain navigators toward the performance of the preliminary calculations and the plotting, it should be pointed out that some of them regard this as purely mechanical work not requiring any initiative or creativity of the one performing it. This is fundamentally incorrect. There is great scope for creativity in this work. Just as there is for training and expanding one's professional perspective.

One can limit oneself to the purely technical aspect, of course: make the necessary calculations, plot the ship's courses on a map, and nothing more. One can also work in a different manner, however: thoroughly study the specific features of the sailing area, gather as much information as possible about it, select the best alternative for the plotting and run through it and others, including unaccustomed ones. "Cruises" on a map are good in that the navigator can try anything without being afraid of having an accident or running the ship aground. One might say that the more "complex situations" the navigator has on the map, the fewer there will be in reality, and if they occur, the greater will be the assurance that he will get out of them with honor.

I recall the following incident. The ASW ship "Admiral Yumashev" was executing missions on a long cruise. Everything was going according to plan. The ship was following the designated route. Complications suddenly developed, however, and it became necessary to make an unforeseen change in the route--specifically, to negotiate a fairly difficult coastal area of the ocean used extremely rarely by ships. The unexpected task did not stump Captain 3rd Rank N. Koryagin, the navigator, however. Based on the information he had and using the results of his own observations, he was able to expeditiously prepare large-scale and precise charts of the situation. This permitted the commander to sail the ship with confidence and assure its navigational safety. It turned out that when the provident Koryagin had prepared for the cruise back at the base, he had run through a possible passage of this area, just in case, and gathered information on it. He had become fairly familiar, even though from a distance, with the unknown area.

We know that during the preliminary plotting, among other things, the navigator is supposed to specify alternatives for using the technical navigation equipment and the procedure for reserving it. This is what is disturbing, however. Certain navigators will sometimes select as alternative methods for determining the ship's location only those which they like the best. Again, these are ordinarily methods which call for the use of the ship's technical means or navigational facilities in the sailing area. It is easy to explain this preference. In this case the navigator does not have to

make a lot of complicated calculations: He is assisted by the equipment. It never occurs to him that every time he selects the easy way, he is cheating himself. In a situation of actual combat operations, after all, the ship's technical equipment could be put out of action, and the navigational facilities in the area could be destroyed by the enemy. How is the navigator going to operate in that case?

The navigators need to learn to use all of the known methods for determining the ship's location and for dead reckoning. Incidentally, this is also a matter of the navigator's discipline.

I would like to point out in conclusion that no sort of plotting, even the most brilliantly executed, can assure navigational safety by itself. When operating at sea, errors can be made even when the plotting has been performed. One has to be able to back up the preliminary calculations with skill in practical navigation and precision in the execution of every maneuver. Furthermore, the preliminary calculations must in no case be regarded as dogma. Following them rigidly and "blindly" can be harmful rather than beneficial, after all. One needs to thoughtfully analyze the situations developing on the cruise and if necessary, make adjustments in the preliminary plotting in accordance with changes in the situation.

Clearly, however, this will turn out better for the individual who has prepared thoroughly and purposefully while on shore for setting out to sea. Truly reliable and competent navigation is based on strict observance of the rules for navigating, extensive preliminary work and a high level of discipline on the part of the navigator, always and in all things. He who is entrusted with plotting the courses of ships and seeing to their navigational safety must clearly understand this.

11490
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NAVAL FORCES

CAPT 2d RANK KRIKUNOV ON 'SLAVA'S' LOW MARKS IN COMPETITION

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 24 Jul 85 p 2

[Interview with Capt 2d Rank V. Krikunov, commander of the guided missile cruiser Slava, by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Capt Lt M. Lukanin aboard the Slava; date not specified]

[Text] This training year, the crew of the guided missile cruiser Slava, initiator of socialist competition in the Navy, has become especially acutely aware of how difficult it is to be the leader. The position of initiator here demands from each strenuous thinking, energetic labor, high consciousness and good organization. On the whole, the cruiser is successfully completing the tasks set before it. At the same time, not everything for the fleet innovators is turning out as planned early in the year. In particular, there are some shortfalls in the further strengthening of discipline, and the planned effect in combat training and mastering and using equipment has not always been achieved.

Now the crew of the Slava, having critically thought over the path covered since the start of the training year, is striving to make adjustments in its activities in order to achieve results befitting an initiator.

The commander of the guided missile cruiser, Capt 2d Rank V. Krikunov, shared his thought regarding this with our correspondent Capt Lt M. Lukanin who recently visited the Slava.

[Question] Viktor Alekseyevich! Lately, there is not much laudatory said in the fleet in reference to the Slava, and more is said about the incomplete utilization of its capabilities. Let us take, say, firing by the main missile complex. The crew handled the task, however, the firing was rated only as good. You yourself, not to mention others, apparently expected better than that?

[Answer] Indeed, the crew is not satisfied with the results of the firing mentioned and in general with the results of the winter training. Healthy dissatisfaction with accomplishments is a good quality, but in this case that is not the whole point. Our ship and the equipment in our charge have changed many of the previous ideas about the content of military labor. Given the saturation with automation and electronics, increasing the reliability of shipboard systems and complexes and expanding their capabilities, the labor itself has not become easier because of this. On the contrary. No "intelligent" machine can free man from the need to think, analyze and make decisions. Unfortunately, not everyone on the crew has truly realized this.

Serious complaints should be made here against the officers of the department which until recently was commanded by Capt 2i Rank S. Katorzhnov. In especially complicated situations, sometimes occurring in carrying out combat training missions at sea, some of them became flustered. Why? It was because they did not display proper aggressiveness during practical mastery of the equipment and were unable to use the full might of its capabilities. This is not the modern way. Scientific and technical progress requires not only the development of perfect equipment, but also the innovative use of its capabilities.

At official conferences and party and Komsomol meetings we spend a lot of time discussing the search, creative work and even research work. This is necessary. The main thing here is to organize the fulfillment of our plans. We have slipped a bit here. At the start of the training year on the ship we made up a list of topics which especially needed to be studied for combat training. But time has passed, and it has started to become clear--papers are being written, procedures are being made up; those of Capt Lt S. Surin, Capt Lt V. Filipov and Sr Lt B. Arkhipov, for example, are very promising. But many of the innovations remain on paper. Their implementation requires new, drastic measures and additional efforts. But there is not enough ardor for this.

Some time ago, the ship's party committee, headed by Capt Lt A. Girin, made a special study of the experience of socialist competition accumulated in the cruiser's electromechanical department. The party activists compiled a detailed report on everything interesting and warranting attention. However, here again the matter did not go beyond papers.

Here it turned out that we at times are lagging behind the requirements of today in our activities. We are suffering losses in areas where we could be making great gains. Just one detail: Many became interested in a method of training operators, proposed by Sr Lt B. Semenov. Soon it was recommended to the entire fleet. You would think the initiator would energetically master it. But until recently, we have made quite limited use of it.

Where was the commander, you ask? A commander's activities also require up-to-date comprehension. At times he is physically unable to probe into all the specifics of life on the ship. In these conditions, it is especially important that every officer on the ship be conscientiously involved in his job, perform his immediate duties and be able to set a task and carry it through to completion, demonstrating initiative and a sense for the new is so

doing. These professional qualities are becoming increasingly important today. However, complaints can be still made about some officers on this point.

[Question] Why was this not properly reflected in the results of the socialist competition for the winter training period? Were there too many excellent marks given? Why, say, was the missile battalion, which received a four for its main firing, rated as excellent according to the winter training results?

[Answer] When the Slava was given only third place in our unit according to the results of the winter training period, many on the ship were at a loss. Just how, they say, can it be that the cruiser is an initiator of socialist competition in the Navy, but not even be the leader in its own unit. As you see, the command and political department strictly considered the rating of the results of our work. But here on the ship not everyone for the time being is sufficiently principled.

Not so long ago the battery commanded by Sr Lt P. Rusov was performing artillery firing. During it, Warrant Officer S. Cherednichenko violated the sequence of his actions. The head of the department and other officers began to assure me that, they say, nothing terrible happened. Of course, the warrant officer's negligence irritated me, but what bothered me far more was the calmness of some of the officers. We do not need excuses, promises and hopes, but real results and a self-critical opinion.

To be honest, we often do not have enough self-criticism and exactingness in assessing our achievements. Otherwise, we would hardly have ended up in third place in the unit.

Hence, the hope that there is still time and an urge here and there to pass off desires as reality. That very mark of "five" for the missile battalion is, to a great extent, to the "credit" of the department 2 deputy commander for political affairs, Capt 3d Rank V. Kokhanyuk. In his zeal to make the indicators of the department desirable, he resorted to fakery. If someone of us thought that a modern ship by itself would "save" the crew in competition, this did not come true. No, it demands much more of people. It requires them to rearrange their thinking and break away from out-of-date evaluation criteria.

What quality criteria for military labor were most popular in some subunits (podrazdeleniya)? A watch went by without a reprimand, a class went according to plan--and this was considered almost an achievement. But, after all, to work and serve without reprimands is the norm. Each watch, each class, training session and exercise, and each sortie to sea must yield a real result, a perceptible increase in specialists' training, in the work of the crew and in increasing the ship's combat readiness. That is precisely the problem for the Slava now. Our primary concerns are in this direction: real results and real evaluations.

[Question] Recently, I had occasion to visit the escort ship Pytlivyy. They have amassed instructive experience in the very problem interesting you--what

to consider objective criteria in competition. One can probably encounter much instructive on other ships of the fleet as well. Does the crew of the Slava turn to the experience of other crews, the experience of the nuclear cruiser Kirov, with whom it is competing?

[Answer] You see, there is not much desire to do this. I can name, for example, the strong points of a commander of some or other ship (I know many of them well), but I am not in the position to say specifically how successful they have been on other ships, especially in the area of education. I consider the summarization and dissemination of advanced experience to be a relevant problem for all of us.

Now the competition with the Kirov crew of the Red Banner Northern Fleet in the meanwhile is not of a creative nature. We received from the members of the Northern Fleet the text of the socialist commitments and several photographs. At the same time, the experience of the Kirov could be very useful to us, especially on forming a ship battle crew and studying and using modern equipment. Correspondence, understandably, will not help out here.

[Question] We would hope that at the appropriate command levels, especially in the Main Political Directorate of the Navy and the political directorates of the Black Sea and Northern fleets, they will look closely at these problems. Now for the main question: What kind of guarantees are there that the commitments made by the crew of the cruiser Slava will be fulfilled by the end of the year?

[Answer] I will say one thing: We have a firm belief in our success. Today we touched upon primarily the shortcomings, but much that is positive has also been amassed on the ship-initiator. There are many genuine enthusiasts on the Slava, people who are profoundly responsible, full of initiative and energetic. They are the reliable support of the ship's command in all matters. They include, by way of illustration, our masters of military affairs Capt 2d Rank V. Fenenko, Capt Lt V. Konoval, Warrant Officers V. Smirnov and Ye Bastrygin and many others. The fact that the crew is on the rise was convincingly confirmed by our last trip at sea, which can serve as an example of intensification of the training process and well thought-out planning of combat training. The ship was not at sea very long, but during this time the crew performed more than 10 combat exercises, all with an outstanding rating.

The decisive factor in all our changes for the better is the human factor. Here the role of each member of the crew is great. Here is one example. Capt 3d Rank Ye. Khalaichev was assigned to the position of executive officer only recently. But he has done so much in the interests of our overall cause. Though his energy, exactingness of himself and others and deep involvement in all areas of life on the ship, this officer has substantially improved the organization of duty on the cruiser, which under the former executive officer at times had breakdowns. A creative and exacting style is becoming more and more firmly established in the work of officer personnel and the entire crew.

We will continue to operate with increased exactingness of ourselves, as directed by the decisions of the April CPSU Central Committee Plenum, in order to welcome the 27th CPSU Congress with worthy results and justify the lofty title of initiators.

NAVAL FORCES

BRIEFS

PORT VISIT AT TUNIS--A Soviet military naval force made an official friendly visit to the Port of Tunis from 12 to 16 August. This was done by agreement. The force consisted of the large ASW ships "Krasnyy Krym" and "Krasnyy Kavkaz" commanded by Vice Admiral V.Ye. Selivanov. [Text] [Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 10 Aug 85 p 4] 11499

SHIPS VISIT DPRK PORT -- In accordance with an understanding, on 13 August 1985 a group of Soviet naval ships composed of the large anti-submarine ship Tallin and escort ships Poryvisty and Ryany will make a five-day official friendly visit to the port of Wonsan in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. The group will be headed by First Deputy Commander of the Pacific Fleet Vice Admiral N. Ya. Yasakov. Soviet sailors will take part in celebrating the 40th Anniversary of the liberation of Korea. [Text] [Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 11 Aug 85 p 3] 12511

BULGARIAN SHIPS VISIT SEVASTOPOL--In accordance with an understanding, a group of ships from the People's Republic of Bulgaria's Navy, flying the flag of fleet commander Admiral V. G. Yanakiyev, will conduct a 4-day official friendly visit to Sevastopol. The Bulgarian sailors will take part in the celebration of USSR Navy Day. [Text] [Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 24 Jul 85 p 3] 12567

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SPECIAL TROOPS

CONSTRUCTION TROOPS' INNOVATORS HASTEN SCIENTIFIC-TECHNICAL PROGRESS

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 24 Jul 85 p 1

[Article by Capt A. Vorobyev, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA stringer correspondent: "The Effect of the Quest Is Growing: What Pooling the Efforts of Innovators Can Yield on Military Construction Projects"]

[Text] Inventors and innovators are helping to solve the problem of hastening scientific and technical progress at military construction sites and enterprises. Valuable experience of using a comparatively new form of collective technical creative work has been amassed in the military construction organization led by Lt Gen N. Gryaznov.

During the lunch break, Warrant Officer G. Sidorov gathered the military construction workers making up the creative brigade of innovators together and said:

"We have been given an urgent, very crucial assignment. It is not a simple matter--we must develop a protective sleeve for an electrical cable. The deadline is also short: We need to fabricate a batch of prototypes in 2 days."

Concern could be detected in the looks the military builders cast at one another and, at the same time, pride. Their creative brigade had not been in existence for many years now, but it did not often have occasion to fulfill such expeditious and important orders.

The staff of the small brigade of innovators is continually being refreshed. Along with novices making taking their first steps in innovative work, there are also experienced innovators--those such as Jr Sgt Vasiliy Nosov and Pvt Nikolay Astapov, already having accounted for many valuable suggestions. They were the ones who were equal to the occasion in carrying out the urgent task of making a protective sleeve.

"Creative collective brigades of innovators, in the establishment of which we use the appropriate statutes drawn up by the All-Union Central Trade-Union Council," says Col V. Gubanov, "have presented themselves in the best light. First of all, they manage to solve the most complex problems, and do so in a

short space of time. Calculations show that the economic impact per innovator is growing significantly. Secondly, the atmosphere in the collective is improving, work involvement of the people is increasing, and they are inspired by the opportunity to participate actively in revitalizing production."

By way of illustration, suggestions by the brigade headed by Lt Col V. Bobkov to change the process for digging drainage trenches and installing reinforced concrete blocks resulted in economic gains of about 40,000 rubles.

Here is another example of collective creative thought. A change in the design of the suspended ceiling at one of the projects, suggested by the brigade headed by V. Sokolkin, a Soviet Army employee, made it possible to save 10,000 rubles.

A conference in the CPSU Central Committee on problems of accelerating scientific and technical progress aimed inventors and innovators to work more aggressively and in a new fashion, to apply themselves more boldly in searching for reserves, and to strive for the soonest implementation of innovative suggestions.

A. Tsvetkov, supervisor of one brigade of inventors and innovators, has this to say:

"The lack of a well-established system of introducing innovative suggestions is one of our sore spots. A suggestion is introduced, as a rule, at one or two construction projects. But others may be struggling with solving a similar problem at the same time."

There is no doubt that much here depends on the supervisors. Technical and creative work is receiving increasingly broader dissemination and has all the conditions for further development. The task of production organizers is to make wise use of this truly "golden" store of collective technical thought, summarize the experience amassed and concentrate the efforts of military construction innovators on solving the key problems of intensification of production.

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SPECIAL TROOPS

COL GEN BYCHENKO ON CONSTRUCTION WORKERS' DAY

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 11 Aug 85 p 2

[Article by Colonel General V. Bychenko, chief of the Military Construction Unit Political Directorate: "Toward New Advances In Work And Service"]

[Text] Today is Construction Workers' Day. A large number of this profession's representatives wear shoulder boards and work at military construction sites and enterprises and in USSR Ministry of Defense organizations and institutions.

The article published below relates what results military construction workers and Soviet Army and Navy workers and employees are meeting their professional holiday with, how they are meeting the plans of this final year of the five-year plan and what they have to do to increase the effectiveness and quality of their labors.

Just as people everywhere in the country, those in the Army and Navy are actively preparing for the upcoming 27th CPSU Congress. Striving for a worthy meeting for this important event, military construction workers are sparing no effort to completely meet the plans and responsibilities of this year and of the Eleventh Five-Year Plan as a whole. They are supporting the plan for speeding up the country's social-economic development energetically, with specific actions and in a thrifty manner. This is a plan that they wholeheartedly approved and one that was clearly defined by the April (1985) CPSU Central Committee Plenum.

The political and labor activity of people at military construction sites and in enterprises has increased, as has their desire to work with total efficiency. The search for and introduction of supplemental reserves to increase labor productivity, to increase product quality and save materials and resources are becoming more intense.

Military construction workers have approached their professional holiday with good results. The plan for the first seven months of the five-year plan's final year has been totally met. Planned defensive and national economic projects have been constructed and put into operation within the established times and with good quality. Collectives of construction directorates in the

Moscow and Belorussian Military Districts, in the organizations headed by A. Gorovatskiy, M. Gromenko, F. Zheberlyayev, A. Navasardov, F. Renich, Yu. Rossomakhov and V. Svirskiy and in the industrial enterprises where I. Mikhaylov, R. Khlebnikov and others are chiefs have worked well.

There are less than six months until the end of the five-year plan. Now work on plans for the next, the 12th Five-Year Plan, is ongoing everywhere and new, critical limits in constructive labor are being outlined. All workers, and of course this includes military construction workers, are being assigned a task of tremendous state importance -- the task of making a fundamental change in capital construction and reducing project construction time as a minimum by a factor of two. They must radically speed up putting achievements in scientific-technical progress into practice and based on that they must firmly intensify construction and increase labor productivity and quality. Savings in raw materials and resources are especially vital as more than half of the total expenditure goes for these items.

The methods for resolving these complicated tasks, tasks that are vitally important to our economy and its future progress, have now been defined. These methods are taking us, military construction workers, to a new, very much higher level of construction industrialization, comprehensive mechanization in all work and improvements in planning and organizing construction, labor and command and control. A lot has been accomplished in these areas, but the required scope of operations has still not been reached.

Clearly much of what is needed to implement that which has been planned depends on further improvements in the economic mechanism, planning quality, improving the material-technical supply system and improving contract and execution discipline. But it depends to no less a degree on each worker's activity, creative initiative and responsible attitude toward work. The example of our best collectives, those that are leaders in socialist competition, shows this in a convincing manner.

The majority of military construction organizations and units operate under roughly the same conditions and at times these are difficult. And yet the results in production and in the organization of service, labor and the domestic life of personnel are often extremely different.

As the saying goes, how do the best collectives succeed? First, by the ability to organize things so that everything that has been outlined is accomplished, so that each individual conscientiously works at his own workplace and is interested in making maximum use of the possibilities of increasing production and in increasing his efficiency. And as was stressed at the April (1985) CPSU Central Committee Plenum, this means that the human factor must be activated to put organizational-economic and social reserves into operation. This means having a clear understanding of the tasks assigned by the party and the desire to devote ones labor, experience and knowledge to their completion with all possible efficiency.

Life convinces one that each enterprise and construction site and every military and labor collective has these capabilities. One has only to define and expose those links in work where one can get the most effect with a

minimum of expenditures or without any at all. But it is precisely this ability that is still lacking in many military construction collectives, even those with high production indicators.

Take for example the organization headed by Colonel E. Borisov. This collective had the right to hold an honored place among right-flank organizations in last year's competition and it was noted for the high level of its personnel's labor and social-political activity, the skillful organizational work of its commanders, political workers and business executives and the combat readiness of its party and Komsomol organizations. These conceived the patriotic initiative of opening socialist competition among military construction workers under the banner "For the 40th Anniversary of Great Victory and the 27th CPSU Congress -- Our Selfless, Shock Labor!". This was picked up by all military construction workers in the Army and Navy and the mobilizing force of the competition was vividly displayed in the successful completion of the shock labor watch in honor of the 40th Anniversary of Victory.

And as befits the initiators, they headed the competition, successfully coping with the intense labor responsibilities from month to month and they successfully held the leading position in competition. Military construction workers led by Colonel E. Borisov are working selflessly yet today, but according to the half-year results, the collective is not among the competition's winners. Why did this occur?

The fact is that while intensifying the tempo of production and labor intensity, the collective of initiators put less attention on strengthening regulatory order and military and labor discipline and on guarding their labor and were not able to raise political indoctrinal work with personnel and the efficiency of the party's influence on the collective's atmosphere to the necessary level. It seems that they learned the cost of notorious inertia and underestimating the party's requirement that they learn to think and work in a new manner and resolutely renounce outdated stereotypes in their consciousness and practical activity. And one cannot become reconciled with this. More so since there are special demands on the initiators of competition.

I am sure that the collective headed by communist Colonel E. Borisov is reaching the correct conclusions and will be very severe in approaching the evaluation of their work and the state of affairs. They will do everything to stay on top of the responsibility assigned them and the new demands made on them.

The character of the period we are living through and the novelty and scale of the tasks brought forward by time are now bringing special resonance to all our work. Commanders, political agencies and party organizations in military construction organizations and units are increasing their political influence on all aspects of people's life, service and labor and are interpreting the accumulated experience and unresolved problems, successes and shortcomings from new positions. The creative labor and solid unity of word and deed, initiative and responsibility and high exactingness on themselves and their comrades -- these are what must become the determining factors in evaluating the success of leadership.

In addition to improving individual forms of competition, competition along the principle of "worker relay-races" are becoming more and more prevalent among military construction workers. The motto of this competition is "From mutual pretense to mutual aid and support."

One of our enormous reserves is the extensive introduction of the brigade work form. For example, up to 40 percent of the total volume of construction and assembly work in the Belorussian Military District is done using this method and the number of contract brigades in other construction departments is increasing. The large vanguard of experienced leaders of such brigades has grown and the names of Soviet Army workers, those masters of their business such as I. Savotikov, A. Sukhozad, M. Osin, A. Afanasyev, A. Aleksikov, N. Maksimov and L. Volozhinskiy, are well known. Yet everything that has been done in this area cannot make us totally satisfied.

Construction deficiencies and those in using the accomplishments of science and engineering that were discussed at the June CPSU Central Committee meeting are peculiar to military construction units. We often make poor use of low-level mechanized equipment and normative assemblies and we do not have enough instruments and appliances and too much manual labor. At the present time industrialization has only been felt in the construction of the bearing and protective structures of buildings. And military construction workers have not eliminated such shortcomings as the large volume of incomplete construction, unproductive waste, mismanagement and at times wastefulness and above-norm supplies of materials and equipment. Construction quality in a number of projects is still poor and this leads to major expenditures in eliminating spoilage and in alterations and finishings.

Performance, labor and military discipline in a number of military construction units are still not at the required level. I want to especially stress that it is extremely important for our units to strengthen military indoctrination, for the military construction worker is not simply a stone mason or a sanitary engineer, a crane or bulldozer operator. He is first and foremost an armed defender of the Motherland. This means that he is obligated to have both military and special training skills firmly at hand, to stand guard and unit administrative duties and to strictly carry out the requirements of the military oath and combined arms regulations. When the regulatory tenor of life and service has been provided and the attitude of military construction detachments is strictly observed, personnel are distinguished by their organization, strong discipline and work efficiency. Unfortunately this situation is still far from commonplace.

In short, there are still a lot of urgent business and concerns ahead of us. Military construction workers have everything that they need -- powerful production and scientific-technical potentials and qualified cadres of commanders, political workers and production organizers -- to confidently cope with the major tasks that have been entrusted to them. They will spare no effort and labor to work more efficiently and provide great returns in order to successfully finish the five-year plan and meet the 27th CPSU Congress in a worthy manner.

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CIVIL DEFENSE

LENINGRAD MEDICAL INSTITUTION PROVIDES FIRST AID TRAINING

Moscow SOVETSKOYE ZDRAVOOKHRANENIYE in Russian No 6, 1985 pp 45-47

[Article by S.V. Akekseyev, Ya. M. Varanovskiy and V. S. Luchkevich:
"Instructors And Medical Students Participate In Improving Mass Defense Work"]

[Text] Effectively protecting the population and providing timely and high-quality first aid to the diseased and sick during war are tasks of major state importance.

First-aid and specifically self-help and mutual assistance, the quality of which predetermines the success of other types of medical aid, have a special role in this.

During the Great Patriotic War first aid in the form of self-help and mutual aid was given 38.2 percent of the time¹. A studying of the training that workers and employees in industrial enterprises get in providing medical assistance proves that the organization of their training has a number of problems, the foremost of which are the irregularity of training exercises and their lack of development and at times the lack of experts able to conduct exercises on medical topics. Also, individual basic medical programs for developing civil defense (GO) are not being fully carried out or are not of high enough quality.

At the initiative of GO course instructors at the Leningrad Sanitary-Hygienic Medical Institute, for ten years senior class medical students have been taking part in training the workers and employees of enterprises at several city areas on methods for providing first aid. This gave the institute an opportunity to develop a practical direction to the training and the enterprises received assistance in completing their GO medical developmental training plans.

Significant organizational and methodological preparations preceded the conduct of these exercises. Organizational preparation amounted to establishing the student groups and appointing economic enterprises and GO formations for them, and also determining the initial level of the workers' medical knowledge.

The appropriate GO regional and industrial enterprise staffs took responsibility for organizing worker and employee training. They are allotting training classrooms and granting the necessary tables, dressing material, authorized and improvised equipment for immobilizing and other things.

Before the exercises begin the GO chiefs of staff inform the instructors about the level of worker and employee training and define the sequence for conducting the exercises according to the integrated training plans.

Student participation in medical exercises conforms to plans of enterprise GO staffs and is organically included in the organization and conduct of GO training at enterprises.

Our experience shows that as a rule students at enterprises were met in a friendly manner and that they gave the exercises the required attention. Also the material training base was up to modern requirements.

There are three basic stages that can be distinguished in the medical students' conduct of social-political, medical-instructional and defensive-mass work in the city's industrial enterprises. In the first stage, in accordance with the work plans of local Red Cross and Znaniye organizations, medical-instructional and agitation-propaganda work aimed at increasing the population's sanitary perceptions work conducted. The inclusion of lecture and discussion topics on preventative subject matter was a feature of the work planning during this period.

During the second stage students train as future public GO instructors. Students are trained on the basic topics for upcoming GO exercises in accordance with the training-methodological texts that have been developed. And students that are sent to enterprises go through instructor-methodological exercises which include participation by clinical physicians and specialists in military field surgery, therapeutics, traumatic surgery, hygiene, psychology and others.

These exercises examine questions on organizing training in the GO system, the basic principles of Soviet pedagogy and psychology and the forms and methods of conducting exercises with workers at economic enterprises.

During the third stage students themselves run exercises with personnel from GO formations. The third stage is characterized by a higher organizational level of training for the workers and employees of industrial enterprises and their development of the first aid methods and skills necessary to function in the midst of a major fire, natural calamity and major industrial accidents.

The students' final stage of work is their report on the completion of their training and research and practical activities at enterprises. These reports often turn into impromptu scientific-practical conferences with participation not only by the students and VUZ [institutions of higher education] instructors, but also by representatives from the enterprise GO staffs. The enterprise GO staffs take organizational, methodological and at times even

disciplinary measures based on the practical recommendations offered as a result of the training and research work that was done.

As a result of the experiment, instructors and students of Leningrad's medical VUZ's held exercises with workers and employees of GO formations in 875 training groups. And in doing this, public primary instructors able to conduct recurring exercises on medical topics for the GO training program were trained.

There is also interest in the fact that when the work was put on a systematic basis and others of the city's medical VUZ's were included in it, they were able to increase the scope of training by more than a factor of 1.5, the number of training groups by a factor of two and the number of people trained by 40 percent. They were also able to train 30 percent more public instructors than at the beginning of this work. And qualitative indicators also improved. The organization of training exercises and assimilation of material improved and the activity during competition and in the training objectives increased.

The experiment of training students to work in GO formations at industrial enterprises was approved by oblast and city GO staffs and was used in a number of other institutes.

Measures are planned to expand the participation of students from other humanities VUZ's, those from medical academies and others in this work.

Seminars on the organization and methodology of conducting exercises are being conducted with instructors and students of other VUZ's based on the results of the Leningrad Sanitary-Hygenic Medical Institute experiment.

Several organizational problems were detected during the course of the experiment. Because the training year for the GO system begins on 1 December and the VUZ academic year starts on 1 September, possibilities of using VUZ personnel are not being fully or evenly utilized.

Students can conduct the primary work only during the spring semester (February to May). GO staff leadership also had doubts about whether there would be a quality loss if they replaced paid doctors (doctor's assistants) who are paid by the hour with medical students who invariably work without charge. The obvious medical and economic effectiveness show that the use of students is totally justified.

In addition, this type of student practice is one of the important trends in public-political activity as a result of which every student acquires the necessary knowledge and habits of organizational and mass-defensive work in industrial enterprise labor collectives. This work has a number of other positive aspects: thanks to this work the practical trend of training students in GO is improving and the theoretical knowledge gained at the VUZ is combined with practical skills.

Thus the work that has been done has allowed us to generalize the experiment on interaction between GO cycles in medical VUZ's and GO staffs at various

levels (enterprise, rayon and city) and to study various forms for training and preparing personnel in GO formations on medical issues.

The development of exercise instructors from among the medical students at various courses is creating the possibility of quickly and effectively training GO instructors to conduct exercises at industrial enterprises. In addition, the work that has been done has improved the methodological training of GO cycle instructors and students and has also increased their social-political activity.

FOOTNOTE:

1. "Soviet Medical Experience In The Great Patriotic War 1941-1945", Moscow, 1951-55, Vol 1, page 94.

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CIVIL DEFENSE

EXERCISE AT UZBEK MEAT PLANT DESCRIBED

Tashkent PRAVDA VOSTOKA in Russian 8 Aug 85 p 3

[Article by V. Nikitin, Uzbek SSR Civil Defense Assistant Chief of Staff for Propaganda: "Recognizing Their Responsibility"]

[Text] "Attention! Air Alert! Air Alert!" resounded in every workshop and throughout the enterprise.

This is how the exercise on developing the actions of Urgench Meat Packing Plant workers and employees at the signal for Civil Defense (GO) began. They acted clearly, in a well-organized manner and strictly in accordance with the enterprise's special instructions.

The radiation and chemical defense, technical-engineer support and transportation services headed by N. Baydzhanova, I. Karimov and Sh. Masharipov got especially good marks. The scouts at the radiation and chemical observation post, I. Tilayev and Sh. Khusainov, managed all their responsibilities in an exceptional manner. All calculations for constructing a half-buried radiation cover and equipping it were completed before the allotted time.

The problem of preparing for the exercise was discussed at a party meeting and this guaranteed its successful conduct.

Communist Faina Ubonovna Khegay, the GO chief of staff whose civilian job is chief engineer, was the primary organizer of all civil defense work in the meat-packing plant.

Exercises are conducted at three levels according to an approved schedule. These levels are: with commanders of the non-military organizations, with the rank and file of these organizations and with personnel of the medical section and aid stations.

Primary attention is given to reinforcing the necessary practical skills. To do this, an area is prepared for working out civil defense norms and a GO classroom was set up.

Planning summaries were developed for the majority of training themes to help exercise instructors. Issues being presented that dealt with protection from very strong toxic agents, fire-protection measures, actions at the center of a nuclear fire and at industrial accidents and other were clearly stated. The carefully prepared GO booklets were a great help to all enterprise officials.

Civil defense propaganda is set up well at the meat-packing plant. GO nooks were prepared and placards with civil defense signals were hung in the workshops. Lecturers from the Znaniye Society and propagandists addressed the workers and employees.

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CIVIL DEFENSE

COAL SHAFT OUTFITTED AS SHELTER

Moscow VOYENNYYE ZNANIYA in Russian No 6, Jun 85 (signed to press 6 May 85) pp 8-9

[Article by special correspondent V. Sinyutin: "Shelter in a Shaft"]

[Text] The door slammed shut and the cage descended abruptly. Our correspondent descended to a depth of 624 m together with the next shift of miners.

It was no idle curiosity that led me here where coal, the grain of industry, is produced. I wanted to see with my own eyes, as the saying goes, the shelter prepared under many meters of earth, and not just see it, but also understand its importance and necessity. The fact is that previously I had occasion to hear repeatedly that shafts in themselves are ideal shelter.

As a matter of fact, mines provide people with reliable protection from such casualty-producing factors of nuclear weapons as the blast wave, thermal radiation, and penetrating radiation. Then why also have a shelter here as well?

I shared these doubts with mine civil defense chief of staff Ye. Terekhov.

"Such talk ceased for us long ago," he said persuasively. "Exercises and calculations show that in case the probable enemy employs mass destruction weapons, even miners under ground must have a reliable shelter, and we have it."

We didn't succeed in coming to an understanding. The time came to descend.

The weather was clear and the sun was shining on top, but when we emerged from the cage below, heavy drops of water suddenly drummed on my helmet, causing an unpleasant sensation.

"This isn't ground water. It's abundant condensation," explained shift chief A. Zhaleznov. "We miners are sick of it, but the heavy moisture of the skip shaft along which we are descending is a good ally in civil defense matters. If toxic agents are employed, then contamination of the air which reaches the mines through the skip shaft will be weakened."

The abundant dripping was perceived in a very different manner after such an explanation.

It was difficult to get one's bearings in the darkness, but the miners are accustomed to it. They set off for their work stations, some on an electric locomotive and others on foot. The numerous little beams of "konogonki" (miners' lanterns) reminded me, a novice in the drift, of a New Year's holiday. But people set off into the shaft here not for merrymaking, but for determined work. The workers of this collective sent up to the surface the last ton of coal for the 11th Five-Year Plan back in the middle of last year.

I became convinced from the miners' stories, from documents and from inspecting the structures that civil defense matters also are being resolved successfully here. Director V. Prishchepa sets the tone. He is the immediate organizer of CD measures, he trains the leaders and formation commanders, and skillfully directs the personnel during exercises. The installation civil defense chief and the staff needed data on various structures and on technological networks in order to identify weak places in the process of coal production and plan necessary steps to increase the stability of shaft operation. Special teams were established for this purpose which were to perform necessary studies and calculations.

These teams performed very important work. The work was directed by Chief Engineer A. Kolchin and party committee deputy secretary A. Yurchik. A. Belous, B. Korolev, V. Gubenko and many other leading specialists displayed great activeness and awareness. They submitted calculations for immediate restoration and for improving stability for all assignments. The specialists drew important conclusions in analyzing reliability of supply of the corresponding sectors with electrical power, natural gas, water and steam. Bottlenecks were uncovered in production management. All this made it possible to draw up a precise plan for improving the stability of the coal production process. The necessary stores of reinforcing material, timber and GSM [fuels and lubricants] were established and a precise schedule for using means of transportation was drawn up in implementing the plan. There had to be a revision of the distribution of assets for the next few years and corrections had to be made for plans for subsequent development of the mine.

Great efforts and many material and labor expenditures were required, but they were not in vain. Much was done in the matter of improving stability. For example, some operational wooden structures were removed and stone ones were built. Overhead electrical power lines were replaced with underground lines and power substations were connected.

We left the skip shaft farther and farther behind. Drifts branched off to the left or right. The noise of shaving machines--unique combines and conveyers--carried from some of them. An electric locomotive appeared ahead and we made way for it. I hit my head on something out of inexperience. Thanks to the helmet I was saved from a bruise, although when I put it on I doubted that it would be necessary. At times it seemingly is a burden, but there are cases when it protects against injury.

A. Zheleznev, our guide through the underground labyrinths, noticed my mistake:

"We keep a strict eye on the serviceability of elements of the miners' gear. In civil defense classes we also teach the skillful use of our day-to-day gear in

case of necessity. That is why the helmet, gas analyzer, and other elements of gear always are with the miners."

We soon stopped after turning into the next drift.

"Here's our shelter," said Ye. Terekhov, pointing to massive entrance doors.

This drift doesn't differ fundamentally from the others. True, it no longer has production value as the coal has been removed here. That is why it was adapted as a shelter. Part of the drift is sealed off on two sides by the airtight door. A secondary shaft was made on the side where places were prepared for the filter-ventilation units (FVU) and a blower which creates a head of air in the sealed space. The accommodation of special cars with water, food stores and a medical station were provided for.

"A shelter in a mine has its features," says the installation CD chief of staff. "It is impossible to keep the filter-ventilation units, individual protective gear, communications equipment and other equipment here because of the high moisture content. We had to rack our brains over how to quickly send down and deliver everything necessary to the underground shelter in case of necessity and to assemble and prepare the equipment for operation."

"Yevgeniy Mikhaylovich, the preparation and maintenance of a shelter at such a great depth really is a difficult and troublesome job. But perhaps it is nevertheless possible to get by without it? There is so much earth above us," I inquired of Ye. Terekhov.

"There is really a lot of earth, but here's the problem. We conducted the following experiment in one exercise. We turned off the blowers which remove air from and supply it to the mine for a certain amount of time. That's when we determined that there is a natural draft. That means there is the danger of toxic agents leaking into the drifts should chemical weapons be employed. Protection against bacteriological weapons also is needed. That is why the question of outfitting a shelter for miners working at great depth arose acutely."

It is in fact impossible to ignore this circumstance. This is why installation heads undertook additional expenditures. They made the shelter under the ground, established the necessary reserve of equipment, provided for its reliable storage, and came up with variants for a rapid descent into the mine.

The following question also was no less important in my view. How can people be brought up if the supply of electrical power should cease or the skip shaft structure demolished?

The people here also thought about this. They even practiced a special task in an exercise. Fifty persons made an ascent to the surface along a ladder section of the skip shaft. The first of them covered 624 m in 47 minutes and the last took almost twice as long to ascend. Medical team personnel on duty at the landings also found work here. They assisted those who were dizzy or short of breath.

Practical conclusions were drawn from this experiment. They also thought about an emergency exit. To this end they connected the shafts of their own mine with those of another mine sector. Now it is possible to remove people from the faces through the shaft of the adjacent mine if necessary.

"Do all the miners know where the shelter and the emergency exit are located?" we asked the shift chief.

"Everyone," responded A. Zheleznev. "We constantly remind them about this at the assignment periods held with each regular shift before descending into the mine."

"Here in the mines," adds the mine CD chief of staff, "the filling and operation of a shelter demand more precise organization. We have established a special team for this which is headed by Viktor Pavlovich Gubenko, chief of the repair and reconstruction sector. The team consists of three shifts. We regularly conduct briefings with each one and clarify functional duties. Formation personnel practice them in exercises."

We headed from the shelter to a face where Party Member I. Skorokhodov's brigade was working. Coal was flowing from the shaving unit along a conveyor. It was difficult to discern the people at the thin seam. They were working on all fours, even lying down, and with limited visibility, but the miners were doing their jobs quickly. Each new ton of coal they produced was a substantial contribution to strengthening the country's economic and defense potential and for a worthy greeting to the 27th CPSU Congress.

And it was gratifying to realize that the people in this foremost collective are thinking not only about today, but they are also looking into the future, correctly assessing the international situation, drawing practical conclusions and taking specific steps to improve the stability of the coal production process.

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CIVIL DEFENSE

USE OF OXYGEN AS BACK-UP FOR SHELTER VENTILATION

Moscow VOYENNYYE ZNANIYA in Russian No 6, Jun 85 (signed to press 6 May 85) pp 19, 34

[Article by A. Malakhov under the rubric "Our Consultations": "The Use of Oxygen"]

[Text] At the request of our readers I. Savitskiy from the city of Mozyr and T. Tsarapiy from the city of Kaliningrad, A. Malakhov tells about the use of oxygen cylinders in protective structures.

Civil defense shelters located in places where the discharge or outflow of strong toxic substances and mass fires are possible as a result of the enemy's use of nuclear weapons must have a third ventilation mode. This assumes that they are outfitted with systems which restore the requisite gas composition of the air in isolation from the surroundings.

The RU-150/6 regeneration units primarily are used. They permit the simultaneous absorption of carbon dioxide excesses and release of the necessary amount of oxygen. The RP-100 regeneration cartridges often are used. The lime absorbent of these cartridges removes only carbon dioxide from the air. Then it is necessary to make up for the shortage of oxygen, 25 liters per hour of which is used by each sheltered person.

The supply of oxygen from seamless steel cylinders, in which it is kept under a pressure of 150 kg/cm², begins when the oxygen concentration in the shelter atmosphere drops below permissible limits. The necessary number of oxygen cylinders is determined from the formula:

$$n = \frac{25Nz}{V\delta} \quad (1)$$

where N is the shelter capacity in number of persons, z is the length of the regeneration mode in hours, and V_δ is the useful volume of oxygen in the cylinder in liters.

After passing through the DKP-1-65 reducers, the oxygen is supplied to the air line. A pipe is run above the cylinders for this purpose, with durite hoses branching off from the pipe. Three reducers are necessary for each of the operating metering devices: one in operation, another being prepared for use, and a third as a reserve in case of a breakdown or freezing of the first two (Fig. 1).




Fig. 1. Diagram of oxygen cylinder connection:

1. Oxygen cylinder
2. DKP-1-65 oxygen reducer
3. Durite hose $d_{inner} = 8$
4. Delivery hose connection
5. Plug $d=20$
6. Steel tee $d=20 \times 15$
7. Gas pipe $d=20$

Oxygen is metered out with the help of nozzles (calibrated openings) which are mounted on the outlet connections of the reducers (Fig. 2). Gas expenditure will not exceed the norm if pressure in the cylinder (at the primary manometer) is no less than twice that of the pressure at the secondary manometer. Nozzle diameter is figured from the formula:

$$d = 1.506 \sqrt{\frac{L_k}{P + 1}} \text{ mm.} \quad (2)$$

where L_k is the requisite oxygen expenditure, m^3/hr ; P is pressure at the secondary manometer, kg/cm^2 .




Fig. 2. Installation of nozzle in oxygen reducer:

1. Coupling nut
2. Nozzle
3. Calibrated opening
4. Weld




Fig. 3. Nozzle No 1

Mathematical calculations and experiments which have been performed show that it is best to use nozzle No 1 with an aperture diameter of 1.1 mm (Fig. 3) in protective structures holding up to 150 persons, and if there are more people then to use nozzle No 2 with an aperture diameter which is 2.2 mm. The pressure set at the secondary manometer of the cylinder for metering oxygen is determined according to the chart (Fig. 4).

The number of metering devices simultaneously at work is taken from the calculation that one device serves no more than 900 persons. The useful amount of oxygen is determined from the formula:

$$V\delta = V_H \left(1 - \frac{2P_2 + 1}{P_H + 1}\right) \text{ liters (3)}$$

where V_H is the initial volume of oxygen in the cylinder in liters; P_2 is pressure at the secondary manometer in kg/cm^2 set according to the chart; P_H is initial pressure in the cylinder in kg/cm^2 .

The initial volume of oxygen in the A-40 cylinder stored under normal conditions (temperature 20°C, pressure 760 mm/Hg) is 6,240 liters.

As an example let us calculate the time in which it will be necessary to change oxygen cylinders in a shelter housing 1,800 persons.

Let's assume that two metering devices will operate. We find from the chart that the pressure at the secondary manometer must be 9.6 kg/cm^2 and oxygen flow through nozzle No 2 will be 375 liters in one minute. The useful volume of oxygen in one cylinder according to formula 3 will be: $V\delta = 6240 \left(1 - \frac{2 \times 9.6 + 1}{150 + 1}\right) \approx 5400 \text{ l.}$

Consequently, one cylinder will empty in $\frac{5,400}{375} = 14.4$ minutes.




Fig. 4. Chart for determining pressure at secondary manometer of a reducer which provides for metering of oxygen based on 25 liters per hour per person.

Thus oxygen is constantly supplied from two cylinders through nozzles No 2 in a shelter designed for 1,800 persons with the third ventilation mode. Pressure at the secondary manometer must be at least 9.6 kg/cm². New cylinders are to be connected every 14.4 minutes.

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CIVIL DEFENSE

TRAINING AT BELORUSSIAN KOLKHOZ

Minsk SELSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 6 Jun 85 p 3

[Article by Ye. Bludilin under the rubric "Civil Defense": "Reliable Protection"]

[Text] Party and soviet organs and public organizations of Berestovitskiy Rayon give constant attention to the military-patriotic indoctrination of the workers and to the improvement of civil defense measures. These tasks are carried out as part of a single system which includes production matters, particularly during exercises. This can be seen from the example of a comprehensive exercise conducted on the Kolkhoz imeni Lenin.

While preparing for and during the exercise particular attention was given to improving control and interaction among the services and paramilitary formations, as well to the quality of the practical training. Party, trade union and Komsomol organizations did a great deal to stimulate the people to successfully carry out the assigned missions.

The objectives and missions of the exercise were explained to the kolkhoz workers. There were various classes and talks and an evening of questions and answers on the subject: "What One Should Know and Be Able to Do in Civil Defense." Workers with the party raykom and the rayispolkom provided the kolkhoz leaders and its party organization with practical assistance.

The exercise was started with an alert signal. Every household, the livestock farms and the brigades were immediately informed of the approaching "danger." Kolkhoz chairman V. Lebedskiy, the civil defense chief, explained the situation and ordered the immediate initiation of the activities specified in the plan. The formation commanders took the people to their stations, clarified their tasks and explained to them what had to be done, and by what time. T. Khmara, the kolkhoz civil defense chief of staff, and his assistants visited the homes of the kolkhoz workers. In one of them there was a practical demonstration of all the steps for protecting oneself against radioactive fallout. Kolkhoz workers who did not have gas masks had prepared fabric dust masks in advance.

Paramilitary formations provided for protecting the animals in the exercise. Under the supervision of A. Dudkovskaya, the chief kolkhoz livestock specialist, they carefully sealed doors and windows, stockpiled feed and provided reliable protection for sources of water.

On the dairy farm the people were dressed in special clothing. The milkers put bag-masks on the most valuable purebred animals, and the equipment necessary for milking the cows was covered. A special area was set up on one of the farms for veterinary treatment of the animals. The treatment was performed thoroughly and expertly.

The population not engaged in rescue operations were in radiation shelters. After the prescribed period of time it was determined that the "radiation" level in the open permitted people to work. The order was issued to begin decontaminating grounds and installations. In the final phase, the buildings and equipment were decontaminated and partial personal cleansing of the people was performed.

The kolkhoz leaders, the communists and all of the workers took an attitude of complete responsibility toward the exercise. Members of the livestock and plant protection teams, the communications section and many others demonstrated a great deal of initiative and ability.

Workers in the civil defense courses provided the kolkhoz with a great deal of assistance in preparing for and conducting the exercise. They conducted practical classes for the people, presented lectures and reports and arranged for the showing of movies on defense subjects. Practical training has been organized for the people on the kolkhoz itself, and the necessary training materials base has been set up. The publicizing of civil defense information is performed in a purposeful and substantive manner.

The exercise demonstrated that civil defense is at the required level on the farm. The kolkhoz workers had the opportunity to learn once again that there are reliable means and methods of defense against modern weapons.

11499
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MILITARY HISTORY

LEGAL SUPERVISION OVER MILITARY TRIBUNALS DURING WAR YEARS

Moscow SOVETSKAYA YUSTITSIYA in Russian No 9, 1985 pp 25-27

[Article by N. Molkov, candidate of legal sciences: "Legal Supervision over Judicial Activities of Military Tribunals during the Great Patriotic War Years"]

[Text] Soviet courts, military tribunals in particular, also made their own contribution to achieving the victory of worldwide importance in the Great Patriotic War against Fascist Germany. Placing their activities on a war footing was begun based on legislative acts passed on the first day of the war. In wartime conditions, all activities of military tribunals, and other courts as well, had to contribute as much as possible to ensuring victory over the enemy and strengthening the front and rear areas.

In accordance with Article 9 of the Ukase of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet dated 22 June 1941 "On Martial Law" and articles 14-16 of the Statute on Military Tribunals in Localities under Martial Law and in Areas of Military Actions, approved the same day, the sentences of military tribunals operating in these localities and areas were not subject to appeal and became valid at the moment they are proclaimed. These sentences could be repealed or changed only under the method of legal supervision. In all other areas of the country, the right of a convicted person to appeal was retained completely, regardless of which court, including a military tribunal, considered the criminal case.

As has been correctly noted in our judicial literature, during the Great Patriotic War, the partial abolition of the right to appeal of sentences (as a form of legal supervision of the judicial activities of military tribunals) cannot be viewed as a deviation from generally accepted norms of criminal proceedings or removal of the guarantee of legality of the sentences passed by them. It was dictated by a real need and by the wartime situation.

The general procedure of appealing the judicial decisions of all courts originally also applied to sentences of military tribunals operating in localities under martial law and in areas of military operations. However, in connection with the abolition of the institution of appeal, it was necessary to create additional guarantees in order to intensify the legal supervision

over the judicial activities of military tribunals administering justice in areas of military operations.

At the beginning of the war, review of sentences by way of legal supervision was accomplished only by the Military Collegium of the USSR Supreme Court. At the same time, the collegium's overload of supervisory work, and sometimes the lack of liaison with military tribunals, led to the fact that the review of sentences accomplished under legal supervision early in the war did not ensure the necessary quickness and effectiveness in correcting judicial mistakes.

It is no coincidence, therefore, that military procurators and chairmen of military tribunals of the fronts and fleets were granted the right to appeal the sentences of military tribunals operating in localities under martial law and in areas of military operations. Military tribunals of the fronts and fleets were granted the right to review these objections by the same Ukase. Thus, the range of officials of organs of the procuracy and court accomplishing supervision of the judicial activities of lower military tribunals was expanded considerably. This made it possible to strengthen supervision over the legality and validity of military tribunal sentences during the Great Patriotic War. In addition, these changes in the law afforded military tribunals of the fronts and fleets the opportunity to eliminate judicial errors quickly and efficiently and simultaneously helped to increase the effectiveness of supervision over the judicial activities and to establish a unity of judicial practice under wartime conditions.

In accordance with laws in effect, it was the duty of the front and fleet tribunals to ensure timely checking of the sentences passed by lower tribunals. Military tribunals of armies checked the sentences of tribunals of units (soyedineniya), and front tribunals checked the sentences of army tribunals. Chairmen of army tribunals were ordered to check the work of unit tribunals each month; chairmen of front tribunals were to familiarize themselves with the work of army tribunals with the same frequency.

Checking the legality and validity of sentences of lower tribunals under the supervisory procedure contributes to the most effective administering of justice in war conditions. One particular feature of checking the judicial sentences of unit tribunals was that each criminal case was studied by the judges of the higher army tribunal. All cases reviewed by the unit tribunals, after drawing up the record of the judicial proceedings, were sent within 3 days to the army tribunal, whose judges were obligated to study the case. With a lack of grounds for raising an objection, a written conclusion was given concerning leaving the sentence in force. In the event of the detection of a judicial error or incorrect settlement of a criminal case, the judge who studied the case informed the chairman of the army tribunal about this. The latter submitted a statement to the chairman of the front tribunal who had the right to submit an objection under the supervision procedure.

Such a check of the legality and validity of sentences in the military tribunals of armies ensured, under combat conditions, the study of all criminal cases reviewed by unit military tribunals and the timely correction of judicial errors made by them.

The grounds for raising an objection under the supervision procedure were the same circumstances as for submitting an appeal protest: insufficiency and incorrectness of the investigation conducted, substantial violation of the forms of legal proceedings, violation or incorrect application of the law, obvious unfairness of the sentence (Article 413, RSFSR Code of Criminal Proceedings, 1923). If other shortcomings were detected, then when leaving the sentence in force written remarks were sent to the lower military tribunals. These remarks and errors were summarized and later discussed at deliberations of judges in front (fleet) tribunals and analyzed in detail in judicial practice reviews.

An important characteristic of supervision over the judicial activities of military tribunals during the Great Patriotic War was the combination of the revisory and supervisory functions into the same judicial organ--the front (fleet) military tribunal. It had the right not only of revisory checking of the judicial activities of lower military tribunals, but also of direct supervisory review of sentences passed by them. All this gave a more effective nature to the supervisory functions of front (fleet) military tribunals and made it possible to uncover in a timely manner and quickly eliminate errors and violations of the law committed by the courts. Thus, combining the revisory and supervisory functions in the military tribunal of a front (fleet) significantly increased the efficiency of this form of supervision over the judicial activities of lower tribunals.

Under the conditions of the Great Patriotic War, the special procedure of supervision of the legality and validity of military tribunal capital punishment sentences assumed great importance. According to Article 16 of the Statute on Military Tribunals dated 22 June 1941, a military tribunal was obligated to inform the Chairman of the Military Collegium of the USSR Supreme Court, the Chief Military Procurator of the Red Army and the Chief Procurator of the Navy of each such sentence immediately via telegraph through proper channels. The sentence was carried out only if a message from these individuals suspending execution of the sentence was not received within 72 hours of delivery of the telegram.

In addition, Article 15 of the statute cited granted commanders-in-chief and military councils of fronts, districts and armies (fleets, flotillas) the right to suspend execution of a capital punishment sentence, simultaneously informing the Chairman of the Military Collegium of the USSR Supreme Court and the Chief Procurator of the Red Army or the Chief Procurator of the Navy of the opinion on this for further action on the case.

At the same time, during the war changes were made to the procedure for supervision over the legality of capital punishment sentences of military tribunals. Military councils of the fronts and armies and also the command of units were granted the right to confirm such sentences.

In practice, the command of units very rarely confirmed capital punishment sentences, only in very exceptional instances when the conditions of combat operations, the nature of the crime committed or the personality of the convicted person required immediate execution of the sentence. Therefore, the majority of such sentences, as a rule, were reviewed by the military councils

of the armies and fronts. Thus, if a military council of an army did not confirm the sentence, the criminal case was sent with a statement by the chairman of the army tribunal to the front tribunal. The latter, in turn, reported the criminal case to the military council of the front for sentence confirmation or, taking into account the opinion of the army military council, passed the case on to the front military tribunal for its review under the supervision procedure. If the military council of the front did not confirm the sentence, the case was sent with a statement of the chairman of the front tribunal to the Military Collegium of the USSR Supreme Court, or the chairman of the front tribunal himself brought an objection to the front tribunal for the purpose of commuting the capital punishment to other punishment.

The activities of the Military Collegium of the USSR Supreme Court were of great importance in the supervision of judicial activities of military tribunals during the Great Patriotic War years. In addition to monitoring the execution of military tribunal sentences applying capital punishment, it acted as a supervisory level. All sentences passed by tribunals of fronts and fleets on the first instance were checked by the Military Collegium. If there were grounds for a review of the sentence, an objection was submitted and the case was reviewed by the Military Collegium. Monitoring of the legality of sentences of lower tribunals was accomplished under the supervision procedure. It was conducted by becoming acquainted with the supervisory decisions of front (fleet) tribunals on criminal cases reviewed by tribunals of armies and units, and also by checking the judicial activities of these tribunals.

The supervisory activities of the Military Collegium under war conditions contributed to a uniform application of wartime laws by all military tribunals and had a substantial effect on strengthening lawfulness in the Red Army and Navy of the USSR.

Thus, during the Great Patriotic War years, a centralized system of supervision by higher military tribunals of the judicial activities of lower ones took shape. It provided the capability to implement justice with strict observance of the laws and basic principles of Soviet criminal proceedings.

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zhurnal "Sovetskaya yustitsiya", 1985

12567
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FOREIGN MILITARY AFFAIRS

NATO NAVAL COMBAT TRAINING FOR 1984

Moscow ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE in Russian No 6, Jun 85 (signed to press 10 Jun 85) pp 61-67

[Article by Capt 1st Rank V. Khomenskiy under the rubric "Naval Forces": "Combat Training of NATO Naval Forces in 1984"]

[Text] In its plans for preparing a war against the USSR and other countries of the socialist community, along with equipping its armed forces with the latest modern weapons systems and combat equipment, the military-political leadership of the aggressive NATO bloc attaches exceptionally great importance to advance training of troops and naval forces for conducting combat operations in maritime (ocean) and continental TVDs. Already during peacetime commands and staffs of Allied Armed Forces have been established and are functioning in the Atlantic and European theaters of war; one of their most important functions is to plan and organize combat training of units (soyedineniya, chasti) and ships of national armed forces transferred under their command.

NATO strategists view the Atlantic as the principal ocean theater of war. Its importance is determined primarily by the fact that the sea lanes, over which they plan to accomplish strategic movements of troops and military and economic cargo from the US, Canada and other areas of the world to reinforce Allied groupings in Europe and to support the war economy of Western European countries, pass through here. The considerable size of the theater and its geographic characteristics make it possible to use all means of armed conflict at sea here without exception. It is believed that the outcome of fighting in the European theater of war will largely depend on the course of combat actions in the Atlantic, particularly in its forward zones and areas.

NATO leadership attaches equal importance to maritime areas within the European theater of war, which are the connecting links between continental TVDs. Lifting of troops and supplies from one TVD to another during combat operations will be accomplished over lines of communication of the Baltic, North and Mediterranean seas. The straits of these seas will be used for the blockade of fleets of the probable enemy in order to prohibit their exit to the Atlantic.

Operational and combat training plans of NATO Allied naval forces call for conducting in the Atlantic and European waters a large number of major exercises and maneuvers which, in the opinion of the bloc's command, should help personnel to become familiar in advance with future TVDs and to accumulate experience in navigation and combat use of forces in a different operational situation and under any climatic conditions.

As foreign press reports, in the course of combat training much attention is given to testing and mastering new equipment, using the modern weapon types and systems (especially missile weapons) of surface ships, submarines and naval aviation, studying and assessing the capabilities of ship task forces of different composition in operations to gain supremacy at sea, and improving tactics for using manpower and equipment in an electronic countermeasures (ECM) environment.

In 1984, naval forces of NATO countries participated in approximately 40 exercises. The main areas in which they were conducted were the Norwegian, North and Mediterranean seas, the Baltic Straits area and the Iberian Atlantic. During the exercises, the naval forces completed the following basic missions: transition of forces from a peacetime to a wartime status in accordance with an alert system in effect in NATO; formation of tasks forces and groups for various purposes; gaining supremacy at sea by destroying enemy surface ships, submarines and aircraft on the sea and at bases and airfields; giving close air and ship support to ground forces in coastal sectors; all-round support of movement of troop reinforcements from the US, Canada and Great Britain to Europe; conducting amphibious assault landing operations; protecting their own sea lanes and oil and gas complexes in the Norwegian and North seas; laying mines and anti-mine support of naval force activities.

Most of the above-mentioned tasks were practiced to the fullest extent at the NATO allied armed forces exercise "Teamwork-84" (conducted every 4 years).*

The exercise area covered the Northeastern Atlantic, including the Norwegian and North seas, the western approaches to the Baltic Straits area, the territory of Norway and the northern part of Great Britain. Participating in it were about 40,000 personnel, up to 150 combatants and auxiliary ships, including the multi-purpose American aircraft carrier CV62 Independence, the LHA2 Saipan and LHA4 Nassau general-purpose amphibious assault ships, the LPH12 Inchon amphibious assault ship, more 300 strategic, tactical, carrier and land-based patrol aviation airplanes and helicopters of the navies and air forces of the US, Canada, Great Britain, the FRG, Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands, Portugal and France, the 4th (US) and 3rd (Great Britain) Marine Brigades, an amphibious battle group of the Dutch Navy, individual units and subunits (chasti, podrazdeleniya) of NATO ground and mobile forces, and manpower and equipment of the Northern and Atlantic zones of the allied air defense system in Europe.

*For more details on this exercise, see ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE, No 8, 1984, pp 61-65--Editor.

Typical features of the exercise included the following: the absence of an American multi-purpose carrier group as part of the amphibious assault force security; active use of NATO E-3A Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft on a continuous basis; a broader involvement of USAF SAC B-52 aircraft in the interests of conducting reconnaissance and destroying enemy surface groupings; inclusion of USN ASW ships, equipped with towed antenna arrays, as part of the security forces, which substantially increased the probability of detecting submarines, especially in areas not covered by the SOSUS stationary long-range sonar surveillance system; an increased number of aircraft being transferred to northern Norway (up to 50 planes) from the 2nd U.S. Marine Air Wing; conducting aggressive actions to prevent breakthrough by the "Orange forces" (armed forces of Warsaw Pact countries) of the anti-submarine and anti-shipping line Greenland--Iceland--Faeroe Islands--Shetland Islands--coast of Norway; practice organizing defense of ocean (sea) lanes.

In the course of combat training in the Atlantic and European theaters of war, NATO command stove for comprehensive practice of the tasks facing the naval forces with the use of carrier-strike, ASW, amphibious assault landing and minesweeping forces. Much importance here was given to problems of effective cooperation with air forces and with ground forces in coastal sectors in the interests of achieving the objectives of armed conflict at sea.

Gaining supremacy at sea in the most important areas of NATO's "zone of responsibility," in the opinion of Western military experts, is the top-priority task of naval forces, and its successful accomplishment contributes to carrying out all other tasks facing them. It is accomplished by destroying enemy surface ship groupings, submarines and aviation at sea and bases (at airfields). The areas where questions of achieving sea supremacy were worked out most actively included the Norwegian and North seas, approaches to the Strait of Gibraltar, the central and eastern parts of the Mediterranean Sea and the Baltic Straits area.

In combatting "enemy" surface ship groupings in the vast areas of the sea, an important role was assigned to carrier aircraft of the NATO strike fleet in the Atlantic and NATO strike naval forces in the Southern European TVD, which operated up to 500 km from the aircraft carriers. Strikes against ships, depending on the nature of the target and the resistance expected, were made by aircraft strike groups including 3-4 ground attack aircraft and 2-3 fighters (for a single target). They were controlled by Hawkeye AWACS aircraft. During actions against a group target with a high-level air defense system, the composition of the strike groups increased. Aircraft of the group delivered strikes from one or several directions with low-angled diving or pitching using guided or unguided air-launched rockets, bombs and guns. Carrier-based assault aircraft operated, as a rule, during daylight hours, completing up to two aircraft sorties per day.

Special attention was given to working out problems of combatting enemy fleet groupings carrying aircraft with carrier-based aircraft in cooperation with surface ships armed with Harpoon anti-shipping missiles. Judging from foreign press materials, a necessary condition for successful actions was the timely identification of the location of an aircraft-carrying ship and the surprise massive attack of it from one or several directions by groups of carrier-based

assault aircraft carrying out flights at maximum combat radius. The assault aircraft were refueled in the air by Intruder tanker aircraft in order to increase their operational radius.

Foreign press indicates that the NATO command plans and practices using Air Force tactical aircraft based in coastal sectors of continental TVDs for fighting enemy fleet forces. In working out problems of gaining supremacy in the North and Norwegian seas, they used British and Norwegian airfields. The depth of action by tactical aircraft on ships at sea, from exercise experience, was up to 400 km from the coast. Guidance was accomplished based on target designation data from E3A AWACS aircraft. At exercise United Effort-84, strategic B-52 bombers operating from the American Loring AFB, which were refueled in the air by KC-135 tankers, were used to reveal the surface situation and to deliver strikes against "enemy" ship groupings on the open ocean.

Groups of guided missile patrol boats and torpedo boats (3-4 in each), which operated "from ambush," were actively used to combat surface ships in the rocky coastal areas of the Northern European TVD and in the northeastern Aegean Sea. They were guided by ship- and shore-based helicopters. Paramount importance here was given to detecting and destroying primarily ships carrying anti-shipping missiles, representing, in the opinion of bloc military experts, the main threat to surface forces of NATO fleets.

The bloc's command considers an integral and most important part of operations to gain supremacy at sea to be fighting enemy submarines at ASW barriers, in individual sea areas and on their deployment routes from bases to operating areas. Antisubmarine actions were practiced at all exercises with naval forces participating, and also at special ASW exercises such as Joint Maritime Kos-84, Dogfish-84 and others. Main attention during these exercises was given to improving techniques and tactics of actions by maneuvering ASW forces in searching, tracking and "destroying enemy" submarines, ASW support of the deployment and activities of nuclear ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), the NATO strike fleet in the Atlantic and NATO naval strike forces in the Southern European TVD, and to checking the organization of all types of defense of ship formations, assault detachments and convoys in sea transit and at anchorage locations. The practice of tasks by maneuvering ASW forces, operating as part of carrier, ship strike and hunter-killer groups, was accomplished in close cooperations with SOSUS.

Antisubmarine operations were actively practiced on a line Greenland--Iceland--Faeroe Islands--Shetland Islands--the Norwegian coastline and in the forward ASW zone (Norwegian and Barents seas). Main efforts were directed at disrupting the deployment of "enemy" submarines to the Northeastern Atlantic (exercise Teamwork-84), which was achieved as a result of continuous tracking of the detected submarines during the threatening period and by their "destruction" (primarily SSBNs) with the start of the war.

Submarines were used predominantly in a positional-maneuvering method in areas 40x40 miles. Nuclear submarines (SSNs) were included in the composition of security forces of multi-purpose carrier groups and operated in threatened sectors ahead of the formation or to its stern.

The basic tactical element of ASW forces was the hunter-killer group, including 3-5 ships. They operated both independently and in cooperation with carrier-based patrol aircraft.

In carrying out ASW missions, an important place was given to the standing NATO naval task force in the Atlantic (created in 1968), which included 5-7 ships of the navies of the US, Canada, Great Britain, the FRG, Portugal and the Netherlands. It was given tasks of demonstrating the bloc's readiness and determination "to defend collective interests at sea by force of arms" and conducting combat training as a complement of ships belonging to various nations. During wartime, this formation is viewed as the forward echelon of ASW forces in the Eastern Atlantic until full deployment of the U.S. Navy and the navies of other NATO countries in operational areas. The standing NATO naval task force in the Atlantic has been involved in most of the naval exercises conducted in the Eastern and Western Atlantic, working out problems of antisubmarine warfare with enemy submarines both independently as 2-3 hunter-killer groups and in cooperation with other bloc forces. During 1984 more than 20 combatants underwent combat training in the task force.

Shore-based patrol aviation, as before, were viewed as a key component of ASW forces, capable of conducting effective search operations at a great distance from the shore and guiding surface ships to detected enemy submarines. Possessing considerable flight time (9-10 hours), Orion, Atlantique, Neptune and Nimrod aircraft swept vast areas of the sea, searching for submarine by using sonobuoys, magnetic detectors, gas analyzers, radar and visual detection means. The aircraft operated both individually and as a part of aviation and mixed (jointly with ships) hunter-killer groups, using depth bombs and torpedoes for "destroying" the detected submarines.

The concept of many exercises conducted in the Atlantic and the Mediterranean Sea called for working out problems of providing close air support to ground force groupings in the Northern European and Southern European TVDs. It was organized in the event of an unfavorable situation in continental TVDs and a shortage of tactical aviation aircraft for these purposes, and was conducted, as a rule, after successful completion of the main mission--gaining supremacy in a specific, most important in an operational respect area of the maritime TVD. In order to increase the effective depth of carrier-based assault aircraft against coastal installations and troop groupings, when launching aircraft the carriers maneuvered in the direct proximity of the coast under cover of continental air defense weapons at distance of up to 50-100 miles from the shoreline. Aircraft operated in individual groups mainly during daylight hours, approaching the target from the seaward side at low altitudes. Important attention here was given to problems of coordinating the actions of carrier and tactical aviation aircraft.

So, during NATO allied forces exercise Display Determination-84*, close cooperation was set up between carrier-based assault aircraft from CV66 America and aircraft from the 5th and 6th Allied Tactical Air Commands in

*For more details on the exercise, see ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE, No 2, 1984, pp 69-72.--Editor.

providing close air support to ground forces groupings in Northern Italy and Turkish Thrace.

Foreign specialists indicate that NATO command attaches exceptionally great importance to the timely transfer of troop reinforcements, weapons and combat equipment from the US and Canada to Europe and uninterrupted deliveries during the war of economic cargo, above all oil and petroleum products, from countries of the Middle and Near East for normal functioning of the economic system of European NATO countries.

In this connection, the question is sharply raised concerning the protection of sea lanes of communication (SLOCs) over which cargo is shipped during the threatening period and during the war. Typical for many of last year's exercises was the working out of two variations for protecting SLOCs: by creating a "mobile zone of supremacy" and a "defended SLOC zone." These variants were reflected most fully in exercises Safe Pass-84, United Effort-84 (areas of the Eastern coast of the US) and Display Determination-84.

The method of creating a "mobile zone of supremacy" is considered by naval experts to be the most acceptable and effective in organizing tracking of assault detachments and convoys with strategic reserve troops over the transatlantic route from the US to Europe, mainly in the central part of the Atlantic. It calls for gaining and maintaining supremacy by a constant detail of forces (as a rule, multi-purpose carrier and hunter-killer groups, local convoy screening forces, carrier-based aircraft and shore-based patrol aircraft) in a zone up to 300-400 miles deep ahead of the center of the cruising order and 150-200 miles behind it. So, at exercise United Effort-84, a carrier hunter-killer group (the British ASW carrier P06 *Illustrious*), a ship strike group (the flagship--amphibious assault ship LPH12 *Inchon* with Harrier aircraft onboard), nuclear submarines, Orion shore-based patrol aircraft and also forces and weapons of zonal ASW formations were used for this purpose.

Defense of convoys and assault detachments in formation areas, at the initial routes across the Atlantic and on the approaches to Europe was accomplished by creating a "defended SLOC zone." This was achieved by displacing and destroying "enemy" forces deployed on the convoy and assault detachment routes, by minesweeping the channels and loading-unloading areas, and by providing reliable air and ASW defense by naval forces in cooperation with tactical aviation.

Protection of SLOCs in the Mediterranean Sea was structured mainly according to a zonal principle, in which responsibility for the security of tracking convoys in individual areas was entrusted to the forces and weapons of their commanders. Convoy tracking was provided by multi-purpose carrier groups, surface ships, shore-based patrol aircraft and tactical aviation aircraft.

During exercise Flotex-84 in the Northern European TVD, tracking of assault detachments and convoys with troop reinforcements from Central to Northern Norway was done under conditions of active opposition by "enemy" fighter-bomber aircraft, cutters and submarines deployed on the convoy routes. Anti-mine support in mine-hazardous areas was accomplished by Norwegian

minesweepers operating as part of minesweeping groups. Guided missile patrol boat strike groups were widely used to "destroy" surface ships of the "enemy." Air cover was provided by fighter aircraft of Norway and the US.

In recent years, NATO command has attached great importance to reinforcing the bloc's northern and southern flanks, groupings of armed forces which it considers relatively weak and insufficient to conduct effective offensive operations. Owing to this, at last year's exercises they widely practiced reinforcing these groupings by amphibious assault landings in Northern Norway, the Baltic Straits zone and the northeastern part of the Aegean Sea. During these exercises, marines from the US, Great Britain and the Netherlands, intended for operations in Northern Norway, studied the various regions of its coastline and worked out tactics of conducting combat operations under difficult Arctic conditions (exercises Clockwork and Cold Winter). According to foreign press reports, striving to reduce the time for transferring Marine forces from the US, the bloc leadership stores weapons and combat equipment in advance on the territory of Norway for a Marine expeditionary brigade, which, in the opinion of NATO experts, will make it possible to airlift brigade personnel with light armament in short periods of time. Problems are also being worked out on airlifting British Marines with light armament using military transport aircraft of Great Britain.

The largest amphibious assault landing operation was conducted during NATO allied forces exercises of Teamwork-84.

The landing of amphibious assault forces in operational areas was preceded by training landings conducted on the Marine movement routes in order to check the readiness of landing forces for the landing and to work out individual, most complicated elements. Thus, during exercise Display Determination-84, a training landing was organized in the Gulf of Teulada (Island of Sardinia).

Defense to counter assault landings on the coastal areas and the islands was conducted through joint efforts of ground, naval and air forces. At various stages it involved carrier- and shore-based aviation, submarines, surface ships, coastal artillery and air defense resources. In the course of defense against amphibious assault landings, naval forces performed missions of reconnaissance, delivering strikes against transport and landing ships in the areas where landing forces were embarking on them and convoys were forming and also during sea transit and in landing areas, laying minefields on tactical approaches to the defended coastline and disrupting the transfer of troop reinforcements to beachheads captured by forward echelons of the amphibious landing force. Tactical aviation aircraft delivered strikes against the assault detachments in sea transit and in the landing areas and provided support to ground forces in defended coastal sectors. Local defense against the assault landing was conducted by ground forces units and subunits.

Problems of defense against assault landings were worked out most actively in Northern Norway (exercises Avalanche Express-84 and Flotex-84), in the Baltic Straits zone (Bold Game-84, Bright Horizon-84 and Bold Gannet-84) and in the Southern European TVD (Display Determination-84 and Dense Crop-84). During the exercise Avalanche Express-84, a multi-purpose carrier group (CV62 Independence), up to three hunter-killer groups and ship strike groups,

tactical aviation aircraft and subunits of the ground forces and the "Hemverna" of Norway participated in defense against assault landings on the coast of Northern Norway.

Important attention in the course of combat training was given to anti-mine support of the activities of aircraft carrier, ASW and amphibious assault landing forces. At practically all exercises, the departure of combatants from bases and ports was accomplished after a controlled sweep of the channels by minesweepers operating individually or as part of minesweeping groups, and also by helicopter minesweepers. Special importance in conducting anti-mine operations was given to the standing formation of NATO minesweeping forces in the English Channel; up to 30 minesweepers from NATO countries underwent combat training in 1984 as part of this formation. The formation operated in various areas of the Eastern and Iberian Atlantic and zones of the Baltic Straits and the English Channel, leading convoys behind the minesweeping in the most mine-hazardous areas.

Along with anti-mine operations, the naval forces of NATO countries widely practiced laying mines for the purpose of disrupting commercial shipping of the probable enemy, interdicting the deployment of his forces from naval bases and ports, defending against assault landings in coastal areas and islands, and blockading the areas of straits. Active minefields were laid in the areas of naval bases by using submarines and strategic aviation aircraft. Defensive minefields were laid down, as a rule, in the course of combat operations in the event of a threat of the "enemy" capturing islands and strait zones. Minelayers, surface combatants and aircraft from strategic and tactical aviation were used to lay them.

Tasks for antisubmarine, anti-aircraft and anti-cutter defense of ships, ship formations, assault detachments and convoys in sea transit and in areas of combat operations were practiced at all NATO allied naval exercises. Counter-submarine and counter-air operations were conducted in close, middle and long-range defensive zones by local screening ships and strike groups and hunter-killer groups formed from them, and also by shore-based patrol aircraft, carrier-based and tactical aircraft. Important conditions for effective screening force operations included well-organized reconnaissance, timely passing of target designation for destruction of ships carrying cruise missiles and their destruction before reaching the line of missile weapons use. Wide use was made of E3A, Hawkeye and Shackleton AWACS aircraft for early detection of the surface or airborne "enemy."

Logistics support of the ships in the course of working out combat training tasks was accomplished by country at naval bases or directly at sea using tankers, support vessels and transports.

As foreign military observers believe, measures for operational and combat training of naval forces of NATO countries in 1984 encompassed all areas of their combat employment and achieved their main objective--to increase the training of staff and ship personnel for conducting combat operations under various situation conditions. Conducting exercises in forward zones and in areas of the Atlantic and European theaters of war in direct proximity to the borders of socialist states is indicative of the aggressive nature of NATO

military preparations and the preparing NATO armed forces for conducting wide-scale offensive combat operations in a future war.

Under these conditions, Soviet soldiers must guard even more vigilantly the borders of our Motherland and other countries of the socialist community, constantly increase their professional skills and study and know the probable enemy in order to repulse him properly if necessary.

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FOREIGN MILITARY AFFAIRS

FRG TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT IN 'REFORGER-84' EXERCISE

Moscow ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE in Russian No 6, Jun 85 (signed to press 10 Jun 85) p 59

[Article by Col M. Sergeyev: "FRG Air Force Transportation Aircraft in Exercise Reforger-84"]

[Text] As foreign press reports, the regularly scheduled American Armed Forces exercise, Reforger-84, took place in August-October 1984, one of the largest in the series of annual Autumn Forge NATO allied forces fall maneuvers. During the exercise, plans were checked for reinforcing NATO troop groupings in the Central European TVD by air- and sealifting strategic reserves of American Armed Forces from the continental U.S. The arriving troops also practiced taking heavy armament stored in the FRG out of storage and participated in exercises being conducted during this period in areas of the Northern and Central army groups.

According to Western press data, the airlift of the main part of troop reinforcements was conducted between 10 and 15 September 1984. A total of 17,000 servicemen and 51,000 tons of military cargo was delivered from the US. Among the largest units arriving in Europe were the 5th Mechanized Division (minus one brigade), which was landed at ports and airfields in Belgium, and also the 1st Armored Brigade, 2nd Armored Division (about 4,000 men), air-lifted to Luxembourg. Personnel were transported from the unloading areas by military transport aircraft to destinations in the FRG. As in previous years, air transport subunits of the Bundeswehr (specifically, from the 62nd Air Transport Wing based at Wunstorf) were used in addition to American C-130 Hercules transports for accomplishing this mission. The C-160 Transall aircraft in its inventory were used for subsequent airlifting of troops arriving in Luxembourg and Antwerp to Munchengladbach airfield (FRG), from where they were transported by land to American weapons and military equipment depots. There they received and took out of storage weapons and military equipment and used them to travel to assigned concentration and deployment areas.

In all, crews of the 62nd Wing completed 40 aircraft sorties and airlifted more than 2,600 American servicemen. In addition, West German C-160 Transall aircraft participated actively in a major American paratroop at the Grafenwoehr training area.

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FOREIGN MILITARY AFFAIRS

JAPANESE AIR FORCE AIRCRAFT

Moscow ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE in Russian No 6, Jun 85 (signed to press 10 Jun 85) pp 54-59

[Article by Col P. Ivanov: "Aircraft of the Japanese Air Force"]

[Text] The military and political leadership of Japan, going along with the aggressive imperialist policy of the United States, is accelerating the build-up of the combat might of all branches of the armed forces (or "Self-Defense Forces" as they are called in Japan) by improving their qualitative level by equipping them with modern models of weapons and combat equipment. This is being done in spite of the current constitution renouncing the establishment of ground, naval and air forces, as well as other weapons of war.

The Air Force (JASDF) is considered an important component of the "Self-Defense Forces." Today, judging from foreign press reports, it numbers about 350 combat aircraft and 46,000 personnel. Until the mid-70s, Japanese aviation firms accomplished mainly production and assembly of aircraft under American licenses (F-86F Sabre, F-4E Phantom and other tactical fighters). However, striving to decrease their dependence on American technology, Japan is making ever-increasing efforts aimed at developing its own models of equipment and weapons for the JASDF. These specifically include the F-1 fighter bomber, the T-2 trainer aircraft and the C-1 military transport aircraft. Information is given below on the main aircraft and helicopters in the JASDF inventory.

The F-15 Eagle tactical fighter has been produced by Mitsubishi since 1981 under license from the American firm McDonnell Douglas. There are plans to purchase 100 of these aircraft for the JASDF: 88 single-seat F-15J fighters and 12 two-seat F-15DJ combat trainers. Of this number, 14 aircraft have already been delivered by the US, and the rest are being built in Japan. The arrival of all of these fighters at line units is expected by 1988. They are also considering purchasing an additional 55 F-15 aircraft in the US. According to foreign press reports, by early 1985 two F-15J squadrons (18 aircraft in each) were formed, one each at Nyutabaru and Chitose air bases, and by March 1985 it was envisaged to form a third such aircraft squadron at Hyakuri Air Base. Three more fighter squadrons will be created in 1985, 1986 and 1987.

The F-15J can carry four Sidewinder and 4 Sparrow air-to-air missiles for hitting airborne targets. In addition, it can be equipped with a built-in six-barrel 20-mm Vulcan gun (940 round battle reserve). This fighter's power plant consists of two F100-PW-100 Pratt and Whitney turbofan engines with an afterburning thrust of 11,300 kg each. The internal wing fuel capacity is 6,100 kg. The aircraft also can carry up to three external tanks (total fuel capacity of 5,390 kg). The main component of the weapons control system is the AN/APG-63 multifunctional pulse Doppler radar.

The F-4EJ Phantom tactical fighter was produced in Japan until 1981 under American license (138 aircraft were built). Presently there are plans to modernize these aircraft substantially by installing new equipment on them, in particular, the AN/APG-66 radar, a central computer, the LH-39 inertial navigational system and an electron-optical situation heads-up display. The fighters will be armed with AIM-9L Sidewinder and AIM-7F Sparrow air-to-air guided missiles, as well as Type 80 (formerly designated ASM-1) anti-shipping missiles.

Flight testing of the first modernized F-4EJ began in July 1984 and will last 2 years. If the tests are successfully completed and positive results are obtained, consideration will be given to modifying 100-130 fighters beginning in 1987. Counting on a considerable increase in the combat capabilities of upgraded F-4EJ aircraft, the JASDF command plans to keep them in service until 1995. Furthermore, the airframe's service life is projected to increase to 5,000 flying hours.

The F-1 fighter bomber was developed by Mitsubishi based on the T-2 trainer aircraft as a replacement for outdated American-designed F-86F Sabre fighters. The first series model was produced in 1974, and a total of 77 of these aircraft are projected to be built.

The aircraft's power plant consists of two bypass turbojet engines with an afterburning thrust of 3,310 kg each. The capacity of body fuel tanks is 3,820 liters. In addition, the F-1 can carry three external tanks (under the fuselage and wing) with a capacity of 830 liters each.

The fighter bomber's built-in armament includes a six-barrel 20-mm Vulcan gun mounted on the left side of the fuselage below the cockpit. The gun's ammunition load is 750 rounds. External armament is positioned on five external points: four underwing and one under-fuselage attachment points. The aircraft is capable of carrying five 750-pound or twelve 500-pound bombs at one time. Each underwing attachment can also accommodate one RL-4 launcher, designed for four 127-mm rockets, or one RL-7 launcher with seven 70-mm rockets. Two AIM-9B Sidewinder air-to-air missiles can be mounted on the wingtip panels for hitting airborne targets. There are plans to replace these missiles with missiles of their own design. The F-1 fighter can carry two Type-80 anti-shipping missiles underwing. The main component of the weapons control system is the J/AWG-12 radar.

The F-104J air-defense fighter was produced under American license (a total of 210 aircraft were built). These aircraft are gradually being taken out of service (as of early 1985 only two squadrons remained) and replaced by the

newest F-15 aircraft. Presently the JASDF command is considering the possibility of converting 30 F-104J fighters into target drones. Initially there are plans to convert two aircraft and conduct flight testing of them. The cost of modernizing one fighter is estimated at \$870,000.

The RF-4E tactical reconnaissance aircraft is produced under license by Mitsubishi. Its flight characteristics and technical data are comparable with the F-4EJ, but differs by the presence of special equipment which includes a side-looking radar, an infrared reconnaissance package and aerial cameras located in the forward fuselage.

The E-2C Hawkeye is a carrier-based early warning and command and control (AWACS) aircraft designed by the American firm Grumman. Its series production began in 1972. Japan has purchased eight of these aircraft (they will be based at regular air bases) for the purpose of increasing the effectiveness of its air defense system. According to foreign press reports, the first subunit of E-2C AWACS aircraft, to which four of the aircraft have been assigned, was formed at Misawa Air Base in late 1983. The rest were planned to be delivered by the end of 1984. It has also been noted that the JASDF command plans to acquire four more E-2C aircraft.

The Hawkeye's main component of onboard equipment is the AN/APS-125 radar, capable of detecting airborne targets at an altitude of 9,000 meters and at distances up to 480 km. The radar can also be used for detecting surface targets. According to foreign press data, the electronic equipment installed in the aircraft enables it simultaneously to track 250-300 airborne targets and vector more than 30 fighter interceptors on them.

The power plant of the E-2C consists of two 4,910-hp turboprop engines. Internal fuel capacity is 5,620 kg, and maximum flight duration is 6 hours. It has a 5-man crew: two pilots and three equipment operators.

The C-1 medium military transport aircraft was developed by Kawasaki to replace the obsolete C-46. By its aerodynamic configuration, it is a high-wing monoplane (40-degree sweepback at leading edge) with a T-shaped tail. Its power plant consists of two turbofan engines having a thrust of 6,580 kg each. Fuel is kept in four wing tanks with a total capacity of 15,200 liters. The aircraft can transport (in one of its variants) up to 60 soldiers, 45 paratroopers, 36 wounded, one 2.5-ton vehicle, one 105-mm howitzer or three jeeps.

It is noted in foreign press that an experimental 4-engine cargo-passenger airplane with a short takeoff and landing is being developed on the C-1 base. Underwing engine placement (thrust of 4,500 kg each) will help improve the aircraft's takeoff and landing characteristics. Lift will increase considerably as a result of jet-engine airflow over the upper wing surface. The prototype of the new aircraft was demonstrated for the first time in the fall of 1983 at an international air show held in Japan at Gifu Air Base.

The C-130H Hercules medium military transport is being purchased in the US. Formation of the first squadron equipped with C-130H aircraft began in late 1984 at Komaki Air Base. Initially it will have four aircraft. Japan plans

to acquire a total of 12 C-130H aircraft for the JASDF. In addition to airlifting troops and cargo, it is assumed their mission will be to conduct aerial reconnaissance and mining straits. Variants of the aircraft's maximum cargo are as follows: 92 soldiers, 64 paratroopers, 74 wounded on stretchers and two escorts or cargo weighing 20.4 tons.

The YS-11P medium military transport is one of the variants of the YS-11P passenger aircraft developed by Japanese specialists. It is designed for airlifting 48 soldiers or 6 tons of cargo. The first flight of the YS-11P took place in 1962, and series production of it ended in 1974. A total of about 180 of the aircraft were built, of which roughly 50 were intended for export.

The T-2 combat trainer was the first supersonic aircraft developed independently by Japanese specialists. The first flight of this two-seat, two-engine aircraft took place in 1971. Subsequently, the single-seat F-1 fighter bomber was built on its base.

Based on the T-2, development of the T-2CCV experimental aircraft equipped with a direct lateral and lift control system. It has forward control surfaces and a forward ventral fin installed for this purpose. Upon commands from the onboard computer, the aerodynamic surfaces move in one or another combination simultaneously with the rudder, horizontal stabilizer, leading-edge slats, ailerons and trailing-edge flaps, as a result of which the aircraft can execute non-standard maneuvers. It has a triplex digital fly-by-wire control system.

The first flight of the T-2CCV took place in August 1983. Testing is planned to be completed in late 1985. Japanese specialists propose to use the test results and also certain other new designs in the FS-X advanced tactical fighter, which could replace existing F-1 aircraft in the early 1990s. From foreign press reports it appears that the possibility of Japan purchasing a new fighter overseas has not been ruled out.

The XT-4 trainer has been under development by Kawasaki since 1981. It is planned to replace the existing outdated T-1 and T-33 trainers. The aircraft's power plant will consist of two turbofan engines with a thrust of 1,510 kg each. It has tandem crew seating. It is noted in foreign press that the XT-4 will be the first Japanese aircraft to make wide use of composite materials (up to 5 percent of the airframe weight). They will be used for the ailerons, underhung rudder and elevators, parts of the vertical and horizontal stabilizers and also the wheel brakes.

Flight tests of the XT-4 are scheduled to begin in August 1985, and series-production in 1987. In all, the JASDF plans to buy 200-220 of these aircraft.

The KV-107 helicopter has been produced by Kawasaki since 1962 under license from Boeing Vertol. The JASDF uses it mainly for search and rescue operations. The plan for 1985 calls for building 7 helicopters, which will bring their total number to 40. The helicopter can transport either 25 soldiers, 15 wounded or 3.2 tons of cargo.

Performance Data of JASDF Aircraft and Helicopters

Name and Designation of Aircraft or Helicopter	Crew	Maximum takeoff weight, kg (empty weight, kg)	Maximum speed, km/h (at altitude, m)	Perry range, km	Dimensions: Length x Height x Wingspan, m	Primary armament or payload variants (maximum weight, kg)
		Number of engines X max. thrust, kg (engine shaft horsepower, hp)	Service ceiling, m	Operational radius, km	Wing area, m ²	
1	2	3	4	5	6	7
TACTICAL FIGHTERS						
F-15J Eagle	3	25 400 (12 250) 2 x 11 300	2650 (12 000) 18 200	4800 1100	19.47 x 5.63 x 13.05 56.48	20-mm Vulcan cannon, Sparrow and Sidewinder missiles, aerial bombs (5500)
F-4EJ Phantom	2	29 000 (13 780) 2 x 8120	2300 (11 000) 17 800	3200 250-1000	18.2 x 5.8 x 11.68 48.24	20-mm Vulcan, Sparrow, Sidewinder and Type-80 missiles, rockets, bombs (7250)
T-3	1	13 670 (6300) 2 x 3310	1700 (11 000) 15 340	2500 350-350	17.88 x 4.39 x 7.98 21.18	20-mm Vulcan, AAM-1, Sidewinder, Type-80 missiles, rockets, bombs (2700)
F-104J	1	13 000 (6400) 1 x 7170	2300 (11 000) 17 700	3500 1100-1300	18.00 x 4.11 x 6.68 18.22	20-mm Vulcan, AAM-1, Sidewinder missiles, rockets, bombs (1800)
TACTICAL RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT						
RF-4E	2	28 000 (13 780) 2 x 8120	2300 (11 000) 17 800	3200 1100	18.2 x 5.8 x 11.68 48.24	Aerial cameras, side-looking radar, IR surveillance station (.)
EARLY WARNING COMMAND AND CONTROL AIRCRAFT						
E-2C Ravkays	3	23 540 (17 240) 3 x 4910 hp	880 (3000) 9400	2900 3200	17.35 x 5.89 x 24.58 65.03	AN/APB-123 radar, AN/ALR-59 ELINT station (.)
MILITARY TRANSPORTS						
C-1	3-5	43 000 (23 150) 2 x 6340	530 (7800) 11 800	3200 1300	29.0 x 10.0 x 30.6 120.5	50 soldiers, 45 paratroopers, 36 wounded (11,900)
C-130H Hercules	4	79 400 (33 000) 4 x 4500 hp	820 (8000) 9130	7700 3600	20.78 x 11.69 x 40.25 183.12	92 soldiers, 64 paratroopers, 74 wounded (20,400)
YS-11P	3	24 500 (15 400) 2 x 3060 hp	470 (4500) 7000	2200 1100	26.2 x 8.88 x 32.0 94.8	32-48 soldiers (6,000)
TRAINING AND UTILITY AIRCRAFT						
T-13	2	5000 (2800) 1 x 1810	920 (8000) 14 000	1950 1000	12.12 x 4.07 x 10.5 22.22	12.7-mm machine gun, Sidewinder and AAM-1 missiles, rockets, bombs (581)
T-3	2	12 800 (8300) 2 x 3310	1700 (11 000) 15 340	2500 350-350	17.88 x 4.45 x 7.98 21.18	20-mm Vulcan cannon, Sidewinder, AAM-1, rockets, bombs (2,700)
T-3	2	1540 (1130) 1 x 340 hp	380 (5000) 8200	1000 -	8.04 x 3.03 x 10.0 18.40	—
T-33A	2	3600 (3800) 1 x 2100	870 (7800) 14 500	2100 -	11.51 x 3.55 x 11.68 22.02	two 12.7-mm machine guns (.)
T-34A	3	1340 (980) 1 x 235 hp	300 (2800) 5500	1100 -	7.81 x 2.92 x 10.0 18.40	—
MU-3C	1	4050 (2400) 2 x 605 hp	500 (3000) 7850	1900 -	10.13 x 3.84 x 11.64 18.5	two 12.7-mm machine guns, rockets, aerial cameras, 6-8 soldiers (.)
HELICOPTERS						
KV-107	2-3	10 400 (5930) 2 x 1400 hp	270 (40) 4285	365 ¹ -	13.87 x 5.18 x 18.58 ² —	23 soldiers, 13 wounded (3,230)
CH 47C Chinook	3-3	20 800 (9470) 3 x 3730 hp	308 (61) 5850	500 185	15.84 x 5.83 x 18.39 ³ —	46 soldiers, 27 paratroopers, 24 wounded (10,000)
S-63A	1-2	3580 (2250) 1 x 1230 hp	160 (40) 2000	740 ⁴ -	13.58 x 4.88 x 18.18 ⁴ —	10 soldiers (1,370)

¹ Radius with 4 hours of loitering time, km.

² With 8,000 kg of cargo.

³ Maximum flight range, km.

⁴ Main-rotor diameter, m.

The CH-47C Chinook is proposed to be produced in Japan under American license by Kawasaki. A total of 15 helicopters are planned to be built. The main loading versions are: 44 soldiers, 27 paratroopers, 24 wounded or 10 tons of cargo.

The S-62A search and rescue (SAR) helicopter is produced by Mitsubishi under license from the American firm Sikorsky. The helicopter can transport 10 soldiers or 1,370 tons of cargo. In addition to the above-mentioned aircraft models, the JASDF inventory includes a considerable number (over 400) of special-purpose and utility airplanes and helicopters, including combat trainer, SAR, test, communications, trainer, reserve and other aircraft. Basic tactical and technical specifications of JASDF airplanes and helicopters, compiled from foreign press materials, are given in the table.

The JASDF combat aircraft are equipped with a variety of weapons to carry out their missions (including air-to-air and air-to-surface guided missiles, unguided rockets, various sizes of bombs, Vulcan aircraft cannons), primarily of American production, purchased in the US or license-produced in Japan. At the same time, judging from Western press reports, definite efforts are being made to develop modern models of their own design. Thus, Mitsubishi developed the Type-80 anti-shipping missile (610 kg launch weight, 200 kg high-explosive warhead, 45 km maximum firing range), series production of which began in 1982. Mitsubishi is also developing a new air-to-air guided missile for close aerial combat. It has an improved infrared homing head, enabling it to hit airborne targets from various angles of attack.

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FOREIGN MILITARY AFFAIRS

WEST GERMAN AIR FORCE DISCUSSED

Moscow ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE in Russian No 6, Jun 85 (signed to press 10 Jun 85) pp 45-54

[Article by Col V. Sibiryakov under the rubric "Air Forces": "The FRG Air Force"]

[Text] The Federal Republic of Germany is one of the most active members of the aggressive imperialist bloc NATO. Its military-political leadership, following in the wake of the American militaristic policy aimed at achieving military superiority over countries of the socialist community and also nurturing its own revanchist plans, is continuing the arms race and constantly building up the might of all services of the armed forces, including the Air Force.

The Air Force, as Western military experts indicate, is already today the most prepared for combat operations and occupy a key position in the NATO aviation grouping in the Central European TVD and in zone of the Baltic Straits. In particular, as the magazine MILITARY TECHNOLOGY reported, of all the manpower and equipment at the disposal of NATO joint air forces and air defense in the Central European TVD, 30 percent of the combat aircraft, 45 percent of the anti-aircraft missile complexes and 60 percent of the radar posts and control centers belong to the FRG Air Force.

In accordance with the basic provisions adopted in NATO on the combat use of tactical aviation, the FRG Air Force is given the following basic missions: interdiction; close air support of ground forces (naval forces in coastal sectors); defending administrative, political and industrial centers, troop groupings and other key installations an air attack; conducting aerial reconnaissance in the interests of the Air Force and armed forces in general; airlifting personnel and equipment, and other missions.

The organization, composition, combat training and basic directions of development of the West German Air Force is dealt with below according to information published in foreign press.

ORGANIZATION AND FIGHTING STRENGTH. The Air Force is headed by an inspector (commander-in-chief) who is directly subordinate to the Minister of Defense and Inspector General of the Bundeswehr. He exercises control over the Air

Force through the main headquarters, consisting of several departments (directorates): personnel and combat training, military intelligence, Air Force administration, organizational, rear service, planning, weapons systems and so forth.

Subordinate to the Inspector of the Air Force are the Tactical Air Command (TAC), Logistics Command and the General Directorate. The organizational structure of the FRG Air Force is shown in more detail in Figure 1.

The Tactical Air Command is the highest operational formation of the FRG Air Force. Headquarters TAC (located at Kolin, near Bonn) is responsible for maintaining the high combat readiness of formations, units and subunits, supervises their combat training, interacts with appropriate NATO Hq and participates in developing exercises conducted both on a national scale and within the framework of NATO.




Figure 1. Organization of the FRG Air Force

According to foreign press reports, TAC includes two air support divisions (1st and 2nd), two air defense divisions (2nd and 4th), the FRG Air Force Training Command in the US and two separate fighter-bomber training squadrons (Tornado aircraft at Cottesmore Air Station, Great Britain and Alpha Jet aircraft at Beja Air Base, Portugal).

The 1st Air Support Division (HQ at Lautlingen Air Base) includes six air wings and one missile wing, namely: the 32nd Fighter-Bomber Air Wing (FBAW, F-104G aircraft, Lechfeld), 33th FBAW (F-104Gs, Buchel), 34th FBAW (F-104Gs, Memmingen), 35th FBAW (F-4Fs, Pferdfeld), 49th FBAW (Alpha Jet light ground support aircraft, Furstenfeldbruck), 51st Reconnaissance Air Wing (RF-4Es, Bremgarten) and the 1st Pershing-IA Tactical Missile Wing (Landsberg).

The 3rd Air Support Division (Kalkar) is also made up of six air and one missile wing: the 31st FBAW (Tornadoes, Norvenich), 36th FBAW (F-4Fs, Hopsten), 41st FBAW (Alpha Jets, Husum), 43rd FBAW (Alpha Jets, Oldenburg), 52nd Reconnaissance Air Wing (RF-4Es, Leck), 38th Combat Training Air Wing established on the base of the 10th Flying School (Tornado and F-104G aircraft, Jever) and the 2nd Pershing-IA Tactical Missile Wing (Geilenkirchen).

The 2nd Air Defense Division (Birkenfeld) includes the 74th Fighter Air Wing (F-4Fs, Neuburg), the 1st Improved Hawk Guided Missile Regiment (Freising), the 2nd Nike Hercules Guided Missile Regiment (Lich) and the 31st and 32nd Electronic Support Regiments (Masshtetten and Birkenfeld respectively).

The 4th Air Defense Division (Aurich) includes the 71st Fighter Air Wing (F-4Fs, Wittmundhafen), the 3rd and 4th Improved Hawk Guided Missile Regiments (Heede and Bremerfedorf respectively), the 13th and 14th Nike Hercules Guided Missile Regiments (Soest and Oldenburg) and the 33rd and 34th Electronic Support Regiments (Goch and Schleswig).

The FRG Training Command in the US trains personnel for West German military aviation; this is done at more than 30 points located in the continental United States. This command monitors the training of its specialists at all training centers, ranges, workshops and other installations placed at the disposal of the Bundeswehr.

Judging from Western press reports, the largest training center of the Bundeswehr's Air Force in the US is the missile school at Fort Bliss, Texas. It trains various specialists in maintenance and tactical use of Nike Hercules, Improved Hawk and other surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems. Permanent staff of the school numbers 300 men, and it graduates about 1,800 specialists annually.

Flying personnel of the Bundeswehr Air Force undergo training in the US primarily at Sheppard AFB, Texas and George AFB and Mather AFB, California.

The Separate Tornado Fighter-Bomber Training Squadron is deployed at Cottesmore Air Station, Great Britain at a special training center of the Italian and British air forces and FRG military aviation (for the Air Force and Naval Aviation). It has 22 Tornado tactical fighters. In addition, the center has one British and one Italian squadron, equipped with the same aircraft (21 and 7 airplane respectively). As has been emphasized in foreign press, the center's main task is to retrain crews of military aviation of the above-mentioned three countries on Tornado aircraft. Further improvement of their flight training is done in the countries' own combat training units and subunits. Thus, in the FRG, the 38th Air Wing is involved in this.




Figure 2. Approximate organization of an FRG Air Force air wing

The Separate Alpha Jet Fighter-Bomber Training Squadron in Portugal (18 aircraft at Beja Air Base) trains crews flying these ground support aircraft tactical use of onboard weapons by performing practice firings, missile launches and bombing against ground targets at a range. They also practice various tactical procedures and flights at low and extremely low altitudes in providing close air support to ground forces and so forth.

A division in the FRG Air Force is considered an operational unit. As was already mentioned above, two types of divisions are included in TAC: air support and air defense. The former are given missions related to delivering strikes against enemy ground targets, and the latter--air defense of their own troops and other objectives by destroying enemy aircraft in the air. Therefore, fighter-bomber air wings and Pershing-IA tactical missile units make up the basis of air support divisions, and fighter air wings and surface-to-air missile units--the basis of air defense divisions.

The air wing is the basic tactical unit of West German Air Force combat aviation. It consists of three groups: flight, technical and air base groups (Figure 2). In turn, a flight group includes two aviation squadrons (up to 18 aircraft in each), an air traffic control squadron (flight control) and a geophysical (meteorological) information department (subunit).

A technical group includes four squadrons: maintenance, field repair, electronic (radar electronic) equipment and supply.

An air base group includes the following squadrons: ground defense (security), training (training of non-commissioned officers), transportation and medical. In addition, a group has cadre subunits: a security squadron, a quick runway repair company and a 20-mm antiaircraft artillery battery.

A Pershing-IA tactical missile wing has four squadrons (nine launchers each) and support subunits for its daily and combat activities. There are a total of 36 Pershing-IA missile launchers in a wing.

A Nike Hercules guided missile regiment consists of two battalions, each with four batteries (nine launchers each). Thus, a regiment has 72 launchers for these missiles.

An Improved Hawk guided missile regiment includes three 4-battery (six launchers in each) battalions. It also has a total of 72 launchers.

An electronic (radar) support regiment (fairly often simply called a signal regiment in Western press) is equipped with radar stations, communications equipment and information processing and display equipment. Radar sites, various fighter combat operations and surface-to-air missile unit control centers and posts are set up with resources from such regiments.

Logistics Command (Koln) is responsible for obtaining aviation equipment and weapons, spare parts and other materiel from industry and supplying them to units and subunits, and also for providing Air Force personnel with all types of rations. Command Hq plans the supply and replenishment of stockpiles, monitors the timeliness of providing Air Force units with necessary materiel and organizes repair of aviation equipment and weapons. In addition, it is responsible for deployment of ground communications centers, radar equipment and other aviation flight support equipment.

The command consists of two logistics groups ("North," Munster Air Base, and "South," Karlsruhe, each of which has a specific area of responsibility), and also a special directorate in charge of questions of purchasing necessary equipment and materiel from industry (Koln). The command has at its disposal a considerable number of units and subunits, depots, workshops and other organizations and installations for carrying out its assigned tasks. In particular, it has more than 20 repair workshops, 27 depots for storing equipment, spare parts and other supplies, and 23 transportation subunits.

An information service having two computer centers has been established to improve logistics organization in the command. The computer centers are involved in monitoring stock availability, processing requisitions, future planning for the required amount of supplies and so forth. These centers interact closely with the main logistics computer center of the country's armed forces. West German specialists believe that the centralized system of monitoring the availability, distribution and planning of the necessary materiel reserves ensures the rapid repair of aviation equipment and a considerable saving of resources.

Delivery of materiel to Air Force units is accomplished by the above-mentioned transportation subunits and also by rail transport. Air Transport Command aircraft and helicopters are used for more rapid completion of this task, and aircraft (helicopters) are sometimes leased from civilian aviation companies.

Personnel of the command are organizationally combined into eight regiments. They undergo training at three technical schools and fairly often also at enterprises of firms producing certain equipment, weapons or other things.

The General Directorate (Koln) takes care of manning the units and subunits, training personnel for them, organizing troop and cargo airlift, as well as meteorological, medical and other types of support of the daily and combat activities of the country's Air Force. Subordinate to it are the Training Command, Air Transport Command, Personnel (Reserve) Directorate, Communications Command, an Inspector Group and services: flight safety, medical, geophysical and logistics (aviation equipment and weapons).

The Training Command (Koln) is in charge of general and specialized training of flight personnel, engineering and technical personnel, as well as specialists of other services.

General training is accomplished at a number of training institutions and units of the FRG Air Force, for example, at the Officers' School (Neuburg), Internal Service School (Iserlohn), Foreign Language School (Utersen) and five training regiments for training new recruits.

Specialized training is accomplished under control of the Tactical Air Command and is structures according to its needs. It is conducted in the above-mentioned units and subunits located in the US (FRG Air Force Training Command in the US), Great Britain (Joint Training Center at Cottesmore), Portugal (Alpha Jet Combat Training Squadron at Beja) and in West Germany itself, for example, the 38th Combat Training Air Wing of Tornado and F-104G aircraft. In addition, the following Air Force schools are in the FRG: a higher school (academy) at Furstenfeldbruck; a civil aviation flight school which trains crews for the Air Transport Command; three technical schools (1st Technical School is located at Kaufbeuren, the 2nd--at Lechfeld, the 3rd--at Fakberg); a logistics medical school (subordinate to Air Force surgeon general--chief of the medical service).*

The Air Transport Command (Munster) is concerned with air movements for all branches of the country's armed forces and carries out the following basic missions: airlifting troops, equipment and other cargo; paratroop dropping (landing); medical evacuation; search and rescue of aircraft and helicopter crews and other personnel of the Bundeswehr in distress; special movements.

It is made up of four air wings: 61st (Landsberg), 62nd (Wunstorf), 63rd (Hohn) and 64th (Ahlhorn). In all they have 4 squadrons of C-160 Transall military transports (75) and 5 squadrons of UH-1 helicopters (over 100).

In addition, a separate special air group is administratively subordinate to the command (sometimes called a detachment or squadron in Western press). It is located at Koln Air Base. The group is operationally subordinate to the Ministry of Defense and is intended for transporting the higher leadership of the country and the Ministry of Defense.** To do this, it has 22 aircraft of various types (specifically, four Boeing 707s, three C-140s, six HFB-320s, three VFW-614s and six Do-28s) and four UH-1D helicopters.

*For more details on the personnel training system in the FRG Air Force, see ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE No 5, 1984, pp 44-47--Editor.

**For more details on this group, see ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE, No 1, 1985, p 70--Editor.

The Communications Command (sometimes called Communications and Electronics Command, and sometimes Control Services Command). Its headquarters is located at Kobl Air Base. It is tasked with the following: setting up and maintaining communications lines supporting the activities of Air Force command echelons; air traffic control; conducting electronic warfare; collecting, processing and passing information to commanders (at any level). To do this, the command has signal regiments, broken down into battalions, which in turn are broken down into companies. Their resources are used to set up landline, radio and radio-relay communications lines and support their operation. In addition, subunits of this type existing in other Air Force units are subordinate to it in a special respect.

Air traffic control and radio navigational support of flights is accomplished in close cooperation with appropriate civilian organizations.

Judging from foreign press reports, much attention in the FRG Air Force is given to conducting signals and electronic reconnaissance, conducting operations for jamming enemy equipment and protecting their own equipment from its effect. The organization and implementation of such measures is entrusted primarily to specially trained Communications Command subunits and specialists concerned with these problems in aviation and other units of the Air Force.

The Personnel (Reserve) Directorate is responsible for manning Air Force units and subunits, registering and training reservists, and other matters related to solving personnel problems.

The Flight Safety Service (its directorate is located in the city Frankfurt-am-Main) deals with investigating causes of flying accidents. It gathers and processes all the information concerning catastrophes, accidents and flying safety hazards. Based on the analysis of information obtained, experts of the service develop recommendations, requirements and measures directed at lowering the accident rate not only in the Air Force, but in Bundeswehr aviation in general.

Headed by the Air Force Surgeon General, the Medical Service monitors the work of the Institute of Aviation Medicine, medical schools and centrally subordinated institutions, as well as medical subunits in aviation, missile and other Air Force units. It directs their work for medical support of the daily and combat activities of the country's Air Force.

The Logistics Service (aviation equipment and weapons) is concerned with questions of the development and purchasing of aviation equipment, weapon systems and other combat and auxiliary equipment not only for the Air Force, but for all aviation of the Bundeswehr. As foreign press notes, this service is actually an aviation equipment and weapons development directorate. It participates in drawing up tactical and other requirements for models ordered from industry, determining the delivery amount and deadlines, coordinating their cost and so forth.

The Geophysical Service primarily handles questions of meteorological support of the country's military aviation activities. It works in close cooperation with appropriate civilian organizations.

The Inspector Group, as instructed by higher headquarters, checks the combat readiness of units and subunits of the Air Force, Army Aviation and Naval Aviation. Based on the results of the inspection, it makes recommendations aimed at further increasing combat readiness.

Thus, judging from foreign press reports, the FRG Air Force has 30 combat aviation squadrons (over 500 aircraft), including 21 fighter-bomber squadrons (10 equipped with F-104G and Tornado aircraft, 4 with F-4Fs and 7 with Alpha Jets), 4 reconnaissance squadrons (RF-4Es) and 4 fighter squadrons (air defense, F-4Fs). Combat characteristics of the main combat aircraft are given in the table.

Basic Combat Characteristics of FRG Air Force Combat Aircraft

Aircraft Name and Designation (Crew)	Number & Type of engines	Maximum engine thrust, kg	Maximum speed at 11,000 m (ground level) km/h	Service ceiling, m	Takeoff Weight, kg	Empty weight, kg	Perry range, km	Operational radius, km	Armament:	
									Guns	Missiles and Bombs (Maximum combat load, kg)
Tornado (2)	bypass 2 x turbojet	2100 (1350)	20300	about 5000	13600	up to 1200	about 5000	up to 1200	27-mm Mauser cannon	Sidewinder and Cormorant missiles; aviation bombs, rockets (5500-7500). 20-mm Vulcan cannon Sparrow, Sidewinder and Maverick missiles; aerial bombs (7250).
	7650	17700	13600	up to 1200					20-mm Vulcan cannon	
F-4F Phantom-2 (2)	2 x turbojet	2400 (1450)	24700	4100	12700	over 18000	4100	up to 1650	External fuel tanks, reconnaissance pods or missiles; aerial bombs, rockets (7250)	Sparrow, Sidewinder and Maverick missiles; aerial bombs (7250).
	6120	over 18000	12700	up to 1650					20-mm Vulcan cannon	
RF-4E Phantom-2 (2)	2 x turbojet	2400 (1450)	28300	3700	13800	up to 1100	3700	up to 1100	External fuel tanks, reconnaissance pods or missiles; aerial bombs, rockets (7250)	20-mm Vulcan cannon 2-4 Sidewinder missiles, aerial bombs, rockets (1800)
	6500	19700	13800	up to 1100					20-mm Vulcan cannon	
F-104G Starfighter (1)	1 x turbojet	2300 (1450)	13000	3500	6400	over 1000	3500	over 1000	2-4 Sidewinder missiles, aerial bombs, rockets (1800)	30-mm or 27-mm external cannon pod aerial bombs, rockets (2250)
	7170	17680	6400	over 1000					30-mm or 27-mm external cannon pod	
Alpha Jet (2)	2 x turbojet	800 (1000)	7250	2700	3300	up to 830	2700	up to 830	30-mm or 27-mm external cannon pod	aerial bombs, rockets (2250)
	1350	15000	3300	up to 830					aerial bombs, rockets (2250)	

The combat strength of the West German Air Force includes Pershing IA tactical missiles (72 launchers), Nike Hercules and Improved Hawk guided missiles (432 launchers) and also more than 1,000 twin-barrelled 20-mm anti-aircraft guns. Military transport aviation has about 200 aircraft and helicopters.

In addition, the FRG Air Force has more than 100 light aircraft and utility helicopters, specifically, 65 Do-28 aircraft which are attached to aviation wings and headquarters of other formations and units. There they are used as liaison aircraft, for weather reconnaissance in areas of airfields and for performing ancillary tasks.

As was noted above, all combat aviation forces, tactical missiles and surface-to-air missile complexes are included in the composition of the 2nd and 4th

Allied Tactical Air Commands of NATO Air Forces in the Central European TVD. Furthermore, part of them are constantly on alert duty, at a high state of readiness for takeoff (launch). Western press indicates that all subunits are fully prepared for performing their basic designated tasks, as well as certain others. For example, if necessary, fighter bombers can be used for fighting airborne targets, and reconnaissance aircraft and air defense fighters can be used for delivering strikes against ground targets.

Combat training in the FRG Air Force is organized according to NATO command requirements and is aimed at further increasing its combat readiness. It is accomplished in the form of daily combat training and also during various exercises and competitions conducted both under the plans of Bundeswehr military leadership and by the allied armed forces command of the bloc.

Special attention is given to training units and subunits of the West German Air Force for carrying out their assigned tasks under complex tactical and meteorological conditions characteristic, in the opinion of NATO military experts, of the Central European TVD. Foreign press notes that in order to achieve this objective, daily activities, training sessions and flights, and especially exercises and maneuvers, are conducted under conditions most closely approximating combat, taking into account the use of both conventional and nuclear weapons with widespread use of electronic warfare. Deployed on the territory of the FRG for this are specially equipped ranges and training bases. At the same time, West German aviation widely use of corresponding bases and ranges of its NATO allies. For example, combat aircraft crews of the Bundeswehr's tactical aviation train the whole year round in turns (in small groups) in delivering missile and bomb strikes against ground targets and in firing on airborne targets at ranges on the islands of Sardinia (Italy) and Crete (Greece). They often practice their missions on the territories of Great Britain, Turkey and so forth.

In the process of combat training, personnel train in performing primarily missions inherent to a given branch of aviation (service).

In particular, fighter aviation (air defense) crews train in intercepting airborne targets from "airfield alert" status or while patrolling in a zone, and also in conducting close-in, maneuvering aerial combat, escorting strike groups and so forth. However, as Western press indicates, lately increasing attention is being given to training fighter pilots in delivering strikes against ground targets so that, if necessary, they can be used to perform this mission.

Tactical fighter crews training in delivering missile and bomb strikes against ground targets. Here, great attention is given to practicing methods and techniques of penetrating heavy enemy air defenses. In the views of West German military experts, the level of their aircraft losses from air defense fire can be decreased by flying at low and extremely low altitudes (at maximum speed), optimum structuring of battle formations and selection of flight routes, effective use of electronic warfare equipment, hitting targets on the first pass, being able to conduct defensive aerial combat and so forth. The FRG Air Force sets aside a considerable amount of time for working on these elements.

Along with training for carrying out basic missions, strike aircraft crews train in conducting both defensive and offensive aerial combat. During exercises they are very often used for building up the efforts of fighter aviation and ground air defense resources in repelling a massive "enemy" air raid.

Subunits of military transport aviation are involved in training for performing such traditional missions as airlifting troops and cargo, paratroops, medical evacuation and so forth. Delivery of cargo is done by air-landed and parachute-drop methods. In recent years, cargo drops from extremely low altitudes by the restraint method has become especially widespread.

Military transport aviation is called upon to act in the interest of not only the Bundeswehr, but also the armed forces of NATO allies. This is taken into account in the course of combat training. Thus, during the regularly scheduled Allied Armed Forces fall maneuvers Autumn Forge-84, C-160 Transall aircraft from the Bundeswehr's 62nd Air Transport Wing airlifted American troop reinforcements arriving in Europe from the US from the airfields at Luxembourg and Antwerp to Monchen Gladbach Air Base. They completed 40 trips and hauled more than 2,600 men. In addition, these aircraft participated in dropping a large American airborne assault force at Grafenwohr training area (FRG).

Specially training helicopter crews actively participate in the search and rescue of servicemen and civilians in distress. In conducting such operations at sea, they cooperate closely with Sea Lynx helicopters in the inventory of FRG naval aviation for this purpose.

Missile, electronic and other units and subunits of the FRG Air Force practice their typical missions.

In recent years, as foreign press reports, during combat training of the West German Air Force and other branches of service as well, special attention is being given to personnel actions when weapons of mass destruction are used. Here, engineering and technical personnel train in preparing aircraft for sorties; specialists of other ground services, wearing individual protective gear, engage in flight support activities. They regularly practice radiological and chemical decontamination of aviation equipment, withdrawing personnel from a contaminated area and so forth.

Development of the Air Force is being accomplished for the purpose of increasing its combat capabilities and combat readiness. The following measures are directed at successful completion of these tasks: updating the aircraft fleet and other combat equipment, modernizing existing weapon systems in the inventory, improving command and control elements and the organizational structure of formations, units and subunits and further intensification of their operational and combat training.

Thus, according to foreign press reports, aviation units continue to be re-equipped with new Tornado tactical fighters (they are replacing the outdated F-104G aircraft). Work is being done to modernize the F-4F multi-purpose

tactical fighters presently in the Air Force inventory. They are being equipped with more modern onboard equipment and are being modified for combat use of the AGM-45 Maverick air-to-ground guided missile. The first of these aircraft are already being delivered to aviation units. The RF-4E reconnaissance aircraft are being modified for use as strike aircraft.

In the future, there are plans to improve the F-4F air defense fighters to extend their service life into the mid-1990s and to expand their combat capabilities. Specifically, they plan to equip them with new pulse Doppler radars and advanced AIM-120A medium-range air-to-air guided missiles. Western press indicates that they are already planning to modernize the new Alpha Jet light ground attack aircraft, delivery of which was only recently completed (175 aircraft). Simultaneously with the above measures, work is ongoing in the FRG to develop new and improve existing models of onboard weapons of combat aircraft (bomb clusters, aerial bombs, guided missiles, unguided rockets and so forth).

Plans for developing ground air defense resources include acquiring in the US 28 batteries (224 launchers) of Patriot SAMs (to replace Nike Hercules complexes) and more than 90 Roland-2 short-range SAM complexes, as well as modernizing the Improved Hawk complexes in the inventory. In addition, testing is being done on the new SHORAD short-range SAM complex, the basis of which comprises AIM-9L Sidewinder missiles.

At the same time, as was mentioned above, command and control systems are being improved. In particular, the new GEADGE (German air-defense ground environment) automated air defense command and control system is being deployed in the southern part of the FRG (in the zone of responsibility of the 4th Allied Tactical Air Command). It will include an air defense sector control center, four control and warning centers, three fixed and two mobile radar posts and also appropriate communications lines. Other measures are also being taken for further increasing the combat might of the FRG Air Force.

All of the above once again indicates that the military and political leadership of West Germany is constantly increasing the combat might and combat readiness of the Air Force, considering it one of the main and most mobile means of achieving its revanchist designs directed against the Soviet Union and other countries of the socialist community.

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FOREIGN MILITARY AFFAIRS

FRENCH GROUND FORCES DISCUSSED

Moscow ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE in Russian No 6, Jun 85 (signed to press 10 Jun 85) pp 29-37

[Article by Lt Col A. Klenov under the rubric "Ground Forces": "The Ground Forces of France"]

[Text] France's ground forces are the main branch of the armed services and in numerical strength are one of the largest among the armies of European capitalist states. Their organizational development is accomplished according to the requirements of a military doctrine envisioning participation in combat operations in Western Europe jointly with NATO Allied armed forces and also independently, including in local conflicts in other TVDs to protect the predatory interests of its own ruling circles and to fulfill "obligations" to other countries with which appropriate treaties and agreements have been concluded.

In the estimates of foreign military experts, improving the organizational structure of units (soyedineniya, chasti) and re-equipping them with modern weapons and combat equipment meet the requirements of the NATO coalition strategy and help to strengthen its military might. The closest cooperation in questions of coordinating military policy and developing and producing the latest models of armament is carried out with the FRG. For example, they are working out joint production projects for PAH-2 helicopters, third-generation antitank guided missiles (ATGMs), ammunition and so forth. Communication lines and systems of the French II Army Corps deployed in the FRG are connected to Bundeswehr communication lines, and joint combat training of units and subunits (podrazdeleniya) is conducted. Thus, in September 1984 a joint exercise of the 1st French Armored Division and the Bundeswehr's 34th Tank Brigade on French territory. Based on bilateral agreements, combat training of ground forces units and subunits is organized with other NATO member countries.

According to foreign press reports, under the program of organizational development of the armed forces for 1984-1988, measures are being taken to re-organize units of the ground forces for the purpose of increasing their combat capabilities and bringing their combat might to the level of units of the main bloc countries. Under this plan, formation of the "Rapid Action Force" (Force d'Action Rapide or FAR) is winding up, the composition of army corps has been

partially changed and there are plans to create operational-tactical missile divisions.

By early 1985, the numerical strength of the ground forces was 312,000 men. The most battleworthy units have been brought together into the 1st Army (I, II and III Army Corps) and the FAR (five divisions). The French Foreign Legion exists to perform 'gendarmerie' functions in various regions of the world, including in overseas departments and countries of Africa.

The ground forces are led by the chief of staff (commander-in-chief) who is directly subordinate to the Minister of Defense; operationally, he is subordinate to the chief of staff of the armed forces (during wartime he is designated a deputy chief of general staff). He is responsible for organizing, manning, supplying weapons, combat equipment and materiel and also for combat training, developing plans for mobilization and operational deployment and combat use of the ground forces. Subordinate to him are the staff, inspectorates of branch arms, services directorates, military educational establishments and also military district commanders.

The inspectorates of branch arms (armored, infantry, artillery, engineering, communications, transport and troops overseas) as well as the inspectorates of various services are headed by the inspector general of the ground forces. He plans and supervises inspection of units and formations and makes suggestions for improving their combat readiness and increasing fighting efficiency and logistical support.

The commanders of the 1st Army and the FAR are operationally subordinate to the chief of staff of the armed forces, and administratively to the chief of staff of the ground forces. Units and subunits of the Foreign Legion are subordinate to commanders of the corresponding formations or commanders of the military districts of which they are a part.

EFFECTIVE COMBAT STRENGTH. According to Western press, the basis of the ground forces is the army, a formation of inconstant composition and designed for participation in an operation (battle) on a strategically important axis within a TVD as a part of a group of armies (in conducting combat operations jointly with NATO allied ground forces) or independently. Depending on the missions to be completed, the nature of enemy actions and the terrain characteristics, it may include two or three army corps. Presently, the I Army Corps includes the 7th and 10th Armored, 15th Infantry and 14th Infantry Training divisions and also corps subordinate units and subunits (the 4th and 6th Armored divisions were disbanded in the first half of 1985 and in 1984 respectively). The II Army Corps includes the 1st, 3rd and 5th Armored divisions and corps subordinate units and subunits. The III Army Corps has three divisions: the 2nd Armored, 8th Infantry and 12th Infantry Training divisions.

In 1983 the military and political leadership of the country decided to form the Rapid Action Force. Today it includes the 9th Marine Infantry, 27th Alpine Infantry, 11th Airborne, 6th Armored Cavalry and 4th Airmobile divisions (formation should be completed in late 1985) and also support units and subunits.




Figure 1. Deployment of HQ and units of France's ground forces.

Key: 1A/1,2,3 AK = 1st Army: I, II, III Army Corps

1. 9th Infantry Div.
2. III Army Corps:
 - 2nd Armored Div.,
 - 8th Infantry Div.,
 - 12th Infantry Training Div.
3. 12th Infantry Training Div.
4. 15th Infantry Div.
5. 11th Airborne Div.
6. 14th Infantry Training Div.
7. 7th Armored Cavalry Div.
8. 27th Alpine Infantry Div.
9. Rapid Action Force: 9th Infantry, 11th Armored, 27th Alpine Infantry, 6th Armored Cavalry and 4th Airmobile divisions.
10. 7th Armored Div.
11. 3rd Armored Div.
12. II Army Corps:
 - 1st, 3rd, 5th Armored Div.
13. I Army Corps:
 - 7th, 10th Armored Div.,
 - 15th Infantry Div.
 - 14th Infantry Training Div.
14. I Army Corps, 4th Airmobile Div.
15. II Army Corps, 5th Armored Div.
16. 1st Armored Div.
17. 10th Armored Div.
18. 2nd Armored Div.
19. FAR (Rapid Action Force)
20. III Army Corps, 8th Infantry Div.
21. HQ Armed Forces, HQ Ground Forces

As foreign press reports, there are 15 divisions in the ground forces (6 armored, 2 infantry, 1 marine infantry, 1 alpine infantry, 1 airborne, 1 armored cavalry, 1 airmobile and 2 infantry training divisions). In addition, there are individual units and subunits of central (high command reserves) and district subordination. Central subordinate units include antiaircraft guided missile, armored cavalry (reconnaissance), engineering, signals, army aviation, transport and other regiments; district subordinate ones include units and subunits not included in army corps and the Rapid Action Force. They are subordinate to the commander of the military district in which they are deployed and, depending on the situation, can carry out missions independently or be transferred to army corps. The deployment of headquarters and formations of the French Ground Forces is shown in Figure 1. The inventory of the ground forces includes: more than 40 Pluton guided missile launchers, approximately 1,500 tanks, about 1,400 field artillery pieces and mortars, more than 1,500 antitank weapons, up to 5,000 armored vehicles, more than 650 army aviation helicopters and aircraft, about 1,000 antiaircraft weapons and other equipment.

Under the program of organization development of the armed forces, the ground forces plan to receive more than 500 AMX-30B2 tanks, about 150 155-mm guns, 100 Milan ATGM (antitank guided missile) launchers, up to 70 Roland surface-to-air missile (SAM) launchers, about 50 helicopter gunships and up to 1,700 infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs) and armored personnel carriers (APCs). In the early 1980s they expect to receive the new Hades guided missile (350-400 km firing range, 80 kt yield nuclear charge) in place of the Pluton guided missile. Based on Hades guided missile regiments, they plan to form a division of operational-tactical missiles, in which they intend to include five missile regiments, five infantry security battalions, a signal regiment and a headquarters support regiment.

ORGANIZATION OF A CORPS AND CORPS-SUBORDINATE UNITS. An army corps is the highest tactical formation of the ground forces. According to foreign press data, it does not have a fixed number of divisions. During peacetime a corps consists of 3-4 divisions, but in wartime it can be reinforced by 1-2 infantry divisions and various central-subordinate units. A corps has a headquarters (staff, chiefs of service arms and services) and individual regiments: 1 motorized infantry, 1-2 armored cavalry (reconnaissance), 1-2 Pluton guided missile, 2 artillery, 1 Improved Hawk SAM, 1-2 Roland SAM, 1 army aviation, 2 engineering, 3 signals, 1 traffic control regiments and also a light helicopter group and a logistics brigade. The overall personnel strength of corps units is approximately 20,000 men.

A motorized infantry regiment (1,400 men) is intended for reinforcing divisions or conducting independent operations in the interests of the corps (division). It includes eight companies: a headquarters services company, six motorized infantry companies and a support company. Its inventory includes about 100 VAB APCs, 44 Milan ATGM launchers, 6 120-mm and 6 81-mm mortars, approximately 12 20-mm guns, up to 100 89-mm RPGs and other armament.

An armored cavalry (reconnaissance) regiment (860 men) primarily performs reconnaissance and flank and boundary cover. It includes five squadrons: a headquarters services squadron, four reconnaissance squadrons (a headquarters

services platoon and five reconnaissance platoons: three with AMX-10RC armored reconnaissance vehicles (ARVs) and one with VAB APCs). It has 48 AMX-10RC ARVs, 32 Milan ATGM launchers, about 50 VAB APCs and approximately 170 various motor vehicles.

A Pluton guided missile regiment (about 1,000 men) consists of the following batteries: a headquarters services battery, three fire batteries with two launchers in each (one per platoon), a transport battery and a security battery. Its armament includes 6 Pluton guided missile launchers and about 300 various motor vehicles. The launcher is mounted on an AMX-30 tank chassis, has a maximum firing range of 120 km and a nuclear charge yield of 10 and 25 kt.

An artillery regiment (about 850 men) has a headquarters service battery and four fire batteries. It has 24 155-mm F-1 self-propelled guns (6 per battery).

An Improved Hawk SAM regiment (about 1,100 men) includes a headquarters service battery and four fire batteries (6 launchers each).

Presently there are two types of Roland SAM regiments in an army corps. The first consists of a headquarters service battery and four fire batteries with eight launchers each. The second has a headquarters service battery, three fire batteries and a 30-mm self-propelled antiaircraft guns (12 guns). The personnel strength of both types of regiments is about 900 men.

An army aviation regiment (900 men) is intended for fire support of units and formations, troop assault landings, conducting reconnaissance, laying minefields and performing other combat missions. It has 9 squadrons: a headquarters service squadron, 3 fire support squadrons each with 10 SA342 Gazelle helicopters with HOT ATGMs, 2 reconnaissance squadrons each with 10 SA341 Gazelle or Alouette II helicopters, 2 transport squadrons each with 11 SA330 Puma helicopters and a logistics squadron. A regiment has 72 helicopters, including 30 antitank helicopters.

The missions of a light helicopter group (360 men) include conducting troop and chemical reconnaissance, communications support, materiel supply by air and other tasks. It has 30 Alouette II light helicopters and up to 140 motor vehicles.

ORGANIZATION OF DIVISIONS. In the views of French military experts, divisions are the basic tactical formations which include units and subunits of service arms and services capable of conducting combined arms battle both independently and as part of a larger formation or field force. Presently there are six types of divisions in the ground forces: armored, infantry, airborne, alpine, armored cavalry and airmobile divisions. Each of them has headquarters elements, combat units and logistics subunits.

Armored divisions, in the estimate of the French command, are the main combat might of the ground forces. Each division of the I and II Army Corps and also the 5th Armored Division, III Army Corps has 10 regiments: a headquarters and support regiment, three tank (two before), two mechanized, one motorized

infantry (not earlier included in a division) and two artillery (one prior to the reorganization) regiments and an engineer and reconnaissance squadron. As a result of a reorganization in the division, judging from Western press reports, the number of tanks has increased from 148 to 193 (the AMX-30 and AMX-30B2 tanks), field artillery pieces have increased from 24 to 48 (155-mm F-1 self-propelled guns), mortars--from 12 to 20, and ATGMs--from 50 to 66. In addition, the inventory includes more than 140 AMX-10P IFVs, including the AMX-10PC command and staff vehicles (CSVs), about 100 VAB APCs (including more than 20 Mistral portable SAM systems), armored recovery vehicles and various motor vehicles. Personnel strength has increased from 7,000 to 10,000 men. Two tank regiments each remained in the 1st and 3rd Armored divisions, II Army Corps, but the number of tanks in them rose to 70 (instead of 54), 174 overall in a division (instead of 148).

A tank regiment (about 700 men) is the basic tactical unit of a division. It includes a headquarters services squadron, three tank squadrons and a mechanized squadron. Its armament includes 53 AMX-30 (AMX-30B2) tanks, 18 AMX-10P IFVs and AMX-10PC CSVs, 3 AMX-30 armored recovery vehicles, 14 VAB APCs, 120 motor vehicles and other combat equipment.

The tank squadron consists of a headquarters services platoon (equipped with an AMX-30 tank, an AMX-10PC CSV and a VAB APC) and four tank platoons (each with four AMX-30 tanks). It has 17 tanks, one AMX-10PC and one VAB APC.

The mechanized squadron has a headquarters services platoon (one AMX-10PC CSV).

A mechanized regiment (about 1,000 men) includes the following companies: a headquarters, services and support company, a tank company and three mechanized companies. It has 17 AMX-30 tanks, about 45 AMX-10P IFVs and AMX-10PC CSVs, 6 120-mm mortars, 18 Milan ATGM launchers and 6 VAB APCs.

The headquarters, services and support company has two AMX-10PC CSVs, six 120-mm mortars, six Milan ATGM launchers, two VAB APCs and other armament.

A tank company is made up of six platoons: a headquarters services platoon (an AMX-30 tank, an AMX-10PC CSV and a VAB APC), four tank platoons (four tanks each) and one mechanized platoon (three AMX-10P IFVs). In all it has 17 tanks, 3 AMX-10Ps, one AMX-10PC CSV, one VAB APC and several motor vehicles.

A mechanized company includes a headquarters services platoon (one AMX-10PC CSV and one VAB APC) and four mechanized platoons (three AMX-10P IFVs each). It has 12 AMX-10P IFVs, one AMX-10PC CSV, four Milan ATGM launchers and one VAB APC.

A motorized infantry regiment (about 1,000 men) is made up of a headquarters, services and support company (six 120-mm mortars and 6 Milan ATGM launchers), an antitank company (12 HOT ATGM launchers on VAB APCs) and 3 motorized infantry companies (two 81-mm mortars and 4 Milan ATGM launchers each). A regiment has six 120-mm and six 81-mm mortars, 12 self-propelled HOT ATGM launchers and 18 Milan ATGM launchers.

An artillery regiment includes a headquarters services battery and 4 fire batteries, a total of 24 self-propelled F-1 155-mm guns (6 guns in each battery) and also 1 air-defense platoon with portable SAM systems(12 sets).

An engineering regiment (about 850 men) has the following companies: a headquarters, services and support company, an engineer mechanized company and two armored engineer companies. Its inventory includes 16 VCG engineer vehicles, 4 PAA self-propelled mechanized bridges, 4 dozer tanks, 24 VAB APCs and other engineering equipment.

Each infantry division includes the following regiments: a headquarters support regiment, three motorized infantry regiments, an armored cavalry (reconnaissance) regiment and an engineer company. Its armament includes 24 155-mm towed guns, 18 120-mm and 24 81-mm mortars, 12 self-propelled HOT ATGM launchers, 96 Milan ATGM launchers, about 60 antiaircraft weapons, 36 AMX-10RC ARVs, 370 VAB APCs, as well as other weapons and combat equipment. The personnel strength of a division is about 7,000 men.

A motorized infantry regiment (1,300 men) includes six companies: a headquarters services company, four motorized infantry and a reconnaissance and support company. It has 6 120-mm and 8 81-mm mortars, 24 Milan ATGM launchers, about 70 VAB APCs, 12 120-mm antiaircraft guns and other equipment.

An armored cavalry (reconnaissance) regiment (about 800 men) is intended mainly for carrying out reconnaissance missions, but can also be used for destroying enemy airborne and amphibious assault landing forces and sabotage groups and for providing security of command posts, headquarters and lines of communications. Its armament includes 12 self-propelled HOT ATGMs, 24 Milan ATGM launchers, 4 20-mm antiaircraft guns, 36 AMX-10RC ARVs and about 50 VAB APCs. The regiment is made up of five squadrons: a headquarters services squadron three armored cavalry squadrons and one antitank squadron. A headquarters services squadron has APCs, communications equipment, motor vehicles and other equipment. There are 12 self-propelled HOT ATGM launchers in each armored cavalry squadron.

An artillery regiment (about 900 men) consists of a headquarters services battery and four fire batteries with six 155-mm towed guns each.

As French military press reports, there are six regiments (one headquarters support, three motorized infantry, one tank and one artillery) and an engineering company in an infantry training division. It has 53 AMX-30 (AMX-30B2) tanks, 24 155-mm towed guns, 42 mortars, 72 ATGM launchers, portable SAMs and 20-mm antiaircraft guns, IFVs, APCs and so forth.

The composition of the Rapid Action Force includes five divisions and headquarters and logistics units and subunits. After formation is completed, it will have over 45,000 men, up to 300 field artillery pieces and mortars, more than 500 ATGM launchers, roughly 200 armored reconnaissance vehicles, up to 300 various helicopters, other weapons and combat equipment.

The 9th Marine Infantry Division (about 8,500 men) has a headquarters and support regiment, two infantry regiments, a special-purpose airmobile group (a

headquarters services battalion and two infantry regiments), an armored cavalry (reconnaissance) regiment, an artillery regiment and also an engineering company. Its armament includes 24 155-mm towed guns, 24 120-mm and 32 81-mm mortars, 120 Milan ATGM launchers, more than 50 antiaircraft weapons, 36 ERC-90S ARVs and other weapons and combat equipment. The infantry and artillery regiments are generally organized similarly to those of infantry divisions. The armored cavalry (reconnaissance) regiment (650 men) has a headquarters services squadron and three armored cavalry squadrons (12 ARVs each).

The 11th Airborne Division (over 12,500 men), according to views of French military experts, will be used in modern combat both as a part of the Rapid Action Force and independently, including for reinforcement of army corps. The division consists of a headquarters and signal regiment, three parachute regiments, an airborne group (three parachute regiments), a reconnaissance regiment, an artillery regiment, an engineering regiment and an airmobile logistics base. Its armament includes 54 120-mm and 48 81-mm mortars, 180 Milan ATGM launchers, about 20 antiaircraft guns, ARVs and about 2,000 various vehicles.

The headquarters and signal regiment (about 1,000 men) includes six companies: a headquarters services company, a headquarters company and four signal companies. It has a variety of motor vehicles in its inventory.

The parachute regiment (more than 1,250 men) is the basic fighting unit of the division. It consists of a headquarters services company, four parachute companies (six platoons: headquarters services, reconnaissance and four parachute platoons; about 200 personnel, 2 81-mm mortars and 2 Milan ATGM launchers), a reconnaissance and support company (four platoons: headquarters services platoon, 120-mm mortar platoon, reconnaissance platoon and an anti-tank platoon; 16 Milan ATGM launchers). The regiment has 6 120-mm and 8 81-mm mortars, 24 Milan ATGM launchers, about 150 transports and so forth.

The airborne group (about 5,000 men) has a headquarters support battalion and three parachute regiments. The group is completely manned with cadre servicemen and individuals serving in the military under long-term contracts.

The reconnaissance regiment (about 750 men) has five squadrons: a headquarters services squadron, a guidance and search squadron, a reconnaissance squadron on jeeps with Milan ATGMs and two reconnaissance squadron on ARVs. It has 36 Milan ATGM launchers, more than 200 various transports and other armament.

The artillery regiment (about 700 men) includes a headquarters services battery and three fire batteries (each with six 120-mm mortars and six 20-mm antiaircraft guns).

The engineering regiment (roughly 700 men) consists of a headquarters services company, two engineering and water crossing equipment companies. Its inventory includes excavating, water crossing and other equipment.

The airmobile logistics base is designed for logistical support of the division's units and subunits. It has a headquarters services company, a

technical company and air supply company. It has a total of about 500 men and more than 120 motor vehicles.

The 27th Alpine Infantry Division (8,800 men) is made up of a headquarters support regiment, six alpine infantry battalions, an armored cavalry (reconnaissance) regiment, a mountain artillery regiment and an engineering company. Its armament includes 24 105-mm howitzers, 36 120-mm and 36 81-mm mortars, 108 Milan ATGM launchers, more than 50 armored vehicles and other combat equipment.

An alpine infantry battalion (about 900 men) includes a headquarters services company, a reconnaissance company, a support company (six 120-mm mortars and eight Milan ATGM launchers) and three alpine infantry companies (standard small arms, two 81-mm mortars and two Milan ATGM launchers). A battalion has 6 120-mm and 6 81-mm mortars, 14 Milan ATGM launchers, up to 130 motor vehicles and so forth.

The organization and armament of the armored cavalry (reconnaissance) regiment is basically the same as for an armored cavalry regiment of a Marine infantry division, and the organization of the mountain artillery regiment is similar to that of infantry division artillery regiments.

The 6th Armored Cavalry Division (more than 7,000 men) was formed in 1984 and is made up of seven regiments: a headquarters support regiment, two armored cavalry regiments, two motorized infantry regiments, an artillery regiment and an engineering regiment. As is emphasized in foreign press, this highly mobile formation is designed to reinforce army corps and also to conduct independent combat operations. The division's armament includes 24 155-mm F-1 self-propelled guns, 12 120-mm and 16 81-mm mortars, 24 HOT ATGM launchers on VAB APCs, 48 Milan ATGM launchers, more than 50 antiaircraft weapons, including more than 30 Mistral portable SAM systems, 200 Apilas RPGs, 72 AMX-10RC ARVs, about 350 VAB APCs and other weapons and combat equipment. The organization of its units and subunits is generally similar to that of like units included in an army corps (armored cavalry regiments) and infantry divisions (motorized infantry and artillery regiments).

The 4th Airmobile Division (about 7,000 men) includes five regiments: a headquarters support regiment, three army aviation regiments (60 helicopters in each, including 30 with ATGMs) and one infantry regiment (a headquarters services company and four infantry companies). Its armament includes 12 120-mm and 8 81-mm mortars, 48 ATGM launchers, more than 200 various helicopters (90 of which are antitank helicopters), portable SAM systems, 20-mm anti-aircraft guns and APCs (there are plans in the future to add one army aviation regiment and one infantry regiment). The division is envisioned to be used mainly for fire support of combined arms formations and for combatting enemy armored vehicles and helicopters.

It is noted in foreign military press that a number of subunits and units of the ground forces, numbering over 15,000 men, are deployed on overseas territories and in African countries: in Guiana (South America), the Antilles (Guadeloupe and Martinique), the island of Reunion, New Caledonia, French

Polynesia, Mayotte (Comoro Islands), in Djibouti, Senegal, Gabon, the Ivory Coast and the Central African Republic.

In the estimate of the French command, basic reorganization measures will be completed in 1985. Their purpose is to increase the combat capabilities of the ground forces by improving the configuration of formations and units and putting into service new weapon systems and combat equipment. In the opinion of Western experts, this will contribute to more effective completion of their combat missions under conditions of using both nuclear and conventional weapons.

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FOREIGN MILITARY AFFAIRS

SUBMARINE ELECTRONIC SUPPORT MEASURES EQUIPMENT DISCUSSED

Moscow ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE in Russian No 6, Jun 85 (signed to press 10 Jun 85) pp 71-75

[Article by Capt 2d Rank (Res) A. Chirkov: "Submarine Electronic Support Measures Equipment"]

[Text] The US and other countries of the aggressive NATO bloc, having undertaken a policy of preparing a new war, continue to build up the might of their armed forces. Side by side with improving weapons, they are devoting considerable attention to developing electronic warfare (EW) equipment and developing principles and methods of using it.

Submarines hold a special place among the numerous EW platforms. Owing to qualities inherent to them alone, above all secrecy, they are able to carry out the wide range of tasks levied on them with a high effectiveness. At the same time, as is emphasized in foreign press, the rapid introduction into the fleet of the latest achievements of science and technology in the area of search, detection and destruction of submarines has had a direct influence on increasing the combat capabilities of antisubmarine (ASW) forces and complicated the activities of submarines. In this connection, a question is most keenly raised concerning equipping them with modern means of detecting the enemy, which include EW equipment, including electronic support measures (ESM) equipment.

This article examines submarine ESM equipment of the navies of the US, Great Britain, France and Norway (Table 1).

US. The second-generation ESM stations in service on American submarines in the 1980s include the AN/WLR-8(V)5, AN/WLR-6 and the export Sea Sentry system.

The AN/WLR-8(V)5 developed in the early 1970s by GTE-Sylvania for Ohio-class nuclear ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) and Los Angeles-class nuclear submarines (SSNs). It is considered the most modern and is designed for intercepting and processing signals emitted from radars of enemy ASW ships and aircraft.

The AN/WLR-8(V)5 is a modular solid-state electronic complex. The station includes an antenna system, receiver, control unit, processors and displays.

The receiver consists of plug-in radio-frequency units which can be connected to various antennas, including omnidirectional ones. The operating frequency range of the station is determined by the number of these units.

It has automated signal reception, analysis, processing and display functions which can be performed in the entire frequency range as well as in individual sections of it. Two PSP-300 and PSP-200 program-compatible processors of increased reliability are used for controlling the station and processing the intelligence data. The first general-purpose processor (consisting of an arithmetic-logic unit, a multi-functional control unit and information input-output devices) ensures parallel operation of the station's different devices. The second monitors the operation of the station's functional and differs from the first only in certain characteristics (Table 2). It automatically determines the bearing to the emitter source of the signals, identifies them and analyzes the parameters (frequency, type of modulation, pulse width (PW) and amplitude (PA), antenna scanning rate, pulse repetition frequency (PRF) and others), according to which it assesses the signal environment and the degree of enemy threat for the submarine.

The memory contains up to 200 current radar signals which it uses to determine the types of radiation sources detected. The data processing results are represented on visual displays and printed out.

Table 1. Electronic Submarine Surveillance Equipment

Name or Designation	Frequency Range. GHz	Platforms	Manufacturer
United States			
AN/WLR 8 (V) 5	0.05-18	Ohio-class SSBNs	GTE-Sylvania
AN/WLR 8 (V) 2	" "	Los Angeles-class SSNs	GTE-Sylvania
AN/WLR 8 Sea Sentry	.	Los Angeles-class SSNs	GTE-Sylvania
	1-2	Nuclear submarines	Northampton
Great Britain			
RDL-4BCS	2.5-30	Submarines	Decca
...	1-18	Submarines, surface ships	MEL
France			
DR3012L	.	Submarines	Thomson-CSF
TMV	.	Submarines	Thomson-CSF
Norway			
VR-1 B	2.5-18	Submarines	Nera
NE10A	2.5-11	Submarines	Nera
VR30	2.5-18	Submarines	Nera

The station has four visual displays: the first displays direction-finding (DF) results; the second and third--information on threat to the submarine, parameters of intercepted signals and so forth; the fourth--results of their analysis.

Digital processing of signals has made it possible to increase the reliability of the data and to interface the AN/WLR-8(V)5 with weapons control systems, which, as foreign experts note, has considerably reduced the reaction time (down to milliseconds) with minimal operator participation.

The ESM station has automatic, semiautomatic and manual operating modes. In the automatic mode a sector search is conducted, and the intercepted signal's frequency, PRF and PW are determined.

According to foreign press reports, the U.S. Navy command has concluded a \$15.3 contract with GTE-Sylvania to deliver 19 stations having various makeups, including 5 for Ohio-class SSBNs and several for Los Angeles-class SSNs.

The AN/WLR-6 ESM station is installed on the Los Angeles-class submarine. It is able to intercept, record and analyze radar signals, as well as signals transmitted over radio and radio-relay communication lines.

The station includes an antenna group, intercept channel allocation unit, demodulator, signal recorder, as well as a receiver group, direction-finder, computer, displays and ancillary instruments and devices. Its equipment is arranged in 23 racks grouped according to function. Five operator positions located in the electronic surveillance and radio rooms are connected to the station. The Navy has received 49 of these stations, which are presently being replaced by the AN/WSQ-4 complex developed under the Sea Nymph program and having better capabilities for processing intercepted signals and a greater degree of automation. It uses new computer processing equipment and an interferometer for direction finding. The complex is supposed to be installed on 36 SSNs, 5 submarine tenders and at 2 Navy training centers.

The Sea Sentry-3 ESM system was developed by Northampton for export for SSNs equipped with Kollmorgen Model 76 periscopes. This automated system is able to detect, identify and determine the bearing to enemy ships, submarines and aircraft emitting signals. Its main components are: an antenna system with a receiver device, a 4-channel DF receiver, a control and information display console.

The antenna system includes a wide-band omnidirectional antenna (mounted in the attack periscope) and four DF loop antennas (located in the ESM mast). The receiver device is connected to the omnidirectional antenna, and the 4-channel DF receiver--to the DF antennas. The incoming signals are fed to the processor which computes the amplitude, pulse width, receipt time of the signals and the bearing to their emitters. The control and information display console switches on the system's controls, the data display screen, the audible signalling device and the malfunction indicator.

A target representing a threat to the submarine is displayed on the screen in alpha-numeric form: platform type (a missile is designated by an arrow, its class--by the direction of the arrow, an aircraft--by a letter). The bearing and distance to it is also indicated here. Upon detection of an active enemy missile-guidance radar, a flickering spot appears on the screen, and there is a constant tone in the operator's earphones.

The ESM system begins functioning when the submarine is at periscope depth with the attack periscope raised. According to Western press data, the Sea Sentry-3 system is interfaced with an automatic weapons control system and search radar, and its DF accuracy in the automatic mode is 10 percent.

Great Britain. British submarines use the RDL-4BCS (Decca) and "Susie" (MEL) ESM stations.

The RDL-4BCS (2-20 GHz) provides search and interception, automatic signal parameter measurement, enemy radar identification and DF, and also warns of the possible use of radar-guided weapons. The station, in the estimation of foreign military experts, is noted for its high speed of operation. It is built in modules and includes an antenna system, a receiving device and control, indicator and power units. Additionally it can use a digital signal analyzer (processor) and a memory.

The antenna system consists of 16 elements (arranged in two tiers around the mast) which are enclosed in airtight radomes. They are small and lightweight.

The digital analyzer is hooked up to the receiver and uses the processor to determine the parameter values (duration and repetition frequency) of radar pulses being emitted, which can be printed out.

The memory is able to store reference parameter values of up to 500 enemy radars.

Table 2. Comparative characteristics of AN/WLR-8(V)5 ESM station processors.

Characteristics	Processors	
	PSP 300	PSP 200
Word length	24	16
Memory, bytes	84 000	64 000
Instruction processing speed, microseconds	4	-
Number of priority levels	16	8

These stations are also installed in submarines of 18 other capitalist countries.

The Susie station (1-18GHz range) intercepts and processes radar signals. The station's equipment, operated by one operator, includes an antenna, receiver, processor and display and control console.

The station's antenna, including eight antenna groups arranged in a circle (each having three horns), provides circular scanning of space and a bearing estimate to the detected target.

The receiver (60 dBm), including radio-frequency amplifiers, measure the frequency almost instantaneously with an accuracy of plus or minus 5 MHz. Its operating range can be expanded to 40 GHz by adding equipment. There is a digital interface with interacting systems.

The processor identifies the types of radar illuminating the submarine according to the parameters of incoming signals and in 18 microseconds puts out information for display on the display unit, and also appropriately converts the data for further processing in the shipboard weapons control computer. The data is considered there in making the decision to use weapons or jammers, or in executing a maneuver to avoid contact with the enemy.

France. The submarines of this country's navy are equipped with the DR3012L and TMV433 ESM stations made by Thomson-CSF.

The DR3012L includes two antennas, a search receiver, an 'Arial' signal analyzer and identifier, and an automatic device signalling illumination by enemy radar.

One antenna, having a conical spiral shape, is located in the attack periscope. It makes it possible to receive signals while the submarine is at periscope depth and when moving at a speed of 4-5 knots. The second (DF) antenna is located on the ESM station mast and consists of six stationary airtight sections able to withstand water pressure of up to 60 kgf/cm². The antenna's diameter is 205 mm.

The receiver conducts an omnidirectional search of continuous and pulse radar signals; with its help, the pulse repetition period frequency is measured and the bearing to the emitter is determined.

The 'Arial' signal analyzer and identifier compares the radar signal received with the reference signals stored in the memory, determines the radar type and displays it on the panel, and also uses light and tone signals to warn the operator about illumination by enemy radar. The total weight of the DR3012L station is 166 kg.

The TMV433 ESM station is designed for detecting anti-shipping missiles. It was developed for torpedo boats, but can also be installed on submarines. In the latter case, the station is made up of the following units: an antenna system, a DR2000 receiver, a 'Arial' or 'Dahlia' signal analyzer and identifier, and a printer. The antenna system consists of one omnidirectional and six DF antennas.

The DR2000 wideband receiver provides search and intercept of pulse and continuous signals, azimuth determination, signal level and frequency range. A signal is selected taking into account its frequency range, level, bearing and pulse duration.

The 'Dahlia' and 'Arial' units automatically and with a high degree of accuracy analyze the received signals, compare them and output the results to the weapon system. The total weight of the station is about 140 kg.

According to foreign press reports, the TMV433 ESM station is series produced, supplied to the French Navy and exported to 25 countries, including NATO member countries.

Development of ESM equipment for submarines in the French Navy is proceeding along two directions: improvement of analysis equipment, making it possible to identify radar signals more accurately and correlate them to platforms and weapon systems; development of a plotting board assessing the tactical EW situation, taking into account enemy radio communications intercept data.

Norway. Submarines are equipped with the VR-1-B ESM station and the NE10A illumination warning search receiver developed by the firm Nera.

The VR-1-B ESM station has equipment for warning about illumination of the submarine by enemy radar and a limited amount of signal processing equipment. The operation of radar installed on the submarine does not affect it. The station makes it possible to measure PRF within 200 Hz-10 kHz and pulse duration within 0.15-10 ms. The accuracy of determining the bearing to the radar is within plus or minus 22.5 degrees.

The VR-1-B includes an antenna system, search receiver and signal display. The antenna system, in the form of an octagon, consists of individual horns. There is a crystal detector in each of them. The antenna is made of stainless steel and is attached to the top of the periscope mast. It withstands water pressure when the submarine is at a depth of up to 320 meters.

The receiver is constantly in the receiving mode. With its help it is possible to determine the band, PRF or pulse duration of radar operating beyond the horizon. There is also a mode for determining the most important signals. The receiver receives vertically or horizontally polarized signals.

The signal display equipment includes a cathode-ray tube (CRT) with dual sweep on the screen and a logarithmic time scale for panoramic frequency scanning and display of PRF and pulse duration. In addition to the visual equipment, the station also has audible signals for warning the operator about detection of enemy radar operation.

The NE10A search receiver for warning about radar illumination is of compact design, simple to operate and designed for surveillance of enemy radar in the foreground. It makes it possible to determine PRF from 1.0-10 kHz. The antenna system is 150 mm high, 200 mm in diameter and weighs 7-12 kg. The dimensions of the display unit are 200x150x100, and it weighs 1.7 kg.

Foreign press has reported on the development of new VR-30 series search receivers for submarines and surface ships. The supposedly provide 100-percent probability of intercepting and determining the PW, PRF and also bearing to the radar emitting signals.

The above-mentioned foreign press data on the state and prospects of development of submarine ESM equipment of capitalist countries indicates that it is an indispensable and important link in the onboard armament system of submarines and is called upon to ensure completion of the tasks set before it.

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12567

CSO: 1801/283

FOREIGN MILITARY AFFAIRS

BRIEFS

INDIA'S GEN BAYDYA VISITS LENINGRAD -- Chairman of the Chief of Staffs' Committee and Chief of Staff for the Army of the Republic of India General A. Sh. Baydyra visited Leningrad while on an official visit to the Soviet Union. He was met at Pulkovo Airport by Commander of the Order of Lenin Leningrad Military District Colonel General B. V. Snetkov and generals and officers from the district. The guest from India put flowers on the Monument to the Heroic Defenders of Leningrad and signed the memorial's book of distinguished visitors at Victory Square. General A. SH. Baydyra is being accompanied on his trip by First Deputy Commander-In-Chief of Ground Forces General of the Army A. M. Mayorov. [Text] [Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 11 Aug 85 p 3] 12511

CSO: 1801/302

AFGHANISTAN

CONDITIONS FOR SOVIET WITHDRAWAL REVIEWED

PM220911 Moscow NEW TIMES in English No 33, Aug 85 p 31

[Yevgeniy Kiselyev answer to reader's letter under the rubric "Taking up a Point"--first paragraph is reader's letter]

[Text] You say that Afghanistan is developing independently along its own path. But as I see it self-determination is not possible for the Afghan people when Soviet troops are present on their soil. For the USSR can use them as a lever of political pressure to channel Afghanistan's development in the direction best suited to itself. J. Baker, New York, U.S.A.

First of all let me remind you of the circumstances in which the limited contingent of Soviet troops was sent into the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. This is important, I believe, because the American press reveals a tendency to switch cause and effect and to contend that it was precisely the introduction of Soviet troops that generated the so-called "Afghan problem." But the undeclared war in Afghanistan began long before December 1979. It was only shortly after the democratic revolution of April 27, 1978, that counter-revolutionary groups started armed attacks against the new government. In this they relied first of all on American aid. By the end of 1979 foreign interference in Afghanistan's affairs assumed such dimensions that the country's independence was threatened.

The government asked the USSR for armed assistance. And it was only in response to this request that the USSR sent a limited contingent of troops to Afghanistan. The sending of military assistance to the DRA is based on clear-cut provisions in the Soviet-Afghan Treaty of 1978 and also--and I would like to draw your attention to this--accords with the United Nations Charter, in particular with Article 51 which recognizes the right of all states to collective self-defence. I must emphatically reject your thesis that the Soviet Union could use its troops as an instrument of political pressure on the Afghan people. We are opposed in principle to the imposition of a path of development on other peoples, including the Afghan people. As early as 1921 a memo to the Soviet Ambassador in Kabul, drawn up with Lenin's direct participation, said: "You must avoid in every way the fateful mistake of artificial attempts to implant communism in the country. We say to the

Afghan Government: You have one system, we have another. Not for a moment would we consider imposing on your people a programme of development that is alien to it."

It is your opinion that the presence of Soviet troops makes self-determination impossible for the Afghan people. For my part, however, I not only refuse to accept this but insist that our military contingent in the DRA is a guarantor of the Afghan people's self-determination. Judge for yourself: the success of the 1978 revolution in that country was a manifestation of the striving of the progressive section of Afghan society to embark on a path of extensive social and economic reforms. The Loja Jirga--the supreme council of elected representatives of the Afghan people--held last April in Kabul demonstrated that today it is just this road of development that has the support of the majority of the population. But without Soviet military assistance the reaction, supported by imperialism, could have stifled the revolution and prevented the Afghans from shaping their own way of life. It was once admitted by THE WASHINGTON POST that in the event of a victory by the counterrevolutionaries a theocratic dictatorship would reign in Afghanistan. But the presence of Soviet troops in that country makes impossible any such turn of events, which I think you will agree, would have nothing in common with the Afghan people's self-determination.

How are relations shaping up between Soviet soldiers and the local population? Let me share with you my impressions of the several years I spent working in Afghanistan. First of all I will quote from the "Memo to the Soviet Soldier-Internationalist," which is given to every soldier who comes to serve in Afghanistan. "You must respect the country, its people and its traditions, get to know and respect the history, culture and politics of Afghanistan. You must strictly observe the orders, laws, customs and mores of the Afghans and respect them." These rules are strictly observed by our soldiers and officers in their relations with the local people. When Soviet troops come to a region the situation there quickly returns to normal, banditry and terror cease and peaceful life starts again. Our soldiers share their food with those who need it, clear peasants' fields and roads of mines planted by counterrevolutionaries, and help rebuild what has been destroyed. I saw Soviet soldiers repair a mosque that had been burned down by the bandits.

Soviet soldiers do not interfere in the internal affairs of the Afghan people. But neither are they passive observers of its difficulties. Consider, for instance, the acute transport problems that arise in a mountainous country. Our troops help the republic in the transportation of goods needed for its national economy.

Of course, military service is military service. The contingent's main task is to help the republic repulse outside aggression. Naturally, there are losses, and the Soviet press writes frankly about them. But consider the circumstances in which Soviet soldiers have to shed their blood. Soldier Nikolay Prikhodko shielded a Kabul boy called Rustam with his own body when terrorists threw a grenade into a crowd. Prikhodko sustained multiple wounds and only miraculously survived. Lieutenant Glebov was badly wounded near

the Afghan town of Charikar when he drove a convoy of food for the local population over a mine field. In other words, in the course of fulfilling their internationalist duty our soldiers risk their lives rather than abandon the Afghan people in time of need.

And the final point, I anticipate your question: When will Soviet troops be withdrawn from the DRA? I must tell you at once that the USSR has on more than one occasion stated its readiness to take this step. But first the conditions that prompted the introduction of our troops must be eliminated and, above all, an end must be put to foreign armed intervention in Afghanistan's affairs. Reliable guarantees are also needed that this intervention will not be resumed after the withdrawal of our troops. And now I have a question for you: Is Washington's constant stepping-up of military and financial aid to the anti-Afghan forces conducive to the formulation of such guarantees and thus, to the withdrawal of the Soviet limited contingent?

CSO: 1812/340

AFGHANISTAN

ARTICLE DISCUSSES 'THREAT' TO SALANG PASS, ROAD

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 11, Jun 85 (signed to press 20 May 85) pp 85-89

[Article by Lt Col A. Nekrylov, special correspondent for the magazine KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL, under the rubric "On International Subjects": "The Pass"]

[Text] The Salang Pass lies north of the city of Kabul, squeezed between mountain peaks almost 5 kilometers high. It is the highest pass in the world. A road snakes its way up to the pass between solid rock, with mountains covered with eternal snow staring coldly and arrogantly down on it. This is the road of life. That is what it is now called in the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.

For many centuries the road, which links northern Afghanistan with the nation's capital by means of the pass, was impassable 9 months out of the year. The snow storms which frequently rage there even when the thermometer below shows 20-25°C above zero, blocked the road and became an insurmountable barrier to caravans.

A new phase in the Salang's centuries-old history began more than 20 years ago, when Afghan and Soviet specialists built a 100-kilometer route over which constant movement by motor vehicles was possible. A covered corridor with a combined length of 2,000 meters was built. A 2700-meter tunnel carved through the stone breadth of the Hindu Kush is an embellishment of the route and the pride of the builders.

The undeclared war being waged today by imperialist circles and reactionary forces against the people of Afghanistan has damaged the economy enormously. Many things have to be hauled in from abroad. In addition, the war has greatly reduced the traditional trade links. Almost everything needed now reaches the republic's interior from the north. Fuel, construction materials, equipment, food, clothing, medicine and grain--tens of thousands of tons of vitally important cargo, previously delivered over hundreds of routes, now has to be sent through the Salang.

The leaders of bandit formations, who have had special training abroad, understand the role of the pass very well. In Pakistan and Iran, several

dozens of various anti-Afghan groupings are being armed. They pass themselves off as political parties, although they are essentially a throng of adventurists and intriguants. Some of them have proclaimed the establishment of an "Islamic Republic" in Afghanistan to be their objective; others talk bombastically about "protecting Islam against the infidels," while yet others talk about returning the nation to feudal ways.

These groupings squabble, and there are frequent clashes among them, which reach the point of shooting matches and the planting of mines in one another's headquarters. Perhaps the only thing uniting them is their eagerness to obtain as much money as possible, money which is generously provided to them from abroad, and a desire to thwart the building of a new life in Afghanistan at any cost. The enemies of the Afghan revolution are making a considerable effort to cut off the vital artery through which the DRA receives supplies and food, thereby producing hunger and a resulting dissatisfaction with the new life.

One such group is headed by Ahmad-shah Masud, scion of a prominent feudal family, who is considered in the West to be a specialist in subversive warfare. And he does his best to please his masters. Using the weapons with which he is supplied in abundance from abroad, Ahmad-shah attempts to discredit the gains of the April Revolution in the eyes of the people by intimidating the population and disorganizing the management and economic functioning of the authorities. His bands were thoroughly battered in the Panjshir Valley last year. After that Ahmad-shah changed the operating tactics of his cutthroats and focused their main effort on putting the Salang Pass out of use.

On the way to the pass we stopped in the party committee of Parwan Province. First Secretary Osef Nabard, a man of 40 eloquently dressed in European clothing, greeted us cordially. Next to him stood a young man of average height in a suit of military cut. He smiled broadly, extended his hand and spoke to us in Russian:

"Hello, comrades. Welcome."

He embraced officers V. Menshikov and V. Rossokhin like old acquaintances.

"Have you lived a long time in the Soviet Union?" I asked.

"No, I haven't had that opportunity. I dream of visiting your country, however."

Turning to the first secretary of the party committee, he smiled and said:

"But Osef Nabard will not let me. He says that I will go nowhere until the province has been freed of the dushmani. I'm sorry, I haven't introduced myself: Sabir Sangar, chief of the defense department of Parwan Province. With respect to the Russian language, I have studied it since childhood. Many of us know the language of your people. Our friendship did not begin with the April Revolution, after all, but considerably earlier. In 1919...."

Many people here do indeed recall that in March of 1919 the young Soviet Russia was the first to recognize the independence of Afghanistan, which had been fighting the British colonizers for many years. V.I. Lenin laid the foundation of our friendship. In October of 1919 he met with Afghan Ambassador Extraordinary Muhammed Wali-khan. Vladimir Ilich said that he was very glad to see a representative of the friendly Afghan people in the Red capital of the workers' and peasants' government. The ambassador responded by saying that he was extending the hand of friendship and expressing his hope that Soviet Russia would help the peoples of the East to free themselves of the oppression of European imperialism....

I felt respect as I looked at Sangar, who limped as he left the room. It turned out that a wound recently received in a battle with the dushmani was making itself felt.

Officer V. Rossokhin noticed my glance. He sighed and said:

"It is a pity that you didn't know his brother, Senior Lieutenant Zakir Sangar. He was chief of staff of a (tsarandoy) battalion. He spoke Russian as well as his own native language. There were five brothers in all in the family, and all of them joined the revolution. Speaking of Zakir, I recall how he visited us on 7 November, bringing his mother, his sisters and sisters-in-law. He said he wanted to extend best wishes to the Soviet fightingmen on the anniversary of their revolution. They had spent 2 days specially preparing tasty dishes for the occasion. Imagine the kind of courage those women had to have, how they had to believe in the future of the April Revolution and in Soviet-Afghan friendship in order to undertake that! Only a few years before, such an act by Afghan women would have been simply inconceivable."

Rossokhin was silent for awhile and then added in a quiet voice:

"But Zakir is no longer with us. He was recently killed. He was patrolling a road with some soldiers when he spotted an anti-Soviet slogan on one of the buildings near the bazaar. He could have ordered the soldiers to tear it down. He climbed up to it himself, however. There was a mine there...."

There was the barely audible creaking of a floor board, and Sabir Sangar walked past us. As though continuing the interrupted conversation, he said:

"Our younger brother Nasir now serves in place of Zakir. He is only 23 years old, but he knows what he is doing."

Sangar dropped his head and fell to thinking. He then looked at us, his eyes sparkling with rage:

"The imperialists will get nowhere. Zakir defended the revolution and his people. For what purpose do the dushmani rob and kill? They have emptiness in front of them. In front of us is the future. And you, the Soviet people, are with us."

We began talking about the Salang. Osef Nabard, first secretary of the party committee, quoted a figure attesting that the bulk of all the freight entering the DRA travels through that high-mountain pass.

"If we imagine that Afghanistan is a man's body, then the Salang is his heart. And I say 'thank you' with all my heart to the Soviet soldier who is preventing that heart from coming to a stop." Outside, as we said goodbye, Osef Nabard took a careful look at our group:

"Be careful. The road to the Salang is a difficult one."

The armored personnel carriers climbed the winding road to the mountain. Suspiciously probing the overhanging cliffs on the right with the barrels of large-caliber machine guns. Small villages clung to rocky ledges at an inconceivable height over our 'eads, like swallow nests. Looking at the overhanging cliffs, one couldn't imagine that they might greet us with fire. One only had to look off to the left, from the side of the road down into a deep gulley, and everything immediately fell into place. The broken and burned hulls of various kinds of trucks lay there next to each other. The smell of burning seemed to be coming still from some of them.

"It is a favorite tactic of the dushmani to intercept a civilian column and attack it," officer V. Menshikov, political worker, explained. "Once they shelled a column containing more than 20 'tankers.' They struck with machine guns and mortars. Can you imagine what could have occurred here?"

The bandits had thoroughly calculated everything. They shelled the column in one of the covered passageways. They hoped that the exploding fuel would lift the reinforced concrete covering into the air and put the road out of use for a certain amount of time.

The dushmani might possibly have succeeded in carrying out their plan, if not for the bravery of the Soviet fightingmen who guard the pass together with an Afghan subunit. They were the first to rush to the rescue upon hearing the firing. The dushmani had foreseen this, however. They left a powerful ambush. As soon as our tractors appeared, the bandits would open fire with machine guns. What could be done? Being drawn into a shooting match would mean losing the valuable minutes available for averting an explosion. It would have been dangerous to attempt to fight their way through to the two burning tankers. The bandits' machine-gun fire was very dense.

"Cover us!" Warrant Officers A. Bubnov and A. Yakubovich said. They were the first to drive their tractors up to the column. Other vehicles followed them.

What were the Soviet fightingmen feeling during those hours, as they helped their Afghan comrades avert a great disaster under the fire of dushman machine guns? I saw that passageway, blackened by soot, the hulls of burned vehicles lying below, the bullet holes in the asphalt and concrete.... The

men who safeguard the functioning of the Salang stood their ground. They were victorious. They conquered fire under fire. The columns were held up only 4 hours. This was 4 hours of bravery on the part of Soviet fightingmen. Warrant Officers A. Bubnov, A. Yakubovich and their comrades. Communists and Komsomol members.

The bandits have attempted to blow up the tunnel itself. They have resorted to all sorts of stratagems for achieving this. They filled vehicles traveling in the columns with explosives. They placed bombs with timing devices in sacks of food. They even tried to organize an attack on the tunnel and stockpiled an adequate quantity of explosives, almost 3.5 tons. Our soldiers and Afghan soldiers frustrated every attempt, however. The posts on the road perform their duty properly. It has to be that way. The dushmani are capable of anything.

Incidentally, those posts--both ours and those of the Afghans--are a constant irritation to the dushmani. They prevent the rebels from disrupting transport traffic and from robbing Afghan columns carrying freight for the civilian population. We have seen how the dushmani, whom people in the West are not averse to describing as "fighters for the faith," oh how they love to plunder.

Moving ahead somewhat, let me say that the first thing which caught our eye when we had made our way up to the pass was an enormous vehicle loaded down with sacks, standing near the tents housing the subunit of Soviet soldiers.

"Sugar," explained officer Ye. Chuguy. "We recently took it from the dushmani." He explained: "I rounded a turn in a patrolling armored personnel carrier and saw them plundering the vehicle and carrying the sacks of sugar into the mountains. They had apparently captured it quite recently, however, and had not had time to carry much away. They opened fire on us. We had to return the fire, of course. That was the only way we could regain the vehicle. We informed the Afghan authorities that they should come soon and pick up their cargo."

The officer was silent for awhile and then added:

"Hunger must have really gotten the best of the dushmani to give them the courage to plunder in the daytime. They usually do not operate that way, however. They will stop one or several loaded vehicles and remove the drivers into the mountains, and then watch from ambush and wait for darkness. If an Afghan patrol or one of ours spots such vehicles during the day and opens fire, they set fire to the cargo and depart.

This is what the dushmani are taught by their imperialist bosses. In a nation with far from an abundance of food, the bandits barbarously destroy flour, rice and sugar which are awaited in the remote villages....

"They haven't learned counterrevolution from the books here," Yevgeniy Grigoryevich Chuguy said with a sigh. "The bosses of the dushmani reason

that the worse it is for the people, the better it will be for them. This is why they order the "fighters for the faith" to fire at their own people, why they order them to burn and kill. What does other people's sorrow mean to them? Other people's pain does not bother them"!

No, something else worries them. They are terribly angered by the fact that the Afghan people have cast off the chains of the Middle Ages and chosen a different path, a different life. This is why the "zealots" for freedom and democracy in the West, under the guise of pharisaical slogans about "freedom" and the "independence of the Afghans," are now openly supplying the rebels with weapons and ammunition and fanning the flames of fratricidal war in the nation. Every sensible person in Afghanistan today, however, understands very well that the subversive operations against democratic Afghanistan will not achieve their ultimate goal, no matter whose territory they are carried out from and no matter whose money is used for the purpose.

The armored personnel carriers had only reached the control posts. They had travelled that far uneventfully, so to speak. They had stopped only twice en route. Local peasants had stopped them and treated them to soft drinks. Loop after loop of the serpentine road lay between them and the pass. Officer Menshikov jumped down from the armored personnel carrier, however, and gestured with his hand toward a "uazik" ahead of them. "That's it. The guard can be released. It is no longer dangerous."

Villages which we would now be passing stood above the road ahead. Exactly the same kind of villages which lay behind us, except that machine-gunners prepared for any event had their eyes constantly trained on them. Menshikov caught my glance:

"The dushmani come here extremely rarely, and only in large groups. Like that which attacked the column of "tankers." Otherwise, they are afraid. The local residents do not look upon them with favor. The people here already understand what is going on, who is the true friend of the Afghans and who is their enemy."

Yes, they now understand. In the beginning, however.... It was very difficult for officer Menshikov, the political worker, and the other Soviet officers and soldiers performing their difficult duty on the Salang Pass to thaw the ice of alienation of the Afghan peasants living in nearby villages, to dispel their suspiciousness and distrust of our fightingmen. After all, the dushmani had threatened them, had resorted to refined lies mixed with hatred.

Vasiliy Pavlovich Menshikov has a great deal of experience in the service and in propaganda work. He has two VUZ's behind him, a higher military command school and a military institute. Here in the DRA, and specifically on the Salang, there is a special school in which the situation tests the political worker every day and every hour. Could one forget this Salang school? Communist Menshikov himself obtained his assignment to Afghanistan. Where, if not here, in the extremely complex situation in which not only revolution, but counterrevolution as well, are engaged in a battle for the

minds and hearts of people, can a propagandist test himself? Vasiliiy Pavlovich loves his work, and fatigue is apparently unknown to him. He successfully combines the commander's resoluteness and the ability to assume responsibility with the talent of a political fighter--extensive erudition, a knowledge of local conditions and the ability to talk with people and get them to like him.

Upon arriving at the pass, Menshikov assembled the elders of nearby villages to have a talk with them. They had just entered a house and taken their seats, when a shell exploded, and then another.... Menshikov understood at once that the dushmani were bracketing them. He looked at the elders, and they looked at him with interest. They were wondering whether the Soviet officer would run. Calmly, as though there had been no shelling, however, Menshikov began talking about the April Revolution, about the fact that the limited contingent of Soviet forces in Afghanistan was there at the request of the DRA's legal government. He told them how important it was for the Salang Pass to be constantly open to transport and that this would require the joint efforts of Afghan fightingmen, local residents and Soviet soldiers.

Vasiliiy Pavlovich ended his talk, but the elders did not even move. They dropped their eyes to the floor. Their faces were wooden and indifferent. It was as though he had said nothing. Then one of them, as though pondering the situation, stated in a low voice:

"We have heard of the revolution. But why are the Russians here? What's the matter? Don't you have enough mountains? Don't you have land?"

It was clear that a different approach had to be taken for strengthening relations with the local population. The dushmani had already done their work there, putting now malicious slander, now direct threats into play. So why not let them continue to rule the hearts of the peasants? Why not let them continue to slander the Soviet soldier? No, Menshikov decided. Although the political worker was swamped with work in the subunits, this could not be permitted.

A special group, something like an agitation detachment, was formed of fightingmen with the best political training. They stocked up on literature on the April Revolution. The peasants themselves were illiterate, but a translator could read and explain things to them. And then there were Uzbeks and Tajiks among the soldiers, who could communicate with the Afghans. They brought food and medicine with them. There was a doctor, Captain Yu. Malakhov.

Menshikov headed the agitation group. They arrived at a village. It was empty. They walked along one small street and then another.... They saw an old man coming directly toward them. He said that the dushmani had taken all of the people away, that they were on the mountain over there. If our men did not leave, he said, they would open fire on the village. What should they do? Return the fire? This would have been playing right into the hands of the bandits, however. They would no doubt place the peaceful residents in the line of fire. Their fanatical tactics are well known.

Suddenly our officers heard a low voice saying: "Suravi, Suravi." This meant Soviet. They turned around. A boy of around 10 was rushing toward them, stumbling. He was carrying a smaller boy around 4 years old. He came up to them and said, crying:

"I know that the dushmani will kill me for coming to you. But save my brother. He is sick. Save him!"

Malakhov examined the little boy and gave him some medicine. He gave the older boy a small box of powder and explained how it was to be taken. He smiled at the boy reassuringly and said: "Don't worry, little one, the dushmani won't touch either you or your brother. We're by your side...."

A thin and emaciated Afghan around 40 years old then showed up. He carried a little boy about 6 years old with terrible burns on his body. "Save my son. I know that the Suravi are good." Malakhov examined the boy and started thinking. There would be a better chance of saving the boy at a hospital. He didn't have the necessary medicine there. And the Afghan was looking at him with such hope in his eyes!

Malakhov told Menshikov that they would have to go for medicine immediately. It would be very risky to try getting through on a "uazik." Not just for himself. He simply might not be able to complete what people were expecting from him. There was no other way, however.

"Not a single shot was fired at the vehicle," Vasiliy Pavlovich said, smiling. "And why not? The residents of surrounding villages, it turned out, knew where the Soviet officer was rushing to. They do, after all, have a 'wireless' telegraph which operates constantly in the mountains. On the most dangerous section of the trip, there where the dushmani frequently set up their ambushes, the residents formed a wall along the road as protection against bandit bullets."

Just as good seed produces healthily sprouts, the noble deeds and acts of the Soviet fightingmen serving at the pass have opened the eyes of the Afghan peasant to the nature of the April Revolution and to the selflessness of the fraternal Soviet assistance. The ice of alienation gradually melted, and smiles appeared with increasing frequency on the faces of the Afghans when they met our soldiers. And then an incident occurred, which became a sort of turning point, if I may call it that, in the minds of the peasants. It was a turning point in the sense that it graphically and convincingly demonstrated to the peasants that the Soviet soldier had come there, to Afghan country, not to acquire other people's land but to help the common toiling people.

The dushmani set up an ambush on one section of the road leading to the pass. And when a column carrying supplies for the population and accompanying Soviet armored vehicles appeared, the dushmani opened fire with large-caliber machine guns. Once again, the bandits had made thorough calculations. They hoped to create a blockage on the road. What is more important, they wanted to undermine the seeds of trust in the Soviet fightingmen which had

already taken root in the minds of the Afghan peasants. What they did was to set up the ambush in the area of two villages. Should our fightingmen return the fire, the peaceful residents would inevitably suffer.

Officer Ye. Chuguy made the only proper decision in that difficult situation. They would not fire. He ordered them to outflank the ambush. The Soviet fightingmen crawled to the bandit ambush over the rocks, under constant fire from the rebels, clenching their teeth until they hurt. Later, when everything was over and the Soviet soldiers appeared in the village, the peasants left their shelters and stared at them in silence. Our translator began explaining what had occurred and why there had been firing, in order to put the people at ease.

A gray-headed, stooped old man moved to the front. Chuguy recognized him. It was the elder Momodul, one of the most respected people in the district.

"We know that the bandits set up an ambush. They want to destroy the pass. Then we too will have nothing to eat. The Soviet soldiers were protecting the road. They could have fired at the bandits, and they should have fired. But they did not, because their bullets could accidentally have struck our women and children. We trust you, Soviet fightingmen, and we thank you with all our heart."

The old man lowered his gray head and then straightened up, his eyes sparkling with rage:

"And the dushmani will not come to our village any more."

The news passed from village to village with the speed of a bird that the Soviet fightingmen were risking their lives to protect the pass and the peaceful citizens from the bandits. The people knew that this was the truth. After that, the villages were not empty when our soldiers and officers arrived. The eyes were not lowered, and the faces of the elders did not freeze in a state of stony indifference when the conversation turned to the revolution and to our common cause. A mixture of Russian and Dari would be heard. The person who risks his life to save a strange child has to have a good heart. They therefore accept other people's suffering as their own.

Are such young Russians as Privates Yu. Polyanskiy, I. Vasiliyev, Ye. Dobroskok and S. Kerleyev, who worked 18 hours a day alongside Afghan workers Abdul Rashid, Gul Abib and Emomudin in the extreme cold and the biting wind during that blizzard-filled winter, capable of contemplating anything bad? After all, every vehicle had almost to be dragged to the pass with tractors. The people in the villages also knew about this.

This is how what we call mutual understanding came about. Two Afghan peasants once showed up at the pass. They said that they had been sent by village residents to warn the Soviet fightingmen that the dushmani had planted three powerful land mines on the road. They could point out the sites. Another time the elders of two villages came to the pass to confer with the commander. They reported that a large number of unknown people had shown up in their villages. They sat around in the tea houses, whispering about

something. "They are bad people, Comrade Chief. They might do something to damage the pass. That would be bad for us and bad for the revolution."

The peasants were not mistaken. It was in fact a large band prepared to attack the Salang Pass.

...It was now nighttime. It was dark, and one could not see anything two steps away. Suddenly there was a bright shaft of light, and the sound of an engine was heard. An armored personnel carrier passed by us on its way to inspect the tunnel and the most troublesome sections of the road. A column would pass through in the morning, and the Salang Pass had to be completely ready.

We silently followed the vehicle with our eyes. We could just make it out from the red orbes of the side lights. Now the armored personnel carrier had disappeared around a turn. An uneasy silence settled over the pass once again.

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FIGHTING NEAR KABUL REPORTED

PM221303 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 19 Aug 85 Morning Edition p 5

[Own correspondent G. Ustinov dispatch under the rubric "19 August Is the Day of Afghan Independence": "The Commander's Name Is (Firuza)"; first two paragraphs are editorial introduction]

[Text] The Afghan people are celebrating their festival--the day of the restoration of independence. The historic victory over the colonialists was won 66 years ago.

Soviet Russia was the first country to recognize Afghanistan's independence. Soviet-Afghan friendship has strengthened considerably since the April 1978 revolution and the proclamation of the DRA. The people of Afghanistan are fully determined to travel the path of revolutionary transformations, repulsing aggressive actions from without.

Kabul--The battle had been brief. The attempt by a small group of dushman to penetrate Kabul, avoiding the main roads with their patrols, had failed. The bandits were making their way back to the mountains. They certainly were not expecting to encounter such a strongpost here. On the city's southwest outskirts, near the simple adobe huts surrounded by fields and truck gardens, as in a village. Shots rang out once again, and three people were left lying on the ground. It made no difference to two of them, but he--Ali-Khan, the gang leader.... Overcoming the pain, he cowered in a furrow and silently cursed his mates for abandoning an injured man. But perhaps he would be lucky, and not be found...?

"Throw the submachine gun away!"--he heard a firm voice behind his back.

Ali was amazed. A woman? And more and more, excited and out of breath, were running up from various directions. And all with weapons in their hands.

"Well?"--the woman shouted sternly.

He did not have a chance. He gave a crooked grin and threw the submachine gun at her feet.

When he was taken to the nearest sarandoi (militia) station, he forgot his injury and swore terribly: "If we had known that there were women in front of us, we would have fought quite differently. We would have chopped you up like cabbage...."

"Are you sure?"--(Firuza) said. Her face flushed, and her black hair with premature gray streaks peeped out from under her shawl. A disdainful smile lurked in her huge eyes: If this bandit had known that she had dozens of such skirmishes behind her and that he was by no means the first "living trophy" taken by her detachment.

Two days later a familiar sarandoi officer, who had long been patronizing their detachment, came to see (Firuza). "Congratulations, commander! This time it was a particularly weighty catch. Ali-Khan's group was taking booby trap mines into the city: 'Cigarette packets,' 'fountain pens,' 'cans....' And we have long been looking for the leader himself. He has been involved in several serious acts of terrorism. Thanks for the service! We have decided to recommend you for an award."

On the eve of 8 March Anahita Ratebzab, member of the PDPA Central Committee Politburo, presented (Firuza) with the medal "For Selflessness." Since then the commander has not removed it from her breast.

...Golkhaneh is an ordinary, poor settlement. For many years the landless peasants who had left for Kabul settled there of their own accord, building one clay hut up against another. Alongside each one there was a small garden, a meadow, a pasture, or field. A village, and that is all. (Firuza) also moved there at one time from Vardak Province. When she was 15, the girl married someone as poor as she was. He was 20 years older than she. But during his life he acquired just a simple adobe hut, where their family still lives, and a modest 3-(dzerib) plot of land (there are 5 (dzeribs) to the hectare). Even today they live on the harvest from that field.

Of course, there have been many changes in Golkhaneh. The settlement now has more solid houses. The people's power has built a hospital. There are dozens of stores and craft workshops, and a new school is being built--the dushman burned down the old one 4 years ago, and all this time the children have been studying far from home.

(Firuza) saw how the counterrevolution was committing outrages on the approaches to the city. How strangers armed to the teeth were brazenly roaming around their settlement, how traders ruined by extortion and "taxes" imposed by thieves were boarding up their stores. And when the dushman burned down the school where her sons were studying, she put this impassioned appeal to her friends and neighbors and all the residents of Bolkhaneh:

"We must take up arms! Is the revolution not our cause? Is it not we ourselves who must defend our homes, our families, and our land?"

The detachment of women defenders of the revolution has been operating in Golkaneh for more than 3 years, and for more than 3 years 25 courageous women have been safeguarding the peace and quiet of the settlement dwellers, carrying out patrol service day and night, joining in combat operations together with army units and militia subunits, participating in the liquidation of secret apartments belonging to the counterrevolutionary underground and in searches for weapons caches, and catching dushman messengers. The reader will ask: But what of the men? Indeed, more than 1,000 people live in the settlement.... I, too, put this question to (Firuza). "The men are busy people," she explained to me. "Many are in the army now, fighting against the dushmans in the front line. The rest are family breadwinners, at work all day, while our detachment includes housewives, students, senior-grade pupils.... Of course, if a serious fight is brewing on the approaches to Golkhaneh, everyone, even old people, will rush to help us. But when on routine duty we cope by ourselves."

"But what if a whole group of suspicious people turns up at once in Golkhaneh?" --I asked the commander.

"One of those on duty calls me," (Firuza) replied, "and I inform other girls. Yes, I forgot to tell you that the state has installed telephones for the majority of us. If necessary, I call the posts and the hospital, where we have our own small groups of defenders of the revolution among the men. When things appear serious, we report to the sarandoi. But we almost always cope by ourselves. There were about 12 people in that gang of Ali-Khan's. Not boys but experienced cutthroats. All the same, we drove them off.... The chief thing is to be on our guard the whole time. Therefore, in addition to patrol groups, we also have several lookouts at the most crucial points...."

(Firuza) is just over 40. She is the head not only among her girl friends but also in her large family. A special word about her family, for without this the tale of my heroine would be incomplete.

It is said that the family is seven "I's"....[a pun on the Russian word for family]. In the case in point this is amazingly accurate. (Firuza) was widowed early--12 years ago. She was left with six boys on her hands, their ages ranging between 1 year and 10 years. She raised them herself, and how! All have finished their studies, except the youngest, who still attends the sixth grade. Five are party members like their mother (incidentally, all the members of the detachment have joined the PDPA). The three oldest are serving in the army, defending the revolution on the most troubled fronts. (Zamankhan) is in Panjsher--"the den of 'five lions'"--and (Makhammed) is in Badakhshan Province, on the border with China. (Karim) is on the high Salang Pass, over which all vitally important freight for the country is brought to Kabul from the north....

(Firuza) has an open and happy nature. But one day people in the detachment noticed that she was not happy in her soul.... However much they badgered her, she would say nothing. But in recent days she has grown happy again. During a quiet moment on the night watch she informed the girls: "Two months

ago I received three letters from the front at once. And they all said the same thing. A grenade splinter had pierced (Zamankhan's) leg. (Makhammed's) tank had been blown up by a dushman mine. A burst from a submachine gun had gone through (Karim's) shoulder. I don't know how I survived that. But now all three write that they are recovering, and they promise to come home on leave...."

"Why didn't you say anything?"--the friends exclaimed.

"I was afraid I wouldn't hold out, that I would burst into tears and break down.... But I must not. For I am your commander!"

CSO: 1801/311

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MOSCOW TV COMMENTS ON BOMBING OF TOWN

LD251951 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1400 GMT 25 Aug 85

[From the "International Panorama" program presented by Aleksandr Bovin]

[Excerpts] At the beginning of this week the Afghan people marked the 66th anniversary of the restoration of independence to Afghanistan. The holiday, as we all understand, is being held in a complicated situation. The struggle against counterrevolutionaries continues, against detachments of bandits, armed and trained beyond the borders of Afghanistan. Trying to intimidate the population, the bandits stop at nothing; they kill innocent people, blow up schools, and burn down hospitals. Mikhail Leshchinskiy tells of a crime in the ancient town of Mazar-e Sharif:

The Muslims call this town in the north of Afghanistan the second Mecca. It happened one summer day right in the center of Mazar-e Sharif, next to the celebrated mosque. Here in this building was a private hotel. And in the evening, when the heat of the day died down and the guests returned to their rooms, an explosion thundered. That day in the hotel, there were ordinary peaceful people, many pilgrims, who come every day to this Islamic shrine.

This barbaric action shocked the townspeople not only by its fanatical cruelty but also by its calculated insult to the religious feelings of the believers. After all, in the torrent of lies and slander which Western propaganda uses in an attempt to discredit the essence of the revolutionary changes taking place in Afghanistan, claims of oppression of believers and insults to their religious feelings and the rooting out of Islam all occupy a leading position. However, the facts speak of the very opposite. Afghanistan's people's power and the People's Democratic Party have proclaimed as one of their fundamental principles respect for Islam and the religious feelings of believers. Many progressive religious figures have accepted the April Revolution and faithfully serve their people.

So who are they, these murderers? The security organs arrested the bandits a few hours after the explosion. (Mohammed Ikuk), a member of the band, speaks about the preparations for the crime and about its real organizers. He was a member of a band of the Islamic Society of Afghanistan. He carried out sabotage and distributed antigovernment leaflets. Then he was sent to Pakistan, where he underwent a training course under foreign instructors. They had

Muslim names, but they were Europeans. They taught various types of terrorist actions, and it was on the instructions of these instructors that an antitank mine, made in West Germany, was placed in the hotel.

The confessions of hired murderers coincide in many ways: in each one, foreign instructors figure, the training center is in Pakistan, the weapons are foreign.

It seems the whole town gathered on the day of the open trial of the bandits in this hall and at the entrance to it. These nine renegades were condemned by the people themselves. And on behalf of the mothers, fathers, widows, and orphans, the death sentence was passed on them.

CSO: 1801/305

of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. On the initiative of the Government means. The way to it is shown in the well-known proposals of the Government. There exist possibilities to remove tension around Afghanistan by peaceful

means. It does not need to be a pawn in somebody's game. However, Washington need of peaceful relations with its neighbors, of pursuing an independent policy. It is obvious that this policy pursued by Islamabad is detrimental to the national interests of Pakistan which is threatened by nobody. Pakistan is in

about 80 percent of the money spent by the CIA on "secret operations." The U.S. Defense Secretary Casper Weinberger publicly admitted that without camps and bases in Pakistan the anti-Afghan invasion would lose power. He said that the "value" of Pakistan for the U.S. consisted in the fact that it provided a possibility to stage actions against Afghanistan. It is not accidental that according to Washington Post the expenditures on the support for the counterrevolutionary forces in Afghanistan accounted in 1985 for

the main base for staging large-scale armed actions against the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, the newspaper writes.

The April Revolution in Afghanistan and the program of democratic transformation proc claimed by it triggered off the resistance of the internal re-actionary forces. However, the forces belonging to the past could hardly have hampered the advance of the new trends had it not been for the direct interference in the affairs of Afghanistan by the imperialist circles with the U.S. at the head.

[Text] Moscow, 27 Aug (TASS) -- For over seven years the Afghan people have been living in conditions of the continuing armed invasion staged by the imperialist and reactionary forces and have been waging a persistent struggle for the establishment of ZVESTITVA VIKHNIKI Matveev writes. The political observer of ZVESTITVA VIKHNIKI Matveev writes,

["IZVESTIYA on Pakistan-Afghan Relations" --TASS headline]

UD271813 Moscow TASS in English 1755 GMT 27 Aug 85

PAKISTANI ROLE IN DRAIGHTING DESCRIBED

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side the talks with Pakistan were started and have been going on for several years through the personal representative of the UN Secretary General D. Cordovez.

Washington not only closely follows the developments at the talks, but also participates in them behind the stage, trying to influence the stand of Pakistan furthering its selfish aims. The talks could have probably brought positive results. However, each time when the sides approached the working out of mutually acceptable agreements, Pakistan under the pressure of Washington either put forward new conditions or rejected what it had agreed to before.

Islamabad should come to realise that Pakistan does not gain anything from the aggravation of tension in that region. This conclusion is also prompted by commonsense logic.

CSO: 1812/334

TASS: CAPTURED DRA BANDITS REPORT ACTIVITIES

LD091805 Moscow TASS in English 1612 GMT 9 Aug 85

[Text] Kabul, 9 Aug (TASS)--TASS correspondent Vladimir Volkodav reports:

Safiullah Guriani, one of the bandits arrested in the Herat Province, spoke here about how the Western propaganda bodies manufacture false reports about the situation in Afghanistan. He said that two "advisers," an American and a German from the FRG, arrived in the positions of the gang after a raid by counter-revolutionaries on a village in Injil District. They were photographing and filming the results of the actions of the "protectors of Islam": Destroyed houses, cars damaged by blasts, heaps of bodies riddled with bullets. Later those sequences were used in the U.S.A. and in Western Europe to slander the actions of the Afghan authorities and of a limited contingent of Soviet forces in the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.

Faiz Mohammad, the ring-leader of the gang of which Guriani was a member testified at the trial in Kabul that raids were made only on unarmed population. His group that was regarded as a special unit of the subversive organisation "Jamiyat-i Islami" that found shelter on Pakistan's territory had a special assignment. The raiding of roads for the purpose of intimidating the population of nearby areas.

Other concrete assignments are implemented in Afghanistan's districts by gangs sent from abroad, gangs that are presented in the West as "victims of violence." One of the aspects of their criminal actions is terror against peasants who enter cooperatives and work on lands confiscated from feudals.

Thus, in the Marja Village in the south of the country, a gang from "Harak-i-Inquilab-i Islam" which also has the headquarters in Peshawar, Pakistan, burnt down warehouses of the district council of peasants' cooperatives and killed all people working nearby. In the Panjir Valley, counter-revolutionaries placed mines at peasants' fields and demanded that people of the villages should go to highlands so as to create the impression that they are "fleeing atrocities of government forces."

The entire crop was burnt down in Hilmand as a result of the raid on a state farm by bandits sent from abroad. Tractors that were meant to be distributed among land-tillers at easy prices were exploded. In order to disrupt field works in Kunduz Province, counter-revolutionaries blew up a bridge across the Kokchah River. In all the post-revolutionary years bandits raided more than 900 agricultural cooperatives.

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BRIEFS

SITUATION ON DRA-PAKISTAN BORDER--Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 12 August 1985 first edition carries on page 6 under the rubric "Afghan Notebook" and the headline "Troubled Border Area" a 1,500-word Kabul dispatch by own correspondent V. Baykov on the situation in the Afghan border village of Spin Buldak. According to the local Afghan commanding officer the local tribes "give great assistance to the people's power in the struggle against the counterrevolutionaries and in protecting the state border." Spin Buldak had been a flourishing trade center, but Baykov writes, "The Pakistani authorities have recently been creating obstacles to normal trade exchange. Tension is growing on the border itself. Previously the neighboring state was used by the forces of imperialism, which unleashed the undeclared war against Afghanistan, primarily as a place to train the counterrevolutionary gangs sent into Afghan territory and as a mouthpiece for hostile propaganda. Now Pakistan is increasingly often resorting to armed provocations itself. From its territory shells and bombs fly across the border onto peaceful Afghans." Baykov notes the success of customs officers in detaining Dushmans who try to cross into the DRA concealed in crates or wearing women's clothes and concludes by reporting a Dushman raid on a village in which a warehouse was destroyed. [Editorial Report]

TASS REPORTS HERAT, NANGARHAR REBELS ROUTED--Kabul, 15 Aug (TASS) --Another two gangs of counter-revolutionary bandits, who operated under the direct leadership of foreign subversive centres, have been routed in Herat and Nangarhar provinces by the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. According to a BAKHTAR agency report, large quantities of weapons, made in the West, ammunition and documents were taken away from the bandits. The documents and weapons are evidence of the links between the counter-revolutionaries and foreign secret services. [Text] [Moscow TASS in English 1122 GMT 15 Aug 85 LD]

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